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Abstract 
Clark and Wells (1995) argued that individuals with social phobia attend solely 
towards internal threat, whereas Beck, Emery and Greenberg (1985) and Rapee and 
Heimberg (1997) proposed that social phobics attend towards internal and external threat 
cues, during a social encounter. With this in mind, the aim was to investigate attentional 
processing in social anxiety and social phobia using the dot-probe task. Findings depend 
in part on which aspects of social anxiety are measured and used to select groups, 
therefore an exploration of the psychometric properties of the Fear of Negative 
Evaluation (FNE: Watson & Friend, 1969) and the Social Avoidance and Distress (SAD: 
Watson & Friend, 1969) scales was undertaken. 
Experiment one investigated conscious processing in high (n = 40) and low (n = 
40) socially anxious participants. The results showed that the high socially anxious 
attended towards negative evaluation words (non-evaluative condition) and somatic 
sensation words (social-evaluative condition), compared to the low socially anxious. 
Experiment two explored pre-attentive and conscious attentional processing. A 
pre-attentional bias towards physical threat words was evident in the high socially 
anxious (n = 41), compared to the low socially anxious participants (n = 41), under 
social-evaluative conditions. There were no more significant findings. 
Experiment three investigated conscious attentional processing in generalised 
social phobics (n = 16) and low anxious controls (n = 16). The results revealed that 
individuals with generalised social phobia attended towards the physical threat words, 
compared to the matched controls. 
Study four examined the psychometric characteristics of the FNE and SAD. The 
FNE comprised of a fear of negative evaluation factor and the SAD a social avoidance 
and distress and a fear of new situations and strangers factor. 
The findings overall showed that attentional biases in social anxiety and social 
phobia can be specific to certain aspects of threat and modified by changes in level and 
cause of state anxiety. 
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Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents a review of the cognitive approach to the' understanding of 
individual differences in emotionality. The main focus of this chapter is on the complex 
emotion of anxiety, however a consideration of the cognitive factors involved in 
depression is also included. The pre-dominance of the theories and research have been 
on these two emotions because they are some of the most prominent and pervasive 
emotions that the population experiences (e. g., Klerman, 1985; Lader & Marks, 1973; 
Rachman, 1998; Weissman, 1985). Furthermore, both depression and, anxiety can 
develop into clinical conditions, which challenges cognitive psychologists to ascertain the 
cause and the factors involved in the maintenance of these distress disorders. Thus, this 
chapter aims to provide a theoretical and empirical overview of the cognitive approach to 
the understanding of anxiety and depression, to `set the scene' for chapter two, which 
focuses on attentional processing in socially anxious and socially phobic individuals. The 
emphasis throughout this thesis is on attentional processing, thus this chapter begins with 
a brief section on some of the earlier models of selective attention that have arisen from 
mainstream cognitive psychology (see Eysenck & Keane, 1996 for a full explanation). 
Selective Attention 
There are a number of theoretical perspectives that have tried to explain selective 
attentional processing by proposing that there is a point at which the attended information 
is passed on for further processing and the non-attended message is filtered out. For 
example, Broadbent's filter model (1958) details that due to the brain's limited capacity, 
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there has to be a selective mechanism operating at a early stage of processing concerned 
with categorising the physical properties of the information and disregarding any 
unattended information. Treisman's (1964) attenuation theory on the other hand, posits 
that the early selective attention filter does not completely block out the unwanted 
messages, but merely attenuates them, allowing for more detailed but limited processing 
of this information. The pertinence model (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963) allows for the 
filtration process to occur much nearer the response stage of the information processing 
system, by suggesting that all incoming information is fully analysed from the start. 
Thus, challenging the aforementioned theories, by suggesting that the capacity of the 
selective processing is not limited, and that all messages are categorised and recognised 
with its importance weighted. Selective attentional responses occur at this late selection 
stage, following the determination of the incoming information's importance or 
relevance. 
Allport (1980) argues that such single channel models as detailed above, do not 
account for the complexities of selective attention. Eysenck and Keane (1996) also 
propose the role of divided attentional processes need to be accounted for by such 
theoretical perspectives. Indeed, Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) argue that there is a 
theoretical distinction between controlled and automatic attentional processing. 
According to these theorists, the automatic stage is fast, capacity-free and not available to 
consciousness, where as the controlled stage which has a limited capacity involving 
strategic attentional processes allowing for flexible responses. This theoretical distinction 
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is explored in this thesis in relation to pre-attentional processing reflecting the automatic 
stage when the individual is not explicitly aware of the of the content of the information 
and conscious processing the more controlled state of attentional processing when there is 
awareness of the incoming information. Also, these theories do not consider the role of 
emotions and the influence they have on the processing of information and the possibility 
that there are different selection points for the variety of situations and types of 
information that a person perceives. For example, in an anxious situation, a pre-attentive 
bias may reflect the rapid detection of potential threat followed be a more conscious 
processing of the information once detected to determine potential threat value (e. g., 
Eysenck, 1992). It is these issues that are explored throughout this thesis using the 
cognition and emotion approach. 
The Cognition and Emotion Perspective 
Teasdale and Barnard (1993) propose that the aim of the cognitive approach is to 
produce comprehensive theoretical conceptualisations, with testable hypotheses, to 
develop an understanding of the nature of affective cognitive processing. Mathews 
(1996) details that the cognitive perspective assumes that all emotions arise from some 
sort of cognitive evaluation of the event, but that this is often an automatic pre-attentive 
process. In this case, the individual is unaware that any cognitive processing whatsoever 
has taken place. In support, Lazarus (1982) argues that "cognitive appraisal underlies and 
is an integral feature of all emotional states" (p. 1021). Teasdale (1996) contests 
however, that it is equally possible for the cognition to be powerfully influenced by the 
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affective state and thus be a consequence of the emotion rather than the antecedent. 
Teasdale goes on to suggest that there is a reciprocal relationship between cognition and 
emotion and that the two are strongly intertwined. In a related vein, Mathews (1996) 
surmises that it is now generally agreed that there is a circular relationship between 
affective responses and cognitive appraisal and processing. 
In consideration of anxiety and depression, Dalgleish and Watts (1990) surmise 
that theoretical perspectives and experimental paradigms acquired from cognitive 
psychology provide a valuable insight into the understanding of the cognitive factors 
relating to these disorders. In support, Eysenck (2004) concludes that it has become 
increasingly obvious that much can be learned about individual differences in anxiety and 
depression by considering such cognitive biases. Taken together, the justification for 
exploring the key cognitive information processing factors that underlie affective 
responses in an individual becomes clear. 
Cognitive psychology takes advantage of the power of experimental methodology 
to investigate the cognitive processes associated with emotional responses. This 
approach proposes that idiosyncratic differences in the processing of emotional 
information may be a causal factor in the development or maintenance of emotional 
disorders (e. g., Beck, 1976; Eysenck, 1992; Williams Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 
1988). The basic assumption is that dysfunctional information processing biases in 
anxious and depressed populations are thought to influence attending to, remembering 
and interpreting threat-relevant information. These biases cause the anxious or depressed 
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person to preferentially process threat information and this plays a causal role in the 
maintenance of the emotional disorder. 
The cognitive approach yielded two influential theories, namely Beck's Schemata 
Theory (e. g., Beck, 1967; 1976; Beck & Clark, 1988) and Bower's Network Theory (e. g. 
Bower, 1981; 1987; Bower & Cohen, 1982; Gilligan & Bower, 1984). Beck's theory 
originated from clinical observations, whereas Bower's notion was based on cognitive 
experiments. Beck, Emery and Greenberg's (1985) cognitive perspective is explained in 
full in chapter two in relation to social anxiety and social phobia. However, since Beck's 
work, together with Bower's work, has been of fundamental importance in generating 
extensive research and further theoretical conceptualisations, a brief explanation of both 
theoretical perspectives is provided here. 
Beck's Cognitive Perspective 
Taken directly from his clinical work and used as a basis for cognitive therapy 
(e. g., Beck, 1995), Beck's theory proposes that emotional disorders arise from different 
dysfunctional schemas, such as those associated with loss or failure in depression (Beck, 
1967), or potential threat or danger in anxiety (Beck, 1976). Beck and Clark (1988) 
define schemas as "functional structures of relatively enduring representations of prior 
knowledge and experience" (p. 24). The theory suggests that once these schemas are 
activated by a stressful life event, they influence the processing of information, shape the 
interpretation of experience, and affect the behavioural responses of the individual. The 
content of the schema is considered to be specific to the disorder. Thus, in anxiety, the 
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over-estimation of potential threat, and the believed inability to cope with anxious 
situations, reflects the activation of underlying danger schemas. In depression, the key 
schemas relate to negative views of the self, the world and the future. These schemas 
guide information processing biases and consequently maintain negative beliefs, 
assumptions and thought processes, and therefore the person's current emotional 
experience. Beck predicts that these biases are evident in both the attentional processing 
and the retrieval of material. The only difference between the emotions being the type of 
information processed is specific to the disorder. 
Beck's schema theory has been of enormous heuristic value in developing 
effective psychological treatments, such as cognitive therapy (e. g. Beck, 1995). Teasdale 
and Barnard (1993) also praise this theory for generating a considerable body of research. 
However, it has been criticised because the theoretical construct of schema is 
hypothetical, ill defined and as Eysenck (1992) argues, little more than a belief. In 
agreement, Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews (1997) posit that the theory lacks a 
clear definition of a schema to ensure precise predictions. Similarly, Eysenck (1992) 
proposes that the evidence for dysfunctional schemas lying dominant within one's 
cognitive system is no more than conjecture, with little supporting behavioural evidence. 
In an attempt to address this issue, Hedlund and Rude (1995) provide evidence for the 
presence of maladaptive negative schemas in individuals who have recovered from major 
depression. Their study found that formerly depressed individuals still displayed a 
negative bias using information processing tasks that was similar to currently depressed 
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individuals. However, Eysenck (1997) feels that the possibility of dysfunctional schemas 
being constantly active, or indeed present at all still requires further testing. 
Bower's Network Theory 
The primary concern of the network theory (e. g. Bower, 1981; 1987; Bower & 
Cohen, 1982; Gilligan & Bower, 1984) is the relationship between mood and memory. 
Fundamentally, this theory proposes that the long-term memory is a semantically 
associated network, consisting of units or nodes. The main stipulation is that each 
distinct emotion represents a specific node within the memory. There are also numerous 
connections to associated ideas, to the physiological system, and to muscular and 
expressive patterns. An affective node reaches the critical level of activation in an 
individual when they cognitively process threatening information from the self or the 
environment. This results in the activation spreading in a selective manner to other 
related nodes, creating a novel pathway. Subsequently, a person's mood state at 
encoding, biases the formation of connections in a mood-congruent fashion and ensures 
associative strengthening and elaborations. 
Although it is basically a theory of memory, it has important implications for 
other aspects of cognitive functioning. Specifically, a similar pattern of mood- 
congruency effects can be applied to anxious and depressed mood states. Bower (1981) 
suggests that the activation of an emotional node (e. g. threat; sadness) leads to further 
triggering of anxiety or depression related nodes (e. g. danger, despair). For example, an 
anxious mood will cause an increase in the activation of distress and anxiety relevant 
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material. The network model suggests that anxious and depressed individuals process 
information related to their mood more quickly, due to the activation of these related 
nodes. Bower states that emotions enhance the salience of mood-congruent material for 
selective attentional and memory processing. He predicts that an individual would 
actively attend to material and recall information that is consistent with their current 
mood. 
Eysenck (1992) and Williams et at. (1997) conclude that the network theory has 
provided an excellent basis for research on mood and cognition. Nevertheless, these 
authors -argue that the supposition that all knowledge, cognitions and emotions are a 
single uniform format in a person's memory is a limitation of the theory. They propose 
that there are many domains of knowledge that require much larger units of organisation 
than suggested by Bower. In support, Power and Champion (1986) suggest that 
emotions, knowledge and cognitive concepts are more than just nodes in a semantic 
network, thus requiring a more detailed explanation of their organisation. Also, Eysenck 
(1992) puts forward that cognitions tend to possess an all-or-nothing quality and often 
rapidly change between cognitions, whereas emotions are diffuse, difficult to clarify and 
typically change relatively slowly over time, indicating that activation remains constant 
for some time. Overall, Johnson-Laird, Herrmann and Chaffin (1984) argue that the 
network theory is a general framework for speaking about the mood-memory phenomena, 
rather than a comprehensive account of cognitive processing. 
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Predictions from Beck's and Bower's Theories 
Both Beck's and Bower's models ascertain that emotion-specific biases are active 
throughout the various stages of information processing within all emotional disorders. 
Hence, they predict that these biases should be evident in both attentional and memorial 
processing. Investigators examining biases in information processing have concentrated 
mainly on the functioning of attention and memory in depression and anxiety. However, 
the results from such research have revealed equivocal findings. The next section 
reviews such empirical evidence relating to the nature of memory and attentional 
processing in anxious and depressed individuals. A brief overview of the anxiety and 
depression literature on memory biases and attentional processing in depression is 
presented, but for a more detailed review see Williams et al. (1997). The emphasis of the 
next section is attentional research and anxiety, as this area forms the main focus of this 
thesis. 
The Memory and Depression Literature 
There is extensive support for Beck's and Bower's prediction of a depression- 
related memory retrieval bias of mood-congruent information (e. g., MacLeod & 
Mathews, 1991; Mineka & Nugent, 1995). In the autobiographical memory literature, 
individuals with depression are constantly associated with negative recall bias (e. g., 
Goddard, Dritschel & Burton, 1996; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993; Williams & Dritschel, 
1988). Additionally, studies including word lists that contain emotionally valenced items 
followed by an unexpected memory test, show a significant negative recall effect in 
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depressed individuals (e. g., Blaney, 1986; Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Hedlund & Rude, 
1995; Teasdale & Dent, 1987). In a meta-analysis, Matt, Vacquez and Campbell (1992) 
report that depressed individuals persistently show a negative recall bias, especially if it is 
self-referencing. Consistent with this suggestion, Denny and Hunt (1992) found that 
depressed participants demonstrate a retrieval advantage for negative stimuli, when the 
method of encoding is personally relevant. 
The Memory and Anxiety Literature 
In contrast to the depression research, there is less supporting evidence for the 
prediction of an anxiety-related memory bias in anxious individuals. For example, 
studies exploring explicit memory biases using free-recall tasks in patients with 
generalised anxiety disorder have found no evidence of a threat-related bias (e. g., 
Mathews, Mogg, May & Eysenck, 1989; Becker, Roth, Andrich & Margraf, 1999). 
Indeed, Mogg, Mathews and Weinman's (1987) results suggest that patients with 
generalised anxiety disorder appear to actively avoid elaborate processing of threat, as 
demonstrated by a memory bias for non-threat material. Conversely, evidence of an 
explicit memory bias for anxiety-related words in high trait anxious populations has been 
reported (Nugent & Mineka, 1994; Reidy & Richards, 1997a, 1997b). Although in a 
recent study, Reidy (2004) found that low-trait anxious participants recalled more non- 
worry related words than worry-related words. The high trait anxious on the other hand, 
did not demonstrate a preference for the recall of either category of word groups. In 
addition to the explicit memory studies, research focusing on anxious populations with 
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implicit memory tasks has also been inconsistent. For example, Richards and French 
(1991) tested high and low trait anxious participants using a word stem completion task 
and found trait anxiety effects on implicit memory processing. Conversely, studies have 
reported findings indicating a lack of implicit memory processing in trait anxious people 
(e. g. Bradley, Mogg & Williams, 1994; Dalgleish, 1994; Harrison & Turpin, 2003; 
Reidy, 1994). On reviewing the literature on implicit memory processing, Russo, Fox 
and Bowles (1999) conclude that there is no substantive evidence to support an anxiety- 
related bias. Taken together, evidence of implicit and/or explicit memory biases in 
anxious populations is inconsistent. 
The Attention and Depression Literature 
Research yields inconsistent support for Beck's and Bower's hypothesis of an 
attentional bias towards negative information in depression. MacLeod, Mathews and 
Tata (1986) found that depressed participants behaved in a similar way to normal 
controls, by directing their attention away from negative words. Indeed, MacLeod, 
Ebsworthy and Rutherford (1998) posited that any automatic attentional bias in people 
with depression is due to the influence of anxiety. In support, several visual attention 
studies reported that selective attention towards threatening information correlated with 
measures of anxiety, rather than depression (e. g., Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, 
Mathews & Weinman, 1989). However, more recent depression studies (e. g., Mathews, 
Ridgeway & Williamson, 1996; Mogg, Bradley, Williams & Mathews, 1993) provide 
evidence for negative selective attentional processing, but only at the conscious level. To 
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conclude, contrary to the predictions, there does not appear to be a pre-attentional 
orientation towards negative information associated with depression. Although, a 
conscious attentional processing of threatening stimuli has been suggested to be 
characteristic of depression. 
The Attention and Anxiety Literature (Part One) 
There is substantial evidence consistent with the hypothesis that high trait or 
clinically anxious people attend to anxiety related information. As attentional processing 
forms the basis of this thesis, a full explanation of the two most popular experimental 
paradigms are presented during this review of the anxiety research. 
The first paradigm extensively used in cognitive-experi mental research is a 
modified version of the Stroop task (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). In the original version 
of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1938), participants are requested to name the colour of the ink 
in which the words are printed and to ignore the content of the word. The time the person 
takes to name the colour is the key variable of interest. Essentially, long response 
latencies indicate interference of the word content in the processing of the colour of the 
words. In the modified version, the Stroop task involves the presentation of threatening 
words (e. g., physical or social threat), together with control neutral words. It is assumed 
that the attention of individuals experiencing high levels of anxiety would be more 
focused on the threatening words. This results in anxious participants taking longer to 
name the colour of the threat word, compared to those low in anxiety. It is suggested that 
this increased colour naming latency (interference effect) for threatening words indicates 
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an attentional bias towards threat. It is important to note that the threat word is generally 
specific to the disorder (i. e., panic related words with panic disorder and social threat 
words with social phobia). In computerised versions of the modified Stroop task, the role 
of pre-attentive biases can also be explored. The computer briefly presents the stimuli 
(e. g., 14 ms) and then masks the visual presentation with a non-word (e. g., xxxxx or 
bctfw). 
Research employing the Stroop task with high trait anxious under normal (e. g., 
Richards & Millwood, 1989; Wikström, Lundh & Westerlund, 2003) or high state anxiety 
(Egloff & Hock, 2001; Mogg, Mathews, Bird & MacGregor-Morris, 1990) conditions, 
demonstrate a preferential attentional processing bias to threatening information, in 
comparison to the low trait anxious. This selective attention to threat cues has also been 
shown at a pre-attentive level in trait anxious individuals under normal (van Honk, 
Tuiten, van den but, Putman, de Haan & Stam, 2001) and stressful (MacLeod & Hagan, 
1992; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992) experimental conditions. Additionally, individuals 
experiencing generalised anxiety disorder also demonstrate a selective preference for 
threatening stimuli at a conscious (e. g., Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, Kentish & 
Bradley, 1993) and pre-attentional (e. g., Mogg, Bradley, Millar & White, 1995; Mogg et 
al., 1993) level of processing. Interestingly, Bradley, Mogg, Millar and White (1995) 
investigated the effects of co-morbid depression on the nature of attentional processing in 
patients with generalised anxiety disorder. They found that compared to non-anxious 
controls, generalised anxiety disorder patients without depression - showed longer 
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response latencies to threat words relative to neutral words. Generalised anxiety patients 
with concurrent depression however, did not differ from the non-patient control group. 
These findings indicate that the co-occurrence of depression may obscure the attentional 
bias normally associated with anxiety and provide further support for the lack of a 
depression-related attentional bias. 
Overall, the results from studies using the Stroop task provide substantial support 
for the prediction of an attentional bias towards threatening stimuli in anxious 
populations. However, it is important to note that the Stroop has been considered an 
impure measure of attentional bias. In particular, MacLeod (1991b) points out that the 
increase in response latencies that is used as a marker of selective attention in modified 
Stroop studies, could arise from post-attention elaboration. In support, Mogg and Bradley 
(1998) propose that the interference effect with colour naming words occurs at the 
response selection stage (post-attentional), rather than during the pre-attentional 
processing stage. Furthermore, Asmundson and Stein (1994) suggest that the possibility 
of mood-congruent response biases also confound the proposal that the Stroop is a 
measure of visual attention. Overall, Williams et al. (1997) conclude from their review 
that the mechanisms leading to delays in colour naming have not been systematically 
investigated. Therefore, specific conclusions on the nature of attentional processing in 
research that has used this task must be considered in view of these criticisms. 
MacLeod and colleagues (1986) devised the visual dot-probe task to be a bias free 
response (pressing a computer key) to a neutral stimulus (e. g., a probe). In a typical 
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version of the dot-probe task, a series of word pairs are briefly presented for 500 ms on a 
computer screen. On critical trials one word from the pair is threatening (i. e., social or 
physical), while the 'other word is neutral and often matched for word length and 
frequency. Immediately following these trials, a small dot appears in the location of one 
of the words. Participants are instructed to press a button (usually the space bar) as soon 
as they see the dot. The dot detection latency is recorded and shorter times signify 
greater vigilance towards the word immediately preceding the probe. Essentially, the 
participant is quicker to respond to the dot-probe that is presented in the attended, rather 
than the unattended region of visual display. Attentional research also uses a target 
detection categorisation task within the dot-probe paradigm. The key difference being 
that participants are requested to determine between one of two possible targets following 
the presentation of the word pair. This can include whether two dots are vertically (: ) or 
horizontally (.. ) aligned, or whether an `E' or `F' is being presented in place of one of the 
words. As before, the stimuli can appear in either location of the word pair. However, 
unlike the traditional dot-detection task in which a number of filler trials are necessary, 
this method allows for all the trials to be used. Similar to the computerised version of the 
modified Stroop task, pre-attentive biases are investigated by presenting the word pairs 
for a shorter period of time followed by masking. 
MacLeod et al. (1986) were the first to demonstrate that generally anxious 
patients orient towards the location of threat, using the visual dot-probe task. Mogg, 
Mathews and Eysenck (1992) replicated MacLeod et al. 's findings, and also reported that 
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recovered generalised anxiety disorder patients and control participants showed similar 
interference effects. Thus, indicating that once the current anxiety has been reduced 
through therapeutic intervention, preferential attentional processing of threat diminishes. 
Evidence of a pre-conscious attentional bias favouring threatening words, in individuals 
with generalised anxiety disorder has also been documented (e. g., Mogg, Bradley & 
Williams, 1995). 
Analogue studies have reported that high trait anxious individuals, under state 
anxious conditions, preferentially attend to threat, in comparison to low anxious 
participants (e. g. Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg & 
Marsden, 1990; Mogg, Bradley & Hallowell, 1994). Additionally, evidence of an 
attentional bias toward threat in high trait anxiety participants, without evoking levels of 
state anxiety, has been found across a range of stimulus presentation times (100ms, 
500ms & 1500ms) by Mogg, Bradley, de Bono and Painter (1997), and at a pre-conscious 
(e. g. l4ms) level of processing by Bradley, Mogg and Lee (1997) and Luecken, Tartaro 
and Appelhans (2004). 
Evaluation of Beck's and Bower's Predictions 
The aforementioned research has shown that different emotions may be 
characterised by quite different patterns of cognitive biases, rather than the more general 
effects as predicted by Beck and Bower. For example, there is substantial evidence for a 
memory bias in depression and an attentional bias in anxiety. However, support for a 
depression-related attentional bias has been equivocal and mainly attributed to the 
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influence of anxiety. Furthermore, an anxiety-related memory bias has not been clearly 
demonstrated in the research. Findings such as these, led Williams and colleagues (1988, 
1997) to suggest that there are several limitations to the models of Beck and Bower. 
They propose that there is a need to recognise the dissociation between anxious and 
depressed populations in attentional and memory processing, and to distinguish between 
different levels of cognitive processing. The research has indicated that it is possible to 
process information both with and without awareness, the latter obviously preceding 
conscious attentional encoding. Thus, Williams et al. propose that it is important for 
theories to make a distinction between conscious and non-conscious aspects of cognition. 
The Integrative Model by Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews (1988) 
In view of the aforementioned criticisms, Williams et al. (1988) devised an 
integrative model to provide a more detailed account of the different processing biases 
associated with anxiety and depression. The model proposes that both attentional and 
memorial processing incorporate both an automatic and a strategic element. Given these 
different elements of processing, it was possible that emotion-related biases may exist in 
one form of processing, and not another, and that different emotions could differentially 
affect various stages of processing. Hence, Williams and his colleagues successfully 
reformulated the cognitive perspective, discarding the view that similar processing is 
involved in all emotions and focusing upon different information processes for different 
emotions. 
The model's primary theoretical categorisation is the concept of priming and 
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elaboration, originally proposed by Graf and Mandler (1984). In essence, priming is an 
automatic process, which is quick, capacity-free and occurs pre-consciously. In this case, 
the processing of a stimulus -word generates the spontaneous activation of numerous 
components of the internal representation. In contrast, elaboration is described as a 
strategic form of processing which serves to link the representation with other associated 
representations, thus making the stimulus more retrievable. This process is required to 
put stimuli in context using previously established representations (Graf & Mandler, 
1984). The Williams et al. (1988) model assumes that anxiety and depressive disorders 
could be attributed to such differential processing of information. Essentially, selective 
attention towards threatening information is an automatic process prevalent within 
anxiety. Whereas, biases in the mood congruent recall of past events, such as 
autobiographical or explicit memory tasks are elaborative processes and a characteristic 
of depression. The theory also predicts that measures of implicit memory bias reflect the 
pre-attention components and therefore underlie memorial biases demonstrated in 
anxiety. Figure 1.1. depicts the Williams et al. information-processing model for anxiety 
and depression. 
In consideration of information processing in anxious people, the theory suggests 
that information is initially assessed for relevance or valence by the `affective decision 
mechanism' (ADM). This assessment is then passed onto the `resource allocation 
mechanism' (RAM), which operates in different directions depending upon this 
judgement. Resources can either be directed towards the stimulus or away from it. 
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Increased allocation of resources succeeds in prioritising the stimulus, thereby facilitating 
priming at a later stage, regardless of whether any deeper elaborative processing has 
taken place. Depression is associated with the information that is obtained during the 
pre-attentive priming stage being transferred to another ADM, which assesses the 
affective valence of the stimulus. Once again, resources are allocated depending upon the 
outcome of this assessment. Resources can be directed into further analysis regarding the 
meaning of the stimulus (elaboration), or redirected so that elaborative links with the 
stimulus are reduced (cognitive avoidance). Any elaborations of the stimulus are linked 
with it, hence the stimulus can be recalled or recognised following the activation of any 
one of these links. Williams et al. also propose that differential processing towards or 
away from affective stimuli would become more apparent as state anxiety levels increase. 
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Figure 1.1. Williams et al. (1988) Integrative Model representing how state and trait 
mood (e. g., (a) anxiety, (b) depression) may affect resource allocation at 
priming and elaboration stages (Williams et al., 1997, p. 281) 
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Unlike the theories of Beck and Bower, this model accounts for different patterns of 
processing biases in anxiety and depression. For example, the model proposes that state 
and trait factors have differential effects on the attentional and memory systems of an 
individual. State anxiety (or transient mood in depression) affects the ADM system, by 
increasing the likelihood of the ADM to decide that a stimulus is threatening. 
Essentially, it has the effect of making the system more sensitive to threat. As for trait 
factors, these tend to influence the workings of the RAM. In that, high trait anxiety leads 
to attentional resources being directed towards stimuli that the ADM classes as 
threatening, whereas low trait anxiety leads to resources being directed away. With 
depression, the trait effects tend to be located in the elaborative processing resource 
allocation component, and the effects are similar to the trait anxiety on attentional 
processing. As far as the development of anxiety and depressive disorders are concerned, 
Williams et al. argue that individuals high in trait anxiety or depression are more 
vulnerable than those wither lower trait levels of these emotions, to develop a clinical 
disorder. This is primarily due to such biases in cognitive processing being evident in 
those with higher trait levels of anxiety and depression. 
On reviewing this model, Eysenck (1997) concludes that is an impressive attempt 
to provide a comprehensive account of the role of cognitive processes, trait and clinical 
anxiety, together with depression. Indeed, the distinction between priming and 
elaboration gives it a substantial theoretical advantage over the aforementioned notions 
that predict emotionally congruent biases throughout the cognitive system (e. g., Beck, 
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1976; Bower, 1981). However, Eysenck (1997) also argues that this theory ignores the 
relationship between the functioning of the cognitive, behavioural and physiological 
systems. Furthermore, there is evidence that anxiety influences elaborative processing too 
(e. g., Breck & Smith, 1983; Claeys, 1989; Mayo, 1989; Young & Martin, 1981). In 
support, Mathews (1993) argues that a combination of automatic and elaborative 
processes are involved in most emotions. For example, the initial tendency for sad 
individuals to make conscious negative judgements about themselves may become 
automated through practice, as the depression becomes more chronic (e. g. Anderson, 
Speilman & Bargh, 1992; Bargh & Tota, 1988). Equally, after the initial automatic 
perceptual identification of threatening cues, anxious individuals may then intentionally 
avoid further conscious processing in order to minimise the threat (e. g. Mogg et al., 
1987). 
Further Theoretical Perspectives 
So far, this chapter has described the earlier theories of Beck and Bower that 
predict cognitive biases operate throughout the cognitive system in both anxiety and 
depression. A review of the research has shown that anxiety is mainly associated with 
selective attentional biases and depression with memorial biases. The Williams et al. 
(1988) model was then presented, as it accounted for a great deal of the inconsistencies 
highlighted in the research. The aim of the next section is to concentrate solely on 
theories that attempt to explain dysfunctional information processing in anxiety. The 
emphasis will be on attentional processing in anxious populations, because as Eysenck 
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(1992) and many others (e. g., Mathews, 1993; Öhman, 1996) propose, the major function 
of anxiety is attending to the rapid detection of threat. Subsequently, if the threat is to be 
detected as quickly as possible then the attentional system needs to be responsive to 
possible indicators of such threat. Thus, it is assumed that a combination of pre-attentive 
and attentional processes makes an anxious person more susceptible to threat-related 
information than low anxious individuals. 
MacLeod's (1991) Theory 
MacLeod (1991a) suggests a more general view of the relationship between 
cognitive processing and anxiety. He proposes that clinical forms of anxiety and trait 
anxiety are associated with different patterns of cognitive processing and not similar 
patterns as proposed by the Williams et al. (1988) model. He maintains that the research 
shows that high trait anxious individuals differ from low trait anxious individuals in the 
processing of threat-related information, only when pre-conscious levels of processing 
are being explored. In support, a study performed by MacLeod and Rutherford (1992) 
using the Stroop task, found that high trait anxious participants demonstrated an 
attentional bias towards general threat words under examination stress, but only when the 
stimuli were presented pre-attentively. When the stimuli were presented at a conscious 
level of processing, the high trait anxious participants showed a similar pattern of 
processing to the low trait anxious, displaying an attentional bias away from threat. In 
contrast, MacLeod and Mathews (1991) found that when clinically anxious participants 
performed the Stroop task, they showed a bias towards the threat words at both pre- 
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attentional and conscious processing levels, compared to low anxious controls. This 
provides evidence to support MacLeod (1991), as he argues that clinical anxiety 
influences both the pre-attentive and conscious level of processing threat. High trait 
anxious individuals on the other hand, are consciously able to control attentional 
processing of threat related information and direct attentional resources away from it. 
Overall, MacLeod suggests that it is the lack of ability to consciously modify the 
attentional focus to threat in clinically anxious patients that may account for the severity 
of anxiety symptoms found in such populations. 
The main problem with this approach is that it offers no explanation as to why 
clinically anxious individuals are not able to compensate for their automatic bias towards 
threat using conscious processing. Also, as far as memory processing is concerned, 
MacLeod suggests that one would expect a memory bias for threatening information to be 
associated with clinical anxiety. However, the evidence suggests either the opposite, 
which is cognitive avoidance of threat (e. g., Foa & Kozak, 1986), or no bias at all (e. g., 
Mogg & Mathews, 1990; Mogg et al., 1987; Mogg, Gardiner, Starron & Golombok, 
1992). 
Eysenck's (1992) Hypervigilance Theory 
Another conceptualisation influenced by the aforementioned theories and the 
empirical research on information biases described earlier, is Eysenck's (1992) cognitive 
theory on the multi-dimensional nature of trait anxiety. This theory argues that the 
primary attentional concern in people with high levels of anxiety is the detection of threat 
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in the environment. This theory stems from the evolutionary perspective (e. g., Oatley & 
Johnson-Laird, 1987), with the assumption that the most important function of anxiety is 
to facilitate the early detection of impeding danger, possibly being essential to survival. 
Similar to the integrative theory (Williams et al. 1988), he assumes that individuals high 
and low in trait anxiety differ in terms of their pre-attentional and attentional cognitive 
functioning of threat detection. 
Eysenck's (1992) theory suggests that high trait anxiety is associated with a high 
rate of environmental scanning for threat-related information. He proposes that such 
increased attentional scanning of the environment could be both general and specific in 
nature. For example, whilst high trait anxious individuals exhibit increased 
environmental scanning and attend to irrelevant stimuli (known as distractibility), they 
also selectively process threat-related information. Once the threat is detected and 
processed, the high trait anxious individual narrows their attentional focus to the 
threatening information that is most related to their current concerns. This theory 
postulates that this process of hypervigilance gives rise to cognitive biases, such as 
selective attentional bias and negative memory biases for socially and physically 
threatening information. 
Overall, Eysenck postulates that hypervigilance is the crucial factor that causes 
cognitive biases in attentional processing. He suggests that the highly anxious selectively 
attend toward threatening material, whereas those low in anxiety avoid such information. 
Hypervigilance is especially obvious in high trait anxious individuals during stressful 
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conditions when state anxiety is high. He argues that hypervigilance for threat, together 
with biases in one's cognitive appraisal and the interplay of a major life stressor, are 
cognitive vulnerability factors pre-disposing high trait anxious individuals to develop a 
clinical anxiety disorder, such as generalised anxiety disorder. 
In consideration of the review of attention and anxiety literature presented earlier 
in this chapter, Eysenck's theoretical notion has reasonable evidence to support the major 
assumption that individual differences in the functioning of the cognitive system, aid in 
the understanding of how high and low trait anxious individuals differ (e. g., Mathews et 
al., 1986; Mogg et al., 1990). However, it concentrates solely on the emotional cognitive 
appraisal of a situation, de-emphasising the importance of one's own perception of 
physiological activity. For example, Clark (1986) has detailed the importance of the 
cognitive appraisal of one's heightened bodily arousal in the maintenance of panic 
disorder. Furthermore, external sources of information such as negative evaluation from 
others are considered to be a key factor in anxiety disorders such as social phobia (e. g. 
Clark & Wells, 1995). Finally, as Eysenck himself recognises in 1997, this theory also 
lacks the detailed consideration of the functioning of the cognitive system, which is 
crucial in the quest for a satisfactory theoretical account. 
The Attention and Anxiety Literature (Part Two) 
The next section presents recent research that highlights further issues not fully 
addressed by the previous theoretical conceptualisations. These studies employ the visual 
dot-probe task using aversive pictures or angry faces (paired with a neutral picture or 
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face), rather than words, as stimuli. The same basic principal applies, in that high 
anxious participants should show attentional priority towards threatening pictures or 
faces. Indeed, Mogg and Bradley (1998) argue that pictures and faces represent a more 
natural, ecologically valid representation of real-life danger, than words. 
Bradley, Mogg, Millar, Bonham-Carter, Fergusson, Jenkins and Parr (1997) used 
pairings of emotional facial expressions (e. g. threatening, happy) with neutral faces and 
reported that individuals experiencing high levels of anxiety and depression attended 
towards the threat,, when compared to individuals experiencing low levels of these 
emotions. Further studies have also shown that high trait anxious individuals orient 
attention towards aversive facial expressions at conscious (Bradley, Mogg, Falla & 
Hamilton, 1998; Bradley, Mogg & Millar, 2000) and pre-attentive (e. g., Mogg & 
Bradley, 1999) levels. of processing. Furthermore, patients with generalised anxiety 
disorder, in comparison to low anxious controls, also show an attentional vigilance for 
threatening faces, relative to neutral faces (Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom & de Bono, 
1999). 
Additionally, studies have used affective pictures and found that high trait anxious 
participants show greater vigilance for mild or severely threatening scenes, in comparison 
to the neutral pictures (e. g., Mogg, Bradley, Miles & Dixon, 2004; Mogg, McNamara, 
Powys, Rawlinson, Seiffer & Bradley, 2000; Yiend & Mathews, 2001, study 1). The 
Yiend and Mathews study also found that low trait anxious individuals avoided mildly 
threatening scenes, but this avoidance was reduced as the threat value of the picture 
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increased. A similar finding has been reported by Wilson and MacLeod (2003), as they 
found that as the threat intensity of the angry face increased to its most severe, both high 
and low trait anxious participants attended towards this threat cue. These findings 
suggest that selective attention to severe threat is relevant for all individuals irrespective 
of their level of trait anxiety. 
Overall, visual dot-probe studies using aversive pictorial and facial cues 
demonstrate the same preferential attentional focus towards threat cues in anxiety-prone 
participants. Furthermore, this effect is notable without evoking high levels of state 
anxiety. Interestingly, there is also evidence that low trait anxious individuals selectively 
attend to more severe threatening stimuli, such as highly threatening scenes or faces, and 
this finding has not been considered by the previous theoretical notions. With this in 
mind, the next section of the review briefly presents two more recent models of selective 
processing in anxiety that attempt to directly address this issue. 
A Cognitive Model of Selective Processing in Anxiety by Mathews and 
Mackintosh (1998) 
Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) developed their theory in an attempt to address 
certain features that have arisen from the extensive experimental evidence into 
preferential attentional processing. They felt that the Williams et al. (1988) model did 
not explain the notion of competing attentional processing and the priority placed when 
this occurs. Furthermore, they felt that, the prediction that the low trait anxious will 
attend away from threatening information, does not make sense in the case of attending to 
a severe threat, as demonstrated in a recent dot-probe study using pictures (Yiend & 
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Mathews, 2001). Thus, Mathews and Mackintosh suggest that it is the current relevance 
of the threat cue to the individual, irrespective of their level of trait anxiety, that is the 
crucial factor in preferential attentional processing. 
Essentially, the model (see Figure 1.2. ) proposes that within the attentional 
system, certain characteristics of the stimuli (such as it threat value) are processed in 
competition with other information. The `threat evaluation system' (TES) determines the 
representations concerned with potential danger, and strengthens activation of threat- 
related attributes if the stimulus is deemed as highly threatening. The TES is a similar 
evaluation system to the `affective decision mechanism' (Williams et al. 1988). The 
increase in activation is strengthened by increases in the individual's current level of 
anxiety. The voluntary `effortful task demand' unit is a limited source, that can counter- 
influence the activation to the target representation, further reducing the possibility of 
distraction. Mathews and Mackintosh suggest the balance between these opposing 
systems determines the magnitude of any attentional processing biases. More 
specifically, attentional differences to threatening stimuli associated with anxiety arise 
due to variations in the threshold level. Anxiety-prone individuals have a relatively low 
threshold, which causes their attention to be captured by weak threat cues (such as 
threatening words). Low anxious individuals, on the other hand, have a higher threshold, 
resulting in them being less likely to focus on weak cues. It is important to note that 
more severe forms of threat will capture everyone's attention, irrespective of their level 
of trait anxiety. 
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Figure 1.2. A Cognitive Model of Selective Processing in Anxiety (Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998, p. 547) 
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A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis of Anxiety by Mogg and Bradley (1998) 
This cognitive-motivational view of anxiety, consistent with Mathews and 
Mackintosh (1998), argues that selective attention to threat is an evolutionary relevant 
mechanism. Basically, Mogg and Bradley (1998) propose that anxiety facilitates rapid 
response to potential threat, and' therefore interrupts ongoing behaviour. They propose 
two conceptually distinct functions (see Figure 1.3. ) are influential in the mediation of 
anxiety, namely the `valence evaluation system' (VES) and the `goal engagement system' 
(GES). This theory assumes that these two systems, the former related to emotion and 
the latter to motivation processes, underlie a person's behaviour. 
According to this theoretical perspective, various factors influence the VES. 
These include the individual's level of state anxiety, the situational context, as well as the 
nature of the stimulus and previous learning experiences. The role of the VES is to 
determine potential threat value of the incoming stimulus. This assessment process can 
be an automatic pre-conscious analysis of the incoming information. It can also include 
more detailed strategic processing involving the combination of contextual and memorial 
information. Consequently, the VES is a complex process comprising multiple levels of 
processing, both within and outside of the person's awareness. This model suggests that 
the VES is more responsive to negative stimuli in high trait anxious individuals. This 
means that mildly threatening stimuli (such as aversive words used in Stroop and visual 
dot-probe tasks) are tagged as having a comparatively high threat value. Individuals low 
in trait anxiety still assess the threat value of stimuli, but if relatively mild (such as 
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negative words), the VES tags it with a low threat value. 
The threat value of the stimuli is then passed onto the GES, which is responsible 
for the allocation of cognitive processing and subsequent behaviour. If the stimulus has a 
high threat value, this system automatically focuses on the threat and interrupts any 
ongoing activities. Conversely, if it is labelled with a low threat value, then the GES will 
ignore the stimulus and concentrate on current goals. The GES consists of many different 
cognitive and behavioural components, including pre-attentive and attentional focus, 
strategic avoidance and disengagement from current goals. 
Goal Engagement System 
Stimulus input 
Situational context 
State anxiety _10 
Prior learning _10 
Biological preparedness 
High Interrupt current goals (`danger' 
threat mode) 
Valence Orient to threat 
Evaluation 
System 
Pursue current goals (default 
Low `safety' mode) 
threat Prioritise positive stimuli 
Ignore minor negative stimuli 
Trait anxiety reflects reactivity of 
Valence Evaluation System to aversive stimuli 
Figure 1.3. A Cognitive-Motivational Model of the mechanisms underlying biases in 
initial orienting to threat in anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998, p. 817) 
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Mogg and Bradley argue that this cognitive-motivational perspective has several 
strengths. For example, it integrates research developments, evolutionary and biological 
perspectives, and traditional theories of selective attention. It also explains pre-awareness 
and conscious attentional processes, and the role they play in the determination of 
whether a stimulus is threatening, or not. Additionally, this model proposes that the 
subjective threat value of the stimulus is a vital factor as to whether or not it will capture 
the person's attention. Interestingly, Mogg and Bradley suggest that it is the bias in the 
operation of the VES, and not just attentional biasing per se, that is the key vulnerability 
factor in the development of an anxiety disorder. They surmise this as both high and low 
trait anxious people attend towards dangerous threat, but it is the higher threat value 
assigned to relatively mild threat that anxiety-prone individuals tend to do through the 
VES, that is the key vulnerability factor. The GES is then activated and attentional focus 
is thus towards the mild threat, ignoring any other current goals. 
The Enhanced Dwell-Time Hypothesis by Fox, Russo, Bowles & Dutton 
(2001) 
An alternative viewpoint to the suggestion made by previous research (e. g., Fox, 
1993; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg et at., 1994) and theories (e. g., Beck, 1976; 
Eysenck, 1992; Williams et at., 1998) that anxious populations are faster to detect threat 
is proposed by Elaine Fox and colleagues (Fox et at., 2001; Fox, Russo & Eititi, 2004; 
Mathews, Fox, Yiend & Calder, 2003). Essentially, they argue that once people with 
anxiety detect a threatening stimulus, they will process the information more deeply than 
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low anxious individuals, which results in them taking longer to disengage from threat- 
related stimuli. Fox et al. (2001) propose that this viewpoint originates from the notion 
that the attentional system is not a unitary concept and consists of three components. 
These are attentional shifting, engagement and disengagement (Posner & Petersen, 1990). 
Fox et al. (2001) tentatively hypothesise that the appearance of a new object in the 
environment automatically draws visual attentional processes to it. At this point, the 
meaning and the emotional content of the stimulus have no influence on the initial 
orienting of attention. Next, the object is prioritised in order to determine whether any 
further processing is required by the attentional system. It is at this stage that relevant 
stimuli are selected for further attentional processing. The increase in attentional dwell 
time for threatening stimuli allows for the identification and evaluation of the implied 
threat. Importantly, Fox and colleagues suggest that it is this mechanism that may be 
biased in anxious individuals. They term this inability to disengage from threatening 
stimuli the `enhanced dwell-time' hypothesis (Fox et al., 2001). They further argue that 
the inability to rapidly disengage from threat, focuses cognitive resources on the threat- 
stimuli, which has the consequence of maintaining and enhancing anxiety states. Thus, 
individuals who can rapidly disengage from threatening information may not experience 
increased anxiety states. 
Fox and colleagues propose that this is a key theoretical distinction that has not 
been directly investigated by the studies using Stroop and visual dot-probe tasks. They 
suggest that the problem with both of these traditional cognitive experimental tasks is that 
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they fail to determine whether the threatening stimuli automatically attracts attentional 
processing resources towards it, or whether following initial detection of threat, attention 
is held and not able to be rapidly disengaged from it (Fox et al., 2001). Basically, Fox et 
al. argue that slower colour-naming times in Stroop and quicker response latencies in dot- 
probe tasks with threatening information could represent a quicker detection of threat or 
an inability to disengage from the threat. 
Consequently, to investigate the exact mechanisms involved in attentional 
processing, a series of experiments have been conducted using visual search cueing 
paradigms (e. g., Posner, Inhoff, Friedrich & Cohen, 1987). This task typically includes 
the presentation of stimuli (threat, positive or neutral) in one of two locations (either left 
or right of a fixation point). Following this, a target (e. g., circle) is presented either in the 
location of the original stimuli (valid trial) or not (invalid trial). The participant is 
required to identify the target using relevant keys on the computer keyboard. The typical 
finding is that individuals are faster to detect the target on valid cues, whereas on invalid 
cues participants are slower to respond to the target. Fox et al (2001) state that this is 
generally termed as the `cue validity effect'. Using this paradigm, Fox and colleagues 
argue that if the stimulus is neutral (face or word) then there should be no difference 
between high and low anxious participants in detecting the target. If the stimulus is 
threatening and automatically draws the attention of anxious people, the highly anxious 
will be faster than low anxious persons to detect the target on valid cued trials (i. e. target 
appears in same location as the threat stimuli). Conversely, if anxious participants dwell 
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on the threat stimuli then they would be slower than control participants to respond to the 
cue on invalid trials (i. e. target appears in the opposite location from the threat stimuli). 
The latter finding would provide evidence for the hypothesis of enhanced attentional 
dwelling on the threatening cue being a characteristic of anxiety. 
In a series of studies, Fox et al. (2001) asked individuals with high and low levels 
of state anxiety to perform this cueing paradigm task. They found that the presence of 
threat related words (experiment 5), schematic angry faces (experiments 2& 3) and real- 
life angry faces (experiment 4) influences the disengagement component of visual 
attention in high state anxious individuals relative to low state anxious participants. 
There was no difference between the high and low state anxious groups on the valid 
trials, suggesting that there is indeed increased attentional dwell time, and that this is the 
crucial factor in attending to threat. Yiend and Mathews (2001, study 2) also reported 
that high trait anxious individuals were slower than low anxious controls, to respond to 
targets following invalid cued trials incorporating threatening pictures. Further evidence 
suggesting that anxiety may primarily affect the disengagement of attention rather than 
the initial detection has been reported (e. g., Fox et al., 2002; Fox et al., 2004; Mathews et 
al., 2003). 
In support of this view, Mathews (2004) surmises that it seems possible that 
failure to disengage attention from a threatening stimulus may be an influential factor in 
maintaining anxiety. Fox et al. (2001) put forward that the anxiety is being maintained 
by increasing awareness of potential dangers and the continued focus of cognitive 
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resources on the source of stress. Fox et al. (2004) further propose that the process of 
lack of disengagement from threatening cues may be associated with increased negative 
worry and rumination. Overall, effective attentional control may help to counter these 
adverse consequences, whereas a lack of attentional control and an increase in attentional 
dwell time may exacerbate them (e. g., Fox et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2004; Mathews, 2004). 
Overall, the attentional dwell time hypothesis adopts an alternative insight into . 
dysfunctional attentional processing in anxious populations. Thus offering an interesting 
new development in the field of the cognitive approach to the understanding of 
dysfunctional attentional processing in an anxious population. Currently, this view is in 
its early stages of development with more research required especially incorporating 
clinically anxious populations to ascertain if they also display this lack of ability to 
disengage from threat. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter describes the development of the cognitive perspective and the role it 
plays in the understanding of anxiety (and depression). It includes a review of some of 
the key research in the area and highlights some theoretical shortcomings in the 
predictions of Beck's Schemata Theory (e. g., Beck, 1967; 1976; Beck & Clark, 1988) 
and Bower's Network Theory (e. g. Bower, 1981; 1987; Bower & Cohen, 1982; Gilligan 
& Bower, 1984). More specifically, that anxiety did not appear to be associated with a 
memory bias and an attentional bias in depression was not apparent. Williams et al. 's 
(1988) theory was then explained, as it attempted to address such issues. Also, as the 
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focus of this thesis is on attentional bias in anxious populations, MacLeod's (1991) and 
Eysenck's (1992) theories were presented, as they provide alternative explanations of 
dysfunctional processing. A review of further attentional research using pictorial stimuli 
showed that fairly consistent biases occur during attentional processing in anxious 
populations. It also highlighted that low trait anxious will attend towards more severe 
threat. In view of this, two more recent theoretical perspectives were then described that 
concentrate not only on the level of anxiety, but also the affective valence of the stimulus, 
as being important factors in attentional processing. Finally, a promising new avenue of 
research was presented detailing that anxious people may not actually be faster to detect 
threat but have a failure to disengage from it at a later stage of attentional processing. 
0 
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Theoretical and Empirical Review: 
Social Anxiety and Social Phobia 
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Chapter Overview 
The theoretical approaches and empirical evidence presented so far have been 
highly influential in developing an understanding of the dysfunctional attentional 
processing in anxious populations. Rachman (1998) proposes that excessive anxiety is a 
central feature of many psychological disorders, such as panic disorder, obsessive- 
compulsive disorder and social phobia. Consequently, a further aim of the cognitive 
approach is to provide conceptualisations for guiding therapeutic intervention and for 
generating testable hypotheses that are specific to the anxiety disorder. The anxiety 
disorder of interest to this programme of work is social phobia, and its non-clinical form 
social anxiety. The focus of this chapter therefore, is to present and evaluate the 
theoretical approaches and experimental evidence pertaining directly to the nature of 
dysfunctional attentional processing in individuals with social anxiety and social phobia. 
Before this, social anxiety and social phobia are defined, together with an explanation of 
the relationship between them. 
Definition of Social Anxiety 
Lader (1998) states that "man is a social animal and inability to participate fully in 
social activities can be handicapping" (p. S33). Indeed, Lader also proposes that it is 
possible for every single person to be innately capable of feeling socially anxious in 
certain contexts. Furthermore, at any given time, for any individual, one's degree of 
social anxiety may range from being relatively low and feeling fearless, to debilitating 
levels and feeling extremely anxious. Stopa and Clark (2001) argue that is generally 
agreed that social anxiety is continuously distributed throughout the general population. 
Rachman (1998) suggests that the most commonly feared social encounters are fear of 
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public speaking, attendance at parties, and having a conversation with people in 
authority. Epidemiological studies (e. g., Kessler, Stein & Berglund, 1998; Stein, Walker 
& Forde, 1996) have established that feeling socially anxious during public speaking is 
the most common population concern. 
Creed and Funder (1998) detail that social anxiety can manifest in a variety of 
ways, by affecting a person directly in the form of physiological symptoms (such as 
sweating, blushing or trembling) and behaviour (such as avoiding a social situation), and 
indirectly through its influence on self-esteem. The hallmark of social anxiety is that 
people fear being evaluated unfavourably by others during a social interaction (e. g., Stein 
& Cavira, 1998; Watson & Friend, 1969). Furthermore, individuals with high levels of 
social anxiety are characterised by a desire to make good impressions on others, but also 
experience a paralysing fear that they are unable to do so. Consequently, the high 
socially anxious adopt a modest no-risk approach to social interaction, in order to reduce 
the possibility of embarrassing social blunders. Unfortunately, the result of this tactic is 
that others often perceive the socially anxious person as being disinterested or bored, 
causing them to withdraw their efforts to be sociable. Creed and Funder (1998) put 
forward that this action has the effect of confirming the fears of the socially anxious 
individual and reaffirms their lack of self-efficacy. Often, the high socially anxious 
person will deliberately avoid the social situation altogether, so that they do not 
experience any negative reactions both from the self and others (e. g., Rachman, 1998; 
Watson & Friend, 1969). It is when such psychological distress or discomfort and 
avoidance behaviour becomes extreme and impairs normal every day functioning that the 
clinical syndrome of social phobia can develop. 
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Definition of Social Phobia 
Heimberg, Stein, Hiripi and Kessler (2000) surmise that social phobia is a 
common disorder associated with serious social, educational and occupational 
impairment, considerable co-morbidity with other mental disorders and reduced life 
satisfaction. Social phobia was first described by Marks and Gelder (1969), but was only 
introduced into the psychiatric nomenclature in the third edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM: American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1980) and has since 
remained a part of the diagnosis lexicon. Individuals with social phobia fear being 
observed and critically evaluated by others, with the DSM-IV defining it as a "marked 
and persistent fear of one or more social or performance situations in which the person is 
exposed to unfamiliar people or to possible scrutiny by others " (APA, 1994, p. 411). 
Essentially, during a social interaction, persons with social phobia form negatively biased 
images and thoughts pertaining to their appearance (e. g., I'm blushing) and behaviour 
(e. g., everyone can see I am shaking). Such thoughts and images result in the individual 
with social phobia judging negative evaluation from others as being highly likely. 
Consequently, social phobics tend to engage in considerable avoidance behaviour, but 
inevitably certain social situations are unavoidable. In this case, the individual with 
social phobia experiences anticipatory anxiety by fearing the encounter, and situational 
anxiety during the social event (e. g., Clark & Wells, 1995). The current DSM-IV 































































































































































































































































































Chapter Two: Theoretical and Empirical Review 
Recent surveys calculate the lifetime prevalence of social phobia at about 7-14% 
in Western countries (e. g., Furmark, 2002; Kasper, 1998; Lecrubier, Wittchen, Farvelli, 
Bobes, Patel & Knapp, 2000). Magee, Eaton, Wittchen, McGonagle and Kessler (1996) 
have reported a slightly higher rate of social phobia in females than in males, with a ratio 
of 1.5 women to every male. Schneier and Johnson (1992) estimate that the mean age of 
onset is during late adolescence and early adulthood. However, as Bogels, van Oosten, 
Muris and Smulders, (2001) report, individuals with social phobia generally do not seek 
treatment until well into their adult years. Furthermore, it is also notable that in 
adulthood, social phobia rarely presents in its 'pure' form. Indeed, Katzelnick and 
Greist's (2001) research suggests that approximately 75% of patients with this disorder 
have at least one other psychiatric disorder, most commonly depression, but also other 
anxiety disorders and alcohol/substance abuse. Social phobia is not only the most 
common anxiety disorder, but also the 3`d most common psychiatric disorder after 
depression and alcohol/drug dependence (e. g., Kessler, Stang, Wittchen, Stein & Walters, 
1999). 
Social phobia consists of two distinct subtypes that differ in clinical 
characteristics and degree of associated social impairment (e. g., Stein & Chavira, 1998). 
The first subtype is called `specific' or `non-generalised' social phobia and is the most 
common of the two. Stein et al. '(1996) suggest that this form of social phobia is 
generally confined to one fear, of which the most common is speaking in public. The 
second subtype is known as `generalised' social phobia and is a pervasive form of the 
disorder. It is associated with several social anxiety fears (i. e. speaking and non-speaking 
fears) and accounts for the majority of social phobia patients being clinically treated. 
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Brown and Barlow (1992) also propose that the generalised form of social phobia is often 
associated with secondary anxiety or mood disorders. Table 2.2. presents the diagnostic 
subtypes for social phobia based on the current DSM-IV criteria. 
Table 2.2. Diagnostic Subtypes of Social Phobia 
Generalised 
" Anxiety precipitated by most social interactions (except those with family or close 
friends) 
" Most severe form of social phobia 
" Likelihood of comorbid psychiatric conditions, including avoidant personality 
disorder 
Non-Generalised or Specific 
" Limited to specific social situations (e. g., public speaking, performance as an 
actor or musician) 
n. b. Information taken from Lydiard (2001, p. 18) 
The Relationship Between Social Anxiety and Social Phobia 
There seems to be a close similarity between individuals experiencing high levels 
of social anxiety and patients with social phobia. In support, Turner, Beidel and Larkin 
(1986) report that during a social interaction there appears to be few differences between 
a clinical sample experiencing social phobia and a high socially anxious student sample 
in degree of distress, negative cognitions, or physiological responses. These authors 
conclude that undergraduate participants with high levels of social anxiety provide an 
appropriate analogue group for the study of social phobia. 
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One reliable way of distinguishing between social anxiety and social phobia is the 
extent to which the social anxiety symptoms interfere with day-to-day living. The DSM- 
IV classification (see Table 2.1. ) states that the experience of anxiety "interferes 
significantly with the person's normal routine" (APA, 1994, p. 41 1) and this appears to be 
the crucial factor in determining clinical levels of social anxiety. In support, Stein, 
Walker and Forde (1994) detail that 69% of people in their community survey reported 
experiencing anxiety in at least one social situation, but only 7% of the total sample felt 
that their social anxiety severely disrupted their lives. 
Cognitive research has been carried out on both socially anxious analogue and 
socially phobia clinical samples. Indeed, Eysenck (2004) proposes that there are 
important similarities between manifestations of anxiety in normal individuals and 
patients with anxiety disorders such as social phobia. Apart from this, research focusing 
on socially anxious samples is required for a number of additional reasons. For example, 
Huppert, Franklin, Foa and Davidson (2003) note that it is well documented that due to 
the very nature of the disorder, individuals with social phobia can be difficult to recruit. 
Also, Stopa and Clark (2001) argue that there is a need for analogue studies, as they 
allow for the recruitment of large numbers of participants and more complex research 
designs. Furthermore, Rachman (1998) puts forward that high levels of social anxiety is 
a vulnerability factor that may predispose the individual to develop the clinical form of 
the disorder, and therefore provide a suitable alternative to people experiencing social 
phobia. Thus, there is a growing body of research investigating the cognitive attentional 
processes of the non-clinically socially anxious (e. g., Mansell, Clark, Ehlers & Chen, 
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1999; Mogg & Bradley, 2002), in an attempt to further the understanding of 
dysfunctional attentional processing in social phobia. 
In order to determine a person's level of social anxiety, self-report measures are 
frequently used. The Fear of Negative Evaluation scale (FNE: Watson & Friend, 1969) 
and the Social Avoidance and Distress scale (SAD: Watson & Friend, 1969) are two 
measures that have been extensively used in social anxiety research (e. g., Harvey, Clark, 
Ehlers & Rapee, 2000; Mansell et al., 1999; Mullins & Duke, 2004; Winton, Clark & 
Edelmann, 1995). Whilst constructing these scales, Watson and Friend (1969) conducted 
a series of experimental and correlational studies that provided support for good test- 
retest reliability and concurrent validity of these scales. In support, recent reviews have 
proposed that both questionnaires are useful and reliable measures of social anxiety (e. g., 
Cox & Swinson, 1995; Heimberg, Hope, Rapee & Bruch, 1988; Herbert, Rheingold & 
Brandsma, 2001). Although, the appropriateness of its use with the clinical syndrome of 
social phobia has been debated (e. g., Heimberg et al., 1988; Turner & Beidel, 1988; 
Turner, McCanna & Beidel, 1987). 
Theoretical Approaches to Social Phobia 
The general theoretical view is that individuals with social phobia possess two 
central themes, namely fear of negative evaluation and heightened self-focused attention, 
that exacerbate their anxiety symptoms (e. g., Hartman, 1983; Beck et al., 1985; Clark & 
Wells, 1995 Leary & Kowalski, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). This chapter will 
concentrate on three key conceptualisations that Musa and Lepine (2000) suggest have 
contributed significantly to the understanding and treatment of social phobia, namely 
Beck et al. (1985), Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997). 
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The Cognitive Model of Anxiety Disorders and Phobias by Beck, Emery 
and Greenberg (1985) 
Beck, Emery and Greenberg (1985) provide one of the earliest and most 
influential cognitive models of anxiety disorders in general, and social phobia in 
particular. This formulation is based on clinical observations and Beck's subsequent 
theories of depression (Beck, 1967) and anxiety (Beck, 1976) that were briefly explained 
in chapter one. The model suggests that people experience social phobia, due to the 
existence of dysfunctional belief systems, or schemas, that socially anxious individuals 
hold about their ability to function effectively in social situations. The schemas 
applicable to social phobia are a perception of themselves as highly vulnerable to 
criticism and rejection by others. Beck and colleagues identify three categories of 
dysfunctional beliefs, namely excessively high standards for social performance, 
conditional beliefs concerning social evaluation, and unconditional beliefs about the self. 
Examples of such beliefs are `I must not show any signs of weakness to other people', `If 
I make mistakes others will reject me' and `I will make a fool of myself if I blush or 
show how nervous I am', respectively. These cognitive structures bias incoming 
information by a process that magnifies social threat and reduces the individual's 
perceived ability to cope with it. The schemas play a vital role, by influencing one's 
perceptions, interpretations and memories, thus maintaining their social anxiety. 
The theory proposes that once triggered by a social situation, these maladaptive 
schemas relating to negative social evaluation, contribute to the maintenance of this 
disorder through a series of vicious circles at both an automatic and conscious level. For 
example, individuals with social phobia view the world as a dangerous place in which 
they must be constantly vigilant for social threat cues. Consequently, an attentional bias 
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towards social-threat cues in the environment increases the likelihood that the socially 
phobic person will perceive signs of social rejections, confirming the initial negative 
expectations. Also, people with social phobia fear that they will not display their desired 
impression of themselves during a social interaction, and perceive somatic and 
behavioural symptoms of anxiety, such as sweating, blushing or increased heart-rate, as 
proof of social incompetence. They are pre-occupied with negative evaluation thoughts 
pertaining to their social ability. This interferes with the processing of social cues and 
results in deterioration in their performance. The individual with social phobia directs 
their attention toward potential indicators of threat or social failure in interpersonal 
situations and excessive detailed negative self-monitoring interferes with their ability to 
process social cues. Beck and colleagues highlight that unlike in other phobias, the 
feared consequences (poor performance) are likely to occur, because of the preoccupation 
with the occurrence of these outcomes. 
The Cognitive Model of Social Phobia by Clark and Wells (1995) 
The Cognitive Model of Social Phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995; Wells & Clark, 
1997) was heavily influenced by David Clark's (1986) theory of panic, together with 
existing cognitive theories of social phobia (Beck et al., 1985; Fenigstein, Scheier & 
Buss, 1975; Hartman, 1983; Leary, 1983b; Trower & Gilbert, 1989). Wells (1997) details 
that it was also empirically based on accumulated clinical and experimental evidence 
obtained from people with social phobia. 
Fundamentally, this model proposes that individuals with social phobia are 
preoccupied with negative evaluational thoughts, and the tendency to over-predict the 
probability and the seriousness of an aversive social encounter. The theory suggests that 
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persons with social phobia tend to construct highly negative images of their performance 
in social situations, which contribute substantially to anticipatory anxiety, as well as post 
event processing. While anticipating a social interaction, social phobics selectively 
retrieve and ruminate on negative information about how they will behave and be 
regarded by others during the social encounter. Thus, on the basis of this over emphasis 
on negative evaluation and self-perception, individuals with social phobia develop a 
series of problematic assumptions about themselves and their social world (e. g., "I must 
look confident" or "If I show signs of being anxious, others will think that I am a 
failure/stupid"). They become overly concerned with protecting themselves from 
negative social outcomes that they assume will occur, resulting in the appraisal of the 
social situation as dangerous, which in turn generates more social anxiety. Clark and 
Wells also propose that the socially phobic person adopts a series of safety behaviours to 
prevent the occurrence of the social catastrophes they fear. In support, Salkovskis (1991) 
suggests that patients with a variety of phobias engage in a variety of safety-seeking 
behaviours, that are intended to prevent or reduce the consequences of the feared 
catastrophe. Clark and Wells (1995) concur with this view, and propose that safety 
behaviours in social phobia are intended to prevent a variety of feared outcomes or hide a 
perceived inadequacy, thereby preventing a social catastrophe such as rejection by others 
or being evaluated by others in a negative fashion. Some examples of safety behaviours 
in social phobia are wearing clothes that would hide their blushing (e. g., scarf or high 
collared shirt), avoiding eye contact with anyone during a social interaction and gripping 
a glass tightly to hide the possibility of shaking hands. However, Clark and Wells 
propose that safety behaviours play a crucial role in the maintenance of the social phobia, 
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as they can actually make the person feel more anxious and appear distant or aloof to 
other people. For example, Clark and Wells present evidence that during therapy, a 
woman who grasped her wine glass very tightly realised that this made her hand more 
likely to shake. Furthermore, the avoidance of eye contact can also make other people 
think the socially phobic person dislikes or is not interested in them, thus provoking an 
unfriendly or critical response from them. 
Figure 2.1. illustrates the range of processes that occur when individuals with 
social phobia enter a novel, demanding or important social situation. A central proposal 
is the importance of self-focused attention, which involves the individual with social 
phobia shifting their attention from the environment to a detailed monitoring and 
observation of themselves. This self-monitoring provides evidence of feared anxiety 
responses (e. g., blushing, sweating or shaking) and interferes with processing external 
information from others and the environment. Furthermore, the interpretation of internal 
sensations in this way creates or maintains a negative impression of themselves, which 
they then assume reflects what other people are observing. For example, if the individual 
with social phobia perceives that they are blushing, they will become more anxious, 
because they then use this internal information to infer how they appear to others and 
what others think of them. The model regards the process of self-focused attention as 
crucial in the maintenance of social phobia in individuals. 
Clark and Wells propose several ways in which self-focused attention could be 
initiated. In certain situations it is considered to be a strategic process that is consciously 
mediated, such as the adoption of a safety behaviour (e. g., wearing clothes to hide 
blushing). In other cases, because anxiety is accompanied by a variety of physiological 
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changes, such fluctuations may attract attention, especially as these symptoms are 
considered so important in indicating how they are coming across to others. 
Additionally, social phobia is associated with the assumption that interoceptive 
information is a more reliable source of information than the people who they are 
interacting with. This is despite the fact that people rarely give unambiguous feedback, 
and even when positive feedback is given, individuals with social phobia are unlikely to 
process it because their primary concern is with self-monitoring. 
Finally, after leaving the feared social situation, this model predicts that 
individuals with social phobia undertake negative `post-event processing'. This cognitive 
process means that they selectively retrieve and focus on any perceived negative anxious 
feelings, thoughts or self-perceptions. These `post-mortems' intensify and consolidate 
their negative experiences and lead the socially phobic person to review the current social 
encounter as being more negative than it really was. This negatively biased review 
process also provides the person with social phobia more negative information regarding 
that social encounter, which the individual with social phobia remembers during the 
`anticipatory' pre-event processing stage before the next social encounter. 
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Figure 2.1. The Cognitive Model of Social Phobia suggesting the processes that occur 
when an individual with social phobia enters a feared social situation 
(Clark and Wells, 1995; p. 72) 
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A Cognitive-Behavioral Model of Anxiety in Social Phobia by Rapee and 
Heimberg (1997) 
The model described here extends earlier approaches (e. g., Carver & Scheier, 
1988; Schlenker & Leary, 1982) and is very similar to the Clark and Wells model (1995). 
The emphasis of this model is on the anxiety that people with social phobia experience in 
social situations (see Figure 2.2. ). It is essentially based on the premise that people with 
social phobia believe that other people are likely to evaluate them negatively. Thus, the 
theory predicts that to a person with social phobia, a social situation comprises the 
potential for interaction or observation by others, thus increasing the possibility of 
negative evaluation. A social encounter causes a person with social phobia to form a 
negative mental representation of his or herself. This is based on information from the 
long-term memory (e. g., prior experience), internal cues (e. g., physical symptoms) and 
external cues (e. g., audience feedback). Attentional resources are assigned to potentially 
negative aspects of the self-image and detailed monitoring for potential external threat. 
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Figure 2.2. A Cognitive-Behavioural Model of Anxiety in Social Phobia (Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997; p. 743) 
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Rapee and Heimberg (1997) propose that external indicators of threat include 
signs of negative evaluation, such as frowns, shaking of head or disinterest. Essentially, 
as the attentional focus of individuals with social phobia is towards negative evaluation, 
they frequently process external indicators with a negative bias. At the same time, the 
individual is also formulating a prediction of how they are being perceived by others. 
This involves a comparison of their own performance with what they perceive to be the 
audience's standard (generally more superior to them). A judgement as to whether they 
are performing in a manner that meets the presumed audience standard, determines the 
perceived likelihood of negative evaluation. The expected negative evaluation from the 
audience further elicits anxiety and comprises of physiological, cognitive and behavioural 
components. This process influences the individual's mental representation of 
themselves, with the consequence of renewing the cycle and maintaining the social 
anxiety. 
This model predicts that persons with social phobia will be characterised by an 
extensive allocation of attentional resources to the detection of threat. Rapee and 
Heimberg also suggest this process of threat detection occurs at a pre-attentive and 
conscious level of processing. The threat however, in this case of social phobia, is the 
monitoring of the mental representation of how the `self' is appearing to others and the 
identification of any features (both internally and externally) that may increase the risk of 
negative evaluation. 
Summary of the Theories 
It is important to understand the nature of attentional processing in socially 
anxious and socially phobic individuals, as Wells (1997) argues that they are considered 
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to be a key factor in the cause and maintenance of this anxiety disorder. Indeed, this 
theoretical review has highlighted that dysfunctional cognitive processing biases appear 
to be a core feature of social phobia. Consistent with the models presented in chapter one 
(e. g., Eysenck, 1992; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley; 1998; Williams et 
al., 1988; 1997), this bias probably intervenes at a pre-conscious and conscious level of 
processing. This review has shown that the key cognitive perspectives of social phobia 
predict differences in the nature of the attentional bias. In consideration of the theoretical 
predictions, both Beck et al. (1985) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997) hypothesise that 
during a social encounter, persons with social phobia constantly scanning the `self' and 
the environment for threatening social information. They propose that this process of 
environmental attentional scanning for threat helps to maintain the high level of social 
anxiety, by confirming their negative expectations. The Clark and Wells (1995) model, 
on the other hand, puts forward that in a social situation, individuals with social phobia 
focus solely on interoceptive information. In particular, they concentrate on their own 
somatic responses and personal negative social-evaluation thought processes and avoid 
attentional processing of external information. 
A further difference is that Beck and colleagues predict that although schemas 
pertaining to social anxiety (e. g., negative evaluation) are relatively stable structures, they 
need to be activated by a feared social encounter. Rapee and Heimberg put forward a 
similar view that the anxiety experienced in a social situation is the triggering factor. In 
contrast, Clark and Wells suggest that the socially phobic are pre-occupied with negative 
evaluation thought processes, irrespective of being in a social situation. They predict that 
a social situation is important for activating the attentional focus towards interoceptive 
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information, such as anxiety physiological symptoms, as well as personal negative- 
evaluation thought processes. 
It is important to note that there are also some similarities between the theories. 
For example, the theories highlight the importance of a social situation on the nature of 
the attentional bias in social phobia to certain socially threatening stimuli. Also, they 
predict that individuals with social phobia attend towards their physiological anxiety 
symptoms (e. g., blushing) during a social interaction, and interpret these feelings as signs 
of weakness and that other people will evaluate them in a negative fashion. 
Attentional Bias and Social Anxiety/Phobia: The Empirical Evidence 
This section presents an overview of the attentional research involving socially 
anxious and socially phobic individuals. The studies detailed in this review have used 
either the emotional Stroop task or the visual dot-probe task to assess attentional 
processing. Please see chapter one for a full explanation of these tasks. The emphasis in 
this section is on the identification of the nature of attentional processing patterns 
associated with individuals with social phobia or social anxiety, when compared to low- 
anxious controls, patients with panic disorder or generalised anxiety disorder. It also 
attempts to illustrate some methodological issues from the research that has influenced 
this current programme of work. For clarity, social anxiety is used to represent analogue 
studies and the term social phobia signifies clinical studies. 
The Emotional Stroop Task 
The first study that investigated attentional processing in social phobia using the 
Stroop paradigm was by Hope, Rapee, Heimberg and Dombeck (1990). They included 
social threat and physical threat words in this task and reported highly specific effects. In 
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that, the study found that individuals with social phobia were slowed by social threat 
words and not physical threat cues, whereas the opposite held for panic patients. In a 
follow-up study, Mattia, Heimberg and Hope (1993) reported that patients with social 
phobia were generally slower than non-anxious controls, to colour name social and 
physical threat words, but more so for social threat words. Furthermore, following 
cognitive-behavioural treatment, those who responded well to the therapy showed a 
significant decrease in response latency, whereas non-responders did not. This study 
provides initial evidence that the Stroop task is sensitive to subtle changes in clinical 
state. However, Williams et al. (1997) argue that as no stress test (i. e., placing the 
participant in a social anxiety provoking situation) was performed during the study to 
ascertain whether the recovered patients experienced lower levels of social anxiety as 
before, the possibility still remains that the emotional Stroop task may be an indicator of 
latent vulnerability to selectively process threat. 
In contrast, a more recent study by Niekerk, Moeller and Nortje (1999) found that 
there was no evidence of an interference effect for disorder-specific words in social 
phobia using the Stroop task. However, over two thirds of the social phobia sample had 
participated in psycho-pharmacotherapy at the time of the study. Furthermore, there were 
no questionnaires or structured interviews included to ascertain the level of social phobia 
in the group, only measures of trait and state anxiety. Thus, it seems fair to conclude that 
severity of social phobia is questionable in this sample. The Nierkerk et al. study does 
however highlight the importance of selecting participants with social phobia who have 
not undergone any form of treatment, because as demonstrated by Mattia et al. (1993) the 
Stroop interference effect can be reduced following successful treatment for this disorder. 
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Levels of social evaluation have also been manipulated to explore the influence of 
state anxiety on attentional processing patterns in patients with social phobia. For 
example, Amir, McNally, Reimann, Burns, Lorenz and Mullen (1996) included a 
condition where participants were advised that they would have to give a speech 
following the Stroop task, thus raising levels of social anxiety. In line with previous 
studies (Hope et al., 1990; Mattia et al., 1993), the individuals with social phobia were 
slower to colour-name social threat words, than the control group, in the non-evaluation 
condition (i. e., not advised that they would have to give a speech). In the social- 
evaluation condition however, individuals with social phobia were quicker to colour 
name these words, than the non-anxious control participants. The authors surmised that 
social phobics might be more adept at suppressing any attentional bias, when in a socially 
anxious situation. However, this study also found evidence of an attentional bias towards 
physical threat words in the social-evaluation condition. Unfortunately, Amir and 
colleagues did not speculate on this finding, even though it provided evidence of social 
phobia being associated with a bias toward a non-specific disorder word group. Lundh 
and Ost (1996) included the presence of a mirror in an attempt to increase self-focus and 
thereby activate various dysfunctional self-related schema. The authors felt that such a 
manipulation would further increase the interference effect for socially threatening 
words. Although the social phobic group demonstrated an attentional bias towards 
socially threatening words, the interference effect was not strengthened by the presence 
of a mirror. These findings indicate the importance of using an anxiety provoking 
manipulation that is strong enough of activate negative self-structures, as Lundh and Ost 
(1996) suggest that the mirror manipulation was not effective at enhancing self-focus. 
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In view of Amir et al's (1996) findings, Amir, Freshman and Foa (2002) 
investigated the possibility that the attentional bias to threat demonstrated by the Stroop 
task may be attenuated, when levels of anxiety are increased. However, rather than 
including a social-evaluation manipulation as in the Amir et al. (1996) study, they 
attempted to manipulate the Stroop effect by varying the frequency of socially 
threatening words to non-words which comprised of a series of crosses (e. g., XXXX). 
They proposed that exposing the participant to a greater number of social threat words, in 
contrast to non-words, would increase their arousal to social threat (high frequency 
condition). Amir and colleagues argued that this manipulation would activate strategic 
processing similar to that when levels of social-evaluative anxiety are increased that 
would be demonstrated by a lack of attentional bias towards the social-threat cues, in the 
high social-threat word frequency condition. They also included a low frequency 
condition, exposing the individual to a lower number, of social threat words in 
comparison to non-words. The results from the study were consistent with their 
hypotheses, in that patients with generalised social phobia took longer to colour-name the 
low ratio social threat words, when compared to high ratio social threat words. The 
control participants did not show such an effect. These findings not only indicate that the 
attentional bias to threat can be experimentally manipulated,, it also suggests the strategic 
avoidance of threat during a heightened exposure to social-threat words. These findings 
provide support for the models that predict a vigilance-avoidance pattern of information 
processing (e. g., Mogg & Bradley, 1988; Williams et al., 1988). In that, anxious 
individuals may not only be characterised with an automatic attention towards threat, but 
also an effortful strategic avoidance of threat. Indeed, Amir and colleagues conclude that 
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the possible implication of demonstrating this strategic control is that it may play a factor 
in the development and maintenance of social phobia. This is because such strategic 
avoidance means that the socially phobic person does not adequately process all the 
information pertaining to the social situation. 
The issue of specificity has been explored within social phobia groups and across 
anxiety disorder groups. The term specificity in these studies refers to both the valence 
and the content of the information presented being of unique relevance to the disorder 
(e. g., public speaking in social phobia or worry related words in generalised anxiety 
disorder). McNeil, Reis, Taylor, Boone, Carter, Turk and Lewin (1995) examined the 
nature of the attentional bias in people experiencing generalised and discrete social 
phobia. Although, both types of social phobic patients demonstrated interference effects 
for negative evaluational and speech related words, only the generalised social phobia 
group showed longer latencies in response to general social situation words. 
In the assessment of specificity across different anxiety disordered groups, 
Maidenberg, Chen, Craske, Bohn and Bystritsky (1996) investigated the nature of the 
interference effect in patients with social phobia or panic disorder. The study 
incorporated threat words (panic, social and general), positive words (social and general) 
and neutral words into their Stroop task. The findings showed that social phobia and 
panic patients displayed an attentional bias towards threatening (and not positive) 
information that was specific to their disorder. Interestingly, both patient. groups were 
equally concerned with their physical sensations as indicated by their scores on the 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986), indicating some 
similarities within the two disorders also. In a related vein, Spector, Pecknold and 
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Libman (2003) reported that persons with generalised social phobia, when compared to 
non-anxious controls, showed attentional biases to socially threatening words (e. g., 
criticise, failure, rejection). Interestingly, they also found that social phobia was 
associated with an attentional bias towards words describing anxiety symptoms that are 
noticeable by others (e. g., blushing, shaking, stuttering). These findings suggest that the 
specificity of the bias in social phobia includes words relating to visible anxiety 
symptoms, that the person with social phobia is often concerned about displaying to 
others during a social encounter. Becker, Rinck, Margraf and Roth (2001) also reported 
disorder-specific effects across the anxiety disorders. They found that patients with 
social phobia displayed a highly selective attentional bias by taking longer to colour- 
name public speaking-related words, whereas individuals with generalised anxiety 
disorder showed more general attentional biases with slower latencies to all emotional 
words. These studies show the importance of the issue of specificity in the determining 
the attentional bias in clinical populations. 
Evaluation of the Stroop Findings in Relation to the Theories 
Assuming that the Stroop paradigm can be interpreted as a measure of attentional 
bias (see chapter one for criticisms), studies including this task have shown consistent 
findings. They found that clinical levels of social phobia appear to be associated with 
longer reaction times towards socially threatening semantic stimuli, indicated by a greater 
interference in response latencies to colour name these words (e. g., Hope et al., 1990). 
These findings provide support for the aforementioned models of social phobia (Beck et 
al., 1985; Clark & Wells 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), as they all predict an 
attentional bias towards cues relating to social threat (especially as the words used in 
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most of the studies relate to negative evaluation). Although, the models also predict the 
importance of being in a social-evaluative situation, it seems fair to suggest that simply 
being in an experimental situation is an anxiety provoking event for individuals with 
clinical levels of this disorder. In further support of the theories, it appears that visible 
anxiety symptoms may also be of concern to individuals with social phobia (Maidenberg 
et al., 1996; Spector et al., 2003). 
Notably, there are several findings that the models of social phobia do not 
address. First, that the interference effect to social threat words appears to be reduced or 
over-ridden when the individual with social phobia are aroused by being in a social- 
evaluative situation (Amir et al., 1996) or by being exposed to high frequencies of social 
threat words (Amir et al., 2002). As previously mentioned, all three cognitive 
perspectives predict an attentional bias to social threat, whether it is solely internally 
(Clark & Wells, 1995) or includes externally cued threat (Beck et al., 1985; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997) cued threat, under such conditions. Furthermore, that an attentional 
bias towards physical threat (when compared to non-anxious controls) was apparent 
under non-evaluation and social-evaluation conditions (e. g., Amir et al., 1996; Mattia et 
al., 1993). Indeed, as all three models suggest that the attentional bias in social phobia is 
specific to the disorder, this finding is particularly interesting. 
The Visual Dot Probe Task 
Asmundson and Stein (1994) were the first to investigate attentional processing in 
socially phobic individuals using the visual dot probe paradigm. Patients with social 
phobia and matched controls were asked to read aloud the top word of a pair of words 
presented briefly on a computer screen. Participants were then'required to quickly press 
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the space bar for trials in which a dot appeared in the position of either the threat or the 
neutral word. This study reported that patients with generalised social phobia were 
faster, than patients with panic disorder, to detect the dot that followed social-threat 
words, and there was no such bias with neutral or physical threat cues. However, this 
effect was only apparent when the social threat word appeared at the top, rather than the 
bottom, part of the computer screen and this led Heinrichs and Hofmann (2001) to 
surmise that these findings cannot be viewed as indicating an overall attentional bias 
towards social threat words. Indeed, Asmundson and Stein concluded that social phobia 
was associated with environmental hyper-vigilance, indicated by overall faster responses 
to probes after processing socially threatening words. Similarly, Horenstein and Segui 
(1997) used comparable experimental procedures and also failed to find any evidence of 
selective attention to social or physically threatening words in social phobia, but did 
however find evidence of an attentional bias towards physical threat words in panic 
patients. 
More recent dot-probe studies have suggested that reading the word presented on 
the top part of the computer screen out loud is an artificial manipulation, and have 
consequently dispensed with this requirement (e. g., Mansell Ehlers, Clark, & Chen, 
2002). The general consensus of opinion is that people are not constantly prompted to 
say what they see out loud. Dispensing with this requirement, Musa, Lepine, Clark, 
Mansell and Ehlers (2003) investigated the nature of the attentional bias in socially 
phobic patients with and without concurrent depression and non-anxious controls. The 
study included socially threatening and physically threatening words, that were paired 
with a neutral word and presented for 500ms. They found that social phobia patients 
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without concurrent depression displayed an attentional bias towards social and physical 
threat words, and no such effect was found in social phobia patients with concurrent 
depression. Musa and colleagues suggest that the finding of an attentional bias towards 
physical threat is possibly due to the presence of an additional anxiety disorder, in which 
physical threat concerns are present. However, this is a tentative conclusion, based on 
post hoc analysis and a very small sample size (n = 9). Additionally, this study provided 
evidence, together with the generalised anxiety disorder study described in chapter one 
(Bradley et al., 1995), that the presence of concurrent depression abolishes the attentional 
bias that would normally be associated with the anxiety disorder. 
So far, the evidence of an attentional bias towards threatening words in social 
phobia has been equivocal. Consequently, research has focused on attentional responses 
to facial stimuli, arguing that facial expressions are more salient to the socially anxious 
(e. g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998). In that, faces convey a more ecologically valid threat 
providing important information concerning personal acceptability and social value. The 
findings from dot-probe studies including facial stimuli have also yielded conflicting 
findings, but they have demonstrated the importance of including a social evaluation 
condition in studies with socially anxious analogue samples. For example, Bradley et al. 
(1997) presented threatening and happy faces, paired with neutral faces, using a visual 
dot-probe task. This study did not include a social evaluation manipulation, such as the 
person believing they would have to give a speech. They found no evidence of 
attentional bias towards or away from threatening faces in the socially anxious sample. 
In contrast, Yeun (1994) reported that under conditions of believing that they would have 
to give a speech, high social anxiety participants showed longer probe detection latencies 
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following a negative face, as compared to a neutral face. The low social anxiety group 
did not vary in response times to the two kinds of facial stimuli. These findings suggest 
that socially anxious individuals may be avoiding negative faces when under conditions 
of social evaluation. It is important to note that the Yeun study presented the stimuli for 
1000 ms, which is longer than the customary period of 500 ms, and that this may have 
influenced the results. 
Mansell et al. (1999) extended Yeun's (1994) study by displaying the stimuli for 
the more traditional 500 ms and included negative, happy and neutral faces paired with 
household objects. The household objects were used to symbolise stimuli that would be 
present in a room during a social interaction. The participants were a non-clinical sample 
with high and low levels of fear of negative evaluation as determined by the FNE scale. 
They replicated Yeun's findings, in that the socially anxious participants directed their 
attention away from all emotional faces, under conditions of social evaluation 
(anticipated public presentation). Furthermore, they reported no evidence of any 
attentional bias differences in the no threat condition, which was consistent with the 
results from the Bradley et al. (1997) study. 
In view of these findings, Mansell et al. (2002) investigated whether the 
attentional bias in social anxiety is unique to faces (e. g., Mansell et al, 1999) or if it 
generalises to words. This study included negative and positive social words and a social 
evaluation manipulation (the participants believing that they would have to give a 
speech). They found no evidence of an attentional bias to positive or negative words 
associated with social anxiety. Due to the significant findings from the previous study 
(Mansell et al., 1999), the authors concluded that socially anxious individuals do not 
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demonstrate an attentional bias for socially threatening semantic stimuli, only the 
avoidance of facial expressions, under social-evaluative conditions. Providing further 
support for this view, Pishyar, Harris and Menzies (2004) investigated dysfunctional 
attentional processing in social anxiety using the dot probe procedure with pairs of 
positive-neutral and negative-neutral words and faces as stimuli. This study did not 
manipulate levels of social evaluation. There were no differences in the direction of the 
attentional bias between the high and low social anxiety groups to either the negative or 
positive words. These findings led Pishyar and colleagues to conclude that word stimuli 
may be a less sensitive index of attentional bias with the dot probe task. 
In consideration of the facial dot-probe task, the results indicated that higher 
levels of social anxiety were associated with attentional bias toward negative facial 
stimuli and away from away from positive faces. The low anxious group attended 
towards the positive faces and avoided the negative faces. Interestingly, these results 
conflict with previous studies that found no evidence of an attentional bias in socially 
anxious samples when levels of social evaluation were low (Bradley et al. 1997; Mansell 
et al., 1999). Pishyar and colleagues argued that the difference between Mansell and 
colleagues' results and their findings was due to the fact that the former study paired 
faces with household objects, rather than neutral faces. Such a methodological difference 
may have influenced the results in some way and suggest that the nature of the 
competing, simultaneously presented stimuli is an important factor when considering the 
attentional response. This possibility does not however explain the inconsistent findings 
with Bradley et al. who also used faces as neutral stimuli. A second study by Pishyar et 
al. (2004) paired the participant's own face with a stranger's face. They argued that 
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evaluative threat would be greater when the participant's own face was presented. They 
found exactly the same results as in the first study, regardless of whether or not the 
participant's own face was presented. 
Another possible explanation for the conflicting findings from the facial dot probe 
social anxiety studies (Bradley et al., 1997; Mansell et al., 1999; Pishyar et al., 2004) is 
that presenting the facial stimuli for 500ms may be too long to identify whether high 
socially anxious participants are initially vigilant for the threatening stimulus (Mogg & 
Bradley, 2004). An eye-movement study currently under preparation by Mogg, Bradley 
and Garner (2004) directly investigates this issue. The preliminary findings suggest that 
the high social anxiety participants were faster to direct their attention towards angry 
faces followed by subsequent quicker avoidance of the threat, in contrast to the low social 
anxiety individuals. This was indicated by the direction and speed of eye movements that 
were being monitored whilst the stimuli was presented for 300ms. This study provides 
initial evidence of a vigilance-avoidant processing style in socially anxious individuals 
providing support for the cognitive-motivational model of anxiety proposed by Mogg and 
Bradley (1998). Thus, it seems quite possible that the conflicting findings with the facial 
and indeed word processing studies may be due to the length of time the stimulus is being 
presented and that the traditional 500ms is actually too long to explore whether attention 
is indeed captured by threat. 
Mansell, Clark and Ehlers (2003) developed a novel probe detection task to 
measure internally focused and externally focused attention simultaneously. The high 
and low socially anxious participants were requested to detect the presence of two 
stimuli. First, evidence of internal bias was determined by the detection of a light 
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vibration on the finger which the participants were (erroneously) led to believe signifies a 
change in their heart-rate acceleration and sweating. Second, external vigilance was 
ascertained by the presentation of happy, angry, neutral faces paired with household 
objects. They found no evidence of an internal or external attentional bias in students 
high and low in social anxiety as determined by the FNE. Although reanalysis using the 
Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker questionnaire (PRCS: Paul, 1966) as a group 
predictor, found an internal attentional bias in high speech anxious students and no 
evidence of attentional bias to facial stimuli, in contrast to the low speech anxious 
participants. It thus appears that the choice of screening instrument may be critical in the 
identification of attentional biases in the non-clinical socially anxious population. 
In the assessment of preattentive bias in social anxiety, Mogg and Bradley (2002) 
investigated automatic vigilance for threat by briefly presenting facial stimuli for 100ms 
followed by masking. They found that the high socially anxious participants selectively 
allocated their attention towards the spatial location of the threatening faces, rather than 
neutral faces, under conditions of restricted awareness. The results showed that this 
vigilance effect was primarily a function of social avoidance and distress as determined 
by the SAD measure, and not fear of negative evaluation based on the FNE scale. Once 
again, this study highlights the importance of choosing the most effective self-report 
instrument in analogue research to determine levels of social anxiety. Indeed, Mogg and 
Bradley concluded that the SAD scale may be a better predictor of attentional bias in 
socially anxious populations. 
Clinical studies using facial stimuli have also shown conflicting findings. For 
example, Chen, Ehlers, Clark and Mansell (2002) reported greater avoidance of negative, 
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positive and neutral facial stimuli (presented for 500ms) irrespective of the emotional 
valence, as opposed to household objects, in patients with generalised social phobia 
compared to non-anxious controls. These results are similar to the Mansell et al. (1999) 
study, except that the clinical sample directed their attention away from all faces and not 
just the negative faces as in the analogue sample. Mogg, Philippot and Bradley (2004) 
also explored the attentional responses to angry, happy and neutral facial stimuli in 
patients with social phobia. The facial expressions were presented for 500ms to assess 
initial conscious orienting, and 1250 ms to investigate any further biases. In contrast to 
Chen et al. (2002), individuals with social phobia displayed an attentional bias toward 
angry faces, relative to happy and neutral faces, when presented for 500 ms. The non- 
anxious controls showed no evidence of an attentional bias for angry or happy faces in 
the 500 ms exposure condition. Mogg et al. interpreted these findings as evidence of an 
initial orienting towards threat being associated with social phobia. There was no 
evidence of an attentional bias in the social phobia group when the faces were displayed 
for 1250 ms. Mogg and colleagues concluded, consistent with Pishyar et al. 's view, that 
a possible reason why their findings are different to Chen et al. 's results lays within the 
choice of neutral stimuli. The Mogg et al. study paired angry facial stimuli with neutral 
faces, whereas Chen et al. paired a variety of negative faces (angry, sad, frightened and 
disgusted) with household objects. Thus, Mogg and colleagues proposed that subtle 
processing differences may occur when the socially phobic individual is being presented 
with threatening and competing innate (e. g., household objects) or biologically relevant 
(e. g., neutral faces) social stimuli. Although it seems fair to suggest that a neutral face is 
an ambiguous stimuli that could indicate disinterest, boredom or neutrality. This would 
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constitute as a threat, similar to an angry face, which may well cause some sort of 
attentional conflict in socially anxious and phobic individuals. Consequently, the 
household objects may indeed be a more subtle representation of a neutral cue in such 
studies. 
Evaluation of the Visual Dot-Probe Findings in Relation to the Theories 
The visual dot probe task, although considered to be a more, direct measure of 
visual attention (e. g., Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001), has also yielded inconsistent findings 
(please see Table 2.3. for a summary). In consideration of the theoretical perspectives 
(Beck et al., 1985; Clark & Wells 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), evidence of an 
attentional bias towards socially threatening word stimuli has not been found in socially 
anxious participants, under non-evaluative (Pishyar et al., 2004) or social-evaluative 
(Mansell et al., 2002) conditions. Also, clinical studies of social phobia have reported 
conflicting findings. In that, two studies (Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Horenstein & 
Segui, 1997) found no evidence of selective attention to social threat words, whereas 
Musa et al. (2003) did find that social phobia without concurrent depression was 
associated with an attentional bias towards social and physical threat. Overall, the 
findings from the dot-probe studies using semantic stimuli provide very limited support 
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Furthermore, although facial stimuli has been argued to be a more ecologically 
valid threat in social phobia (e. g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998), conflicting results have been 
reported in the literature. In relation to the theories, both Beck et al. (1985) and Rapee 
and Heimberg (1997) would predict an attentional bias towards aversive faces, as it is 
considered to be an external threat (i. e., signs of criticism from others) to the individual 
with social phobia. However, the Clark and Wells (1995) model would predict 
attentional avoidance of such negative facial stimuli. Mansell et al. (2003) provided 
evidence to support the latter model, as they found an attentional bias towards internal 
(vibration on finger), rather than external (facial dot-probe task) stimuli, in speech 
anxious participants. Furthermore, high socially anxious participants have demonstrated 
no evidence of an attentional bias towards negative faces (e. g., Bradley et al., 1997), as 
well as an attentional bias towards aversive faces (e. g., Pishyar et al., 2004) under non- 
evaluative conditions. Additionally, under conditions of social-evaluation, Mansell et al. 
(1999) have shown that individuals high in social anxiety avoid negative facial stimuli. 
Clinical studies incorporating facial stimuli have also shown conflicting results of an 
attentional bias avoidant (Chen et al., 2002) and towards (Mogg et al., 2004) negative 
faces at a conscious level of processing. Overall, despite the notion that faces represent a 
more ecological type of threat to the socially anxious (e. g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998), it 
appears that the findings from the facial dot-probe studies are also conflicting. 
Conclusions 
Overall, this literature review has shown that the evidence relating to the nature of 
attentional bias in social anxiety and social phobia is conflicting and in need of further 
detailed investigation. At the time of designing the series of experiments for this thesis, 
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there were no studies investigating the interplay of state anxiety and levels of social 
anxiety, on the nature of attentional bias in the trait socially anxious using the visual dot- 
probe task with semantic stimuli. Moreover, there was no reported evidence of an 
attentional bias to threat words in patients with social phobia using visual dot probe tasks 
(Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Horenstein & Segui, 1997). In contrast, Stroop studies have 
found consistent evidence of attentional bias towards social threat words in social phobia 
(e. g., Amir et al., 1996; Hope et al., 1990; Mattia et al., 1993). Furthermore, an 
attentional bias towards threat using the dot probe paradigm and semantic stimuli has 
been reported in other clinical anxiety disorders. For example, evidence of attentional 
bias towards disorder-specific threat cues had been reported in individuals suffering from 
spider phobia (Watts, McKenna, Sharrock & Tresize, 1986), generalised anxiety disorder 
(Mogg et al., 1992) and panic disorder (Horenstein & Segui, 1997). Also, all the 
theoretical perspectives presented in chapter one and chapter two, detailed that there 
would be attentional bias differences between a person suffering from an anxiety disorder 
and those low in anxiety. Taking all these factors into consideration, this programme of 
work was designed to explore the nature of the attentional bias in social anxiety and 
social phobia to semantic stimuli using the dot-probe paradigm. 
The Aims of this Thesis 
The overall aim of this thesis is to systematically investigate the nature of the 
attentional bias associated with social anxiety and social phobia to specific categories of 
threatening words using the visual dot-probe task. A further aim is to address the 
aforementioned theoretical conflict to ascertain whether the dysfunctional attentional bias 
is solely self-focused (Clark & Wells, 1995) or includes external stimuli as well (Beck et 
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al., 1985; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Finally, a psychometric investigation of two of the 
most popular self-report questionnaires (the FNE and the SAD) is undertaken to see if 
they reliably measure the aspects of social anxiety that they were originally designed to 
by Watson and Friend (1969). Several important factors highlighted in this chapter and 
chapter one have influenced the design of the studies included in this programme of 
work. The next section summarises these factors in relation to the design of the current 
experiments. 
Nature of the Threat Cues 
On reviewing the dot-probe studies using semantic stimuli, it was clear that one of 
the most important factors that may aid in the explanation of such inconsistent findings 
was the type of threatening words used in the studies. For example, Asmundson and 
Stein (1994) included general social-threat words (e. g., criticised, foolish, inept), and 
physically threatening words that included a mix of panic. related (e. g., suffocating, 
gasping dizzy) and violence related (e. g., attack, pain, emergency) words. Horenstein 
and Sergui (1997) used mainly physically threatening words (e. g., fracture, mutilated, 
violence) together with social threat words (e. g., stupid, pathetic). These studies show 
the importance of the social threat word categories needing to be as specific to the current 
concerns of the individual, as it is quite possible that their choice of word stimuli may be 
an influential factor in the non-significant findings reported in both studies. Indeed, a 
Stroop study by McNeil et al. (1995) showed that different types of social phobia (speech 
anxious and generalised) was associated with different attentional biases towards 
different types of social threat (social situations, speech-related and negative evaluation 
word groups). However, the dot-probe studies have only included general social threat 
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words that tend to represent negative evaluation themes. It is highly possible that 
individuals with social anxiety and social phobia respond differently to various types of 
social threat, and that this needs to be explored in more detail. Also, the physical threat 
word group need to be as distinct as possible from the panic related concerns. This is 
because panic symptoms (e. g., racing heart, feeling dizzy and faint) are quite apparent in 
social phobia, as detailed by the DSM-IV criteria and previous Stroop studies 
(Maidenberg et al., 1996; Spector et al., 2003). Thus, the inclusion of such a mix of 
words that may be of specific interest to people with social phobia may be a factor in the 
inconsistent attentional bias effects reported. In support of the view, Heinrichs and 
Hofmann (2001) suggest that the word pool chosen in studies needs to be representative 
of the core of the disorder and as distinct as possible from other categories of threat. 
This chapter has also shown that social anxiety and social phobia dot-probe 
research have used facial stimuli rather than words. It has been suggested that aversive 
faces may symbolise a more ecologically valid representation of threat to a socially 
anxious and social phobic individual (e. g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998). It is proposed that 
angry faces indicate signs of disapproval or negative evaluation to a person with high 
levels of social anxiety. Conversely, Musa and L. pine (2000) argued that photographs of 
faces may not be particularly threatening to individuals with social anxiety and social 
phobia. A face presented in a laboratory setting could be deemed as trivial to the patient' 
with social phobia, as they do not present a realistic and current threat. Thus, such 
stimuli may not actually activate the typical hypervigilance response that has been shown 
to occur with words. Also Clark and Wells (1995) suggested that face processing studies 
measure attention to actual social cues, whereas word processing studies could be 
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representative of an attentional measure of a preoccupation with themes of social threat 
and danger. 
It is the internal thought processes demonstrated by an attentional bias to 
particular categories of threat words in socially anxious and socially phobic participants 
that is of specific interest here. Consequently, this programme of work attempted to 
identify the categories of threat that are of specific concern to socially anxious and 
socially phobic individuals based on previous social phobia literature (Asmundson & 
Stein, 1994; Hope et al., 1990; Lundh & Ost, 1996; Maidenberg et al., 1996; McNeil et 
al., 1995). This resulted in four categorically distinct word groups being chosen and 
included in the series of visual dot-probe experiments in this thesis (experiments one, two 
and three). Negative evaluation (e. g., failure, mocked), somatic sensation (e. g., tense, 
nervous) and social situation (e. g., party, interview) words groups represented various 
categories of social threat, and a physical threat (e. g., doctor, coffin) word group was 
included. Please see chapter three for details on how the words were selected for each 
category of threat. 
Influence of State Anxiety on the Nature of the Bias 
Another issue that this programme of work aims to explore is the influence of 
state anxiety on the nature of the bias in socially anxious samples. In chapter one, the 
more consistent attentional bias effects were demonstrated with trait anxious participants 
under high state anxious conditions (e. g., Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; Mogg & 
Marsden, 1990; Mogg et at., 1994). Although, the more recent dot-probe studies that did 
(Mansell et al., 2002) and did not (Pishyar et al., 2004) include a social-evaluation 
condition, have failed to find any evidence of an attentional bias with threatening words 
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to be associated with social anxiety. Furthermore, to date, no study has explored 
attentional processing in social anxiety at a pre-attentive level using semantic stimuli in a 
dot-probe task. The view here is, that the adoption of such distinct word groups, might 
make clearer the interplay of the influence of social evaluation on pre-attentional and 
attentional processing biases in socially anxious populations. 
In view of this, experiment one investigates attentional processing to various 
categories of threatening words presented for the traditional 500ms. Experiment two 
explores pre-attentional (stimuli presentation time of 14ms) and conscious (stimuli 
presentation time of 500 ms) processing of threatening words. Both of these studies 
include individuals high and low in social anxiety and manipulate levels of social- 
evaluation. In the social-evaluative condition, participants were advised that they would 
have to give a speech, which would be recorded and assessed (please see chapter three for 
full' details of the social-evaluation induction). Experiment three includes the same 
categories of threatening stimuli (presented for 500 ms) in a visual dot-probe task with 
individuals experiencing clinical levels of social phobia and matched low anxious 
controls. Partly due to ethical considerations, and the fact that individuals with social 
phobia will find taking part in an experiment a particularly socially anxious provoking 
situation, experiment three did not include a social-evaluation induction. 
Participant Selection 
Additionally, this chapter has highlighted that using different self-report measures 
of social anxiety may yield different results in the nature of the attentional bias (e. g., 
Mansell et al., 2003; Mogg & Bradley, 2002). As previously stated, the most widely used 
questionnaires in socially anxiety studies are the ENE and the SAD scales (e. g., Harvey et 
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al., 2000; Mansell et al, 1999; Winton et al., 1995). Furthermore, there is evidence to 
suggest that the SAD scale may be a more reliable measure when investigating the nature 
of the attentional bias in social anxiety (e. g., Mogg & Bradley, 2002). This is an 
important issue that needs to be explored in more detail, as crucial differences in attention 
processing between high and low socially anxious groups may be missed because the 
study has not included the most reliable measure of social anxiety. 
Consequently, study four includes a detailed psychometric analysis of the FNE 
and SAD measures to establish whether the scales reliably measure the aspects of social 
anxiety they pertain too. Indeed, despite their extensive use, there appears to be a lack of 
studies exploring whether the questionnaires reliably measure what the original Watson 
and Friend (1969) paper suggested they do. Additionally, this study suggests cut-off 
points for high and low social anxiety groups to guide future research. It also explores 
the relationship between the factors identified from the scales with the attentional bias 
data from the three visual dot-probe experiments. The aim is to identify the factors that 
are the most sensitive to any attentional bias effects in socially anxious and socially 
phobic individuals. Finally, this study also explores the characteristics of the brief 
version of the FNE questionnaire by Leary (1983a) and proposes a shortened version of 
the SAD scale. 
The issue of participant selection in clinical studies of social phobia is also a 
contentious one. An important consideration is that there are two subtypes of this clinical 
disorder, namely specific and generalised social phobia. Both of these forms of social 
phobia have been shown to demonstrate differences in the nature of their attentional 
biases (McNeil et al., 1995). Also, as detailed by Stein and Chavira (1998), the 
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generalised form of social phobia is believed to be the more disabling and life impairing 
than the specific social phobia. Additionally, Heimberg et al (2002) propose that 
generalised social phobia is often associated with co-morbid or secondary emotional 
disorders. Previous clinical dot-probe studies have not fully detailed sample 
characteristics such as the sub-type issue (e. g., Horenstein & Segui, 1997) and comorbid 
disorders (e. g., Asmundson & Stein, 1994). Although a more recent study by Musa et al. 
(2003) did attempt to explore the influence of comorbid depression in social phobia, as it 
has been suggested that depression can moderate attentional biases in anxious individuals 
(Bradley et al., 1995). These are all important factors to consider in the recruitment of 
individuals with social phobia. In view of this, experiment three uses the Anxiety 
Disorders Interview Schedule for the DSM-IV, Adult Version (ADIS-IV, Brown, 
DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994), as this questionnaire assesses the spectrum of mental health 
problems that an individual may experience. The aim is to try and recruit individuals 
with a primary diagnosis of generalised social phobia without any comorbid anxiety or 
depressive disorders. 
Theoretical Considerations 
This thesis also aims to address the apparent conflict between the theoretical 
perspectives of social phobia presented in this chapter (Beck et al., 1985; Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). It is important to note that the categories of threatening 
word groups were also specifically chosen to explore these theoretical predictions in 
more detail. As a self-focusing style of information processing was expected to be 
evident with an attentional bias towards negative evaluation (e. g., failure, mocked) and 
somatic sensation (e. g., tense nervous) words and an external focus by selective attention 
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to social situation (e. g., party, interview) words. The physical threat (e. g., doctor, coffin) 
words were included to assess specificity of the attentional bias to disorder-specific 
words. Thus, in consideration of the theories proposed by Beck et al. *(1985) and Rapee 
and Heimberg (1997), an attentional bias to threat cues related to the self (e. g., somatic 
sensation and negative evaluation word groups) and to external disorder-specific threat 
(e. g., social situation word group) would be predicted in socially anxious and socially 
phobic individuals under social-evaluative conditions. Clark and Wells (1995) on the 
other hand, hypothesise that a pre-occupation with negative evaluation is apparent in 
social phobia irrespective of being in a social-evaluative situation. Thus, this model 
would predict an attentional bias towards negative evaluation words under non-evaluative 
and social-evaluative conditions in social anxiety and social phobia. They also argue that 
during a social encounter the person with social phobia focuses solely on interoceptive 
information, thus an attentional bias towards internal information (e. g., somatic sensation 
word group) is also expected in the social-evaluative condition. The processing biases 
predicted by these theories are assumed to be an automatic process, thus a similar pattern 
of attentional processing should be evident in pre-attentional processing tasks. These 
predictions are explored in detail in experiments one, two and three of this thesis using 
socially anxious and socially phobic individuals. 
Additionally, in chapter one, the theories by Eysenck, (1992) and Williams et al. 
(1988) specifically predict that selective attention to threatening stimuli is an automatic 
(i. e., pre-attentional) process in anxious populations operating outside conscious 
awareness. In particular, Eysenck proposes that those high in anxiety will display a pre- 
attentional bias towards disorder-specific and general threat cues in the environment. In 
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contrast, Williams and colleagues suggest that the pre-attentive bias in anxious 
population would be towards threatening stimuli that is congruent with their current 
concerns, such as social threat in social anxiety. These notions will be explored in 
experiment two, as automatic attentional processes are directly investigated using the 
visual dot-probe paradigm by briefly presenting the word pairs (14 ms) followed by a 
mask for 486 ms. 
Table 2.4. presents an overview of the predictions from the relevant theories and 
indicates which study in this thesis addresses these theoretical notions. 
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Table 2.4. Summary of Theoretical Predictions Investigated in the Thesis 
Theoretical Predictions The Experiments 
The Clark and Wells (1995) Model: 
" This model predicts that social 
phobia is associated with a general pre- 
occupation with negative evaluational 
thoughts (negative evaluation words), and 
during a social situation the attentional 
focus is towards interoceptive information 
(e. g., negative evaluation and somatic 
sensation, words). This bias is apparent at 
both a pre-conscious and a conscious level 
of processing. 
Beck et al (1985) and Rapee and 
Heimberg (1997): 
" These theories both propose that 
social phobia is associated with an 
attentional bias towards self-focused (e. g., 
negative evaluation and somatic sensation 
words) and external (e. g., social situation 
words) social threat. The bias is only 
activated under conditions of social 
evaluation and is a pre-attentive and 
conscious process. 
Experiment 1 explores these predictions at 
a conscious level of processing using high 
and low socially anxious participants 
(including a social evaluation 
manipulation). 
Experiment 2 investigates these proposals 
at a pre-Conscious as well as a conscious 
level of processing using high and low 
socially anxious participants (including a 
social evaluation manipulation). 
Experiment 3 considers these suggestions 
at a conscious level of processing using a 
clinical population and low. anxious 
matched controls (without the social 
evaluation manipulation). 
Williams et al. (1988) Integrative Theory: 
" This theory suggests that 
individuals with high levels of anxiety 
demonstrate an attentional bias towards 
disorder specific threat at a pre-attentive 
and conscious level of processing. 
Eysenck (1992) Hypervigilance Theory: 
" He hypothesises that high levels of 
anxiety are associated with a pre- 
attentional focus towards social and 
physical threat. This becomes specific to 
the disorder at a more conscious level of 
Experiment 2 investigates these proposals 
at a pre-conscious as well as a conscious 
level of processing using high and low 
socially anxious participants (including a 
social evaluation manipulation). 
processing. 
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Chapter 3 
The Effects of Social-Evaluative Threat on 
the Specificity of the Attentional Bias in 
Social Anxiety 
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Experiment One 
Introduction 
The experiment described in this chapter sought to investigate the nature and 
specificity of the attentional bias in social anxiety. Individuals high and low in social 
anxiety took part in a visual dot-probe task, in order to ascertain if there are any 
attentional processing differences between the two groups. Four categories of threatening 
stimuli were incorporated into the dot-probe task including negative evaluation, somatic 
sensation, social situation and physical threat word groups. Levels of state anxiety were 
manipulated by including a non-evaluation and a social evaluation induction. The latter 
condition involved the participant believing that they were being recorded by a video 
camera throughout the entire task. They were also advised that they would have to give a 
speech that would be recorded and assessed by an independent panel of psychologists. 
The cognitive models of anxiety described in chapter one all proposed that 
selective attention to threatening stimuli plays an important role in the development and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders (e. g., Beck, 1967; Bower, 1981; Eysenck 1992; 
MacLeod, 1991; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1988; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 
1988; 1997). In support, evidence of attentional bias towards disorder-specific threat 
cues has been reported in individuals suffering from spider phobia (e. g., Watts et al., 
1986), generalised anxiety disorder (e. g., Mogg et al., 1995), post-traumatic stress 
disorder (e. g., Foa, Freske, Murdock, Kozak & McCarthy, 1991) and panic disorder (e. g., 
McNally, Rieman & Kim, 1990). 
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In chapter two, direct consideration of some of the key theories relating to social 
anxiety and social phobia also revealed the importance of dysfunctional attentional 
processing in the aetiology and maintenance of this anxiety disorder (Beck et al., 1985; 
Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). For example, these theoretical 
perspectives all proposed that fear of negative evaluation and increased self-focused 
attention are two central tenets in social phobia and social anxiety. More specifically, 
individuals with social phobia are focused on scanning the `self' for threatening 
information during a social interaction. This interoceptive attentional scanning such as 
searching for physiological (e. g., blushing) and behavioural (e. g., stuttering) signs of 
anxiety, together with personal negative evaluation (critical thoughts), serves to 
exacerbate social anxiety. In a review of the self-focus literature, Spurr and Stopa (2002) 
concluded that there is substantial evidence that self-focused attention is an influential 
factor in social anxiety and social phobia. More specifically, they argued that it increases 
negative self judgements, social anxiety and the possibility of poor performance during 
social interactions. 
Furthermore, Beck et al. (1985) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997) proposed that 
during a social situation, individuals with social phobia search the environment for 
threatening social information, such as signs of boredom in others. This process of 
attentional scanning for external threat helps to maintain the high level of social anxiety 
by confirming the expected negative evaluations from others. Clark and Wells (1995) on 
the other hand, emphasised that the socially anxious are pre-occupied with negative 
evaluational thoughts irrespective of whether they are in a social situation. Furthermore, 
they suggested that during a social encounter, the primary attentional concern of the 
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socially phobic is towards the `self', such as thoughts of negative evaluation and 
physiological sensations pertaining to anxiety and consequently avoid attentional 
processing of external threatening information. This attentional avoidance is considered 
to be a safety behaviour (Salkovskis, 1991), because the person with social phobia feels 
that they are reducing the risk of being humiliated. Clark and Wells noted however, that 
such avoidance leads to the reduction of opportunities that might disconfirm negative 
appraisals, thus maintaining the fear. 
As shown in the literature review in chapter two, in order to test such theoretical 
notions, several studies have utilised the emotional Stroop task to obtain evidence for 
attentional biases in social phobia (e. g., Hope et al., 1990; Mattia et al., 1993). The 
general findings were that social phobia was associated with an attentional bias towards 
socially threatening words. Furthermore, the issue of specificity, described as both the 
valence and the content of the information presented being of unique relevance to the 
disorder, has been explored in studies involving the Stroop task. Social phobia patients 
displayed an attentional bias towards social threat, panic patients towards bodily 
sensation (Maidenberg et al., 1996) and generalised anxiety disorder patients to general 
worry (Becker et al., 2001) related words. 
To date, the three studies employing a modified version of the dot probe task with 
word stimuli and clinical participants have yielded conflicting results. Two studies failed 
to find any evidence of selective attention to threatening words using this paradigm 
(Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Horenstein & Segui, 1997). A recent study by Musa et al. 
(2003) investigated the nature of the attentional bias in socially phobic patients with and 
without concurrent depression. They found that social phobia without depression was 
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associated with an attentional bias towards social and physical threat words, in 
comparison to low anxious controls. Interestingly, patients with social phobia and 
concurrent depression failed to demonstrate any evidence of an attentional bias. This 
finding provided further support for the notion that high levels of depression could 
actually abolish any attentional bias effect in anxious populations (e. g., Bradley et al. 
1995). 
The visual dot-probe task has also been used in analogue studies with high and 
low socially anxious students under social-evaluation (Mansell et al., 2002) and non- 
evaluation conditions (Pishyar et al., 2004). These studies failed to find any evidence of 
an attentional bias for socially threatening words to be associated with social anxiety. 
Indeed, both studies concluded that social anxiety was not associated with an attentional 
bias towards or away from visually presented words: If however, one considers the 
findings from the trait anxiety dot-probe studies presented in chapter one, this conclusion 
seems somewhat premature. Indeed, these studies found that the high trait anxious 
participants selectively attend to threatening words under high state anxiety conditions, in 
comparison to the low trait anxious (e. g., Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988, Mogg et al., 
1994). 
The choice of self-report questionnaire used to determine levels of social anxiety 
in analogue samples could be an influential factor in the non-significant results from the 
visual dot-probe studies (Mansell et al., 2002; Pishyar et al., 2004). In particular, Mogg 
and Bradley (2002) found no evidence of an attentional bias in students with high levels 
of social anxiety as determined by the FNE scale to threatening faces in a dot-probe task. 
However, further analysis revealed that the scores from the SAD questionnaire 
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demonstrated a positive relationship with the attentional bias scores from the aversive 
facial stimuli. In view of this, Mogg and Bradley suggested that the SAD scale may be a 
better predictor of attentional bias in a socially anxious sample. Furthermore, a recent 
study by Mansell et al. (2003) developed a novel probe detection task to measure internal 
and external attention simultaneously. They found no evidence of an attentional bias in 
students high and low in social anxiety as determined by the FNE measure. This study 
did however report an internal attentiönal bias in high speech anxious students, using the 
Personal Report of Confidence as a Speaker scale (Paul, 1966) as a group predictor. 
Taken together, it seems fair to propose that the screening instrument may be critical in 
the identification of attentional biases in the non-clinical socially anxious population. 
A final factor to consider from the dot-probe studies is the issue of word selection. 
Essentially, the aforementioned studies were based on the original MacLeod et al. (1986) 
study that investigated attentional bias in generalised anxiety disorder. Thus, they 
included similar categories of socially threatening and physically threatening words to 
establish the specificity of the attentional bias. Although the word pools used do vary 
from study to study. For example, Asmundson and Stein (1994) included generally 
socially threatening words (e. g., criticised, foolish, inept) and physically threatening 
words that comprised of a mix of panic related (e. g., suffocating, gasping dizzy) and 
violence related (e. g., attack, pain, emergency) words. Horenstein and Sergui (1997) 
used mainly physically threatening words (e. g., fracture, mutilated, violence) together 
with social threat words (e. g., stupid, pathetic) and Musa and colleagues (2003) used the 
same stimuli. The problem here, as detailed by Heinrichs and Hofmann (2001), is that 
the social threat words need to be as specific to the current concerns of the socially 
93 
Chapter Three: -Experiment One 
anxious individual and the corresponding physical threat as distinct from the panic related 
concerns as possible. 
To conclude, the literature review in chapter two, together with the brief summary 
presented here have suggested several factors that may have affected the results from the 
previous social anxiety dot-probe studies incorporating threatening words. First, the lack 
of any attentional bias associated with socially anxious samples may be due to the choice 
of participant selection questionnaire. In this current study, the level of social anxiety was 
initially determined by screening on the FNE scale as used in most analogue studies (e. g. 
Bradley et al., 1997; Mansell et al, 2003). The SAD measure was also included during 
the experiment as a secondary measure of social anxiety. Second, participants were - 
tested either in a social-evaluative (believing they are being filmed and that they will 
have to give a speech) or a non-evaluative condition (simply performing the task). This 
manipulation was included to explore the effects of high levels of state social anxiety on 
the nature of the bias. Third, categorically distinct word groups, similar to those included 
in the Stroop studies (e. g., Maidenberg et al., 1996; McNeil et al., 1995) were 
incorporated into the dot probe task. Three word groups were specific to the concerns of 
the socially anxious, comprising negative evaluation (e. g., failure, inept), social situation 
(e. g., interview, party) and somatic sensation (e. g., blushing, faint) words. In addition, a 
physical threatening word group (e. g., injury, coffin) representing general threat was 
incorporated. 
Thus, the overall aim of this current study was to ascertain the nature and 
conditions of the attentional bias associated with social anxiety, using a dot-probe task. 
Furthermore, to address the aforementioned theoretical conflict, hypotheses were derived 
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in consideration of these theoretical frameworks. In view of both Beck et al. 's (1985) 
and Rapee and Heimberg's (1997) notions, no evidence of an attentional bias was 
expected in the high socially anxious in the non-evaluation condition. This is because 
both theories predicted that it is the social situation itself that activates cognitive biases in 
the socially anxious. Thus, in the social-evaluation condition, the high socially anxious 
would be predicted by these theories to display an attentional bias towards all socially 
threatening stimuli relating to the self and the environment. This would be demonstrated 
by an attentional bias towards negative evaluation, somatic sensation and social situation 
words. No attentional biasing effects would be expected in either experimental condition 
with the physical threat words, as they are not specific to the disorder. 
In contrast, the Clark and Wells (1995) model suggested a more complex 
interaction between the nature of threat cue and levels of social-evaluative anxiety. 
Therefore, in the non-evaluative condition, the high socially anxious would be expected 
to display an attentional bias towards the negative evaluational words, as this model 
predicted that high levels of social anxiety is associated with a pre-occupation with 
negative evaluation. No further processing differences would be expected between the 
high and low socially anxious in the no-threat condition. In the social-evaluation 
condition, the model hypothesised that individuals high in social anxiety would display 
an attentional bias towards interoceptive information such as negative evaluation and 
somatic sensations. As a consequence of this self-focus, no evidence of an attentional 
bias in the high socially anxious towards the social situation words or the physical 
threatening words would be expected in this experimental condition by Clark and Wells. 
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Method 
Participants 
Students from Sheffield Hallam University (n = 397), who were predominantly 
female due to the sex distribution of students on health and psychology degrees, were 
screened using the FNE scale. Those scoring in the upper (19 and over) and lower (12 
and under) tertiles on the questionnaire, constituting high and low social anxiety groups 
respectively, were invited to take part. Of these, 89 students participated in the main 
study, of which 9 participants were excluded because their FNE scores on the day of 
testing were not consistent with their screening assessment. The remaining participants 
consisted of 7 males and 73 females with an age range of 18 to 44 years and a mean age 
of 22.7 years (SD = 6.1). There were no social anxiety group differences in age and 
gender ratio across social anxiety groups and experimental conditions (%2<1). Gender 
was equally distributed across the social anxiety groups and participants were randomly 
allocated to either the social-evaluation or the non-evaluation condition. 
Word List Generation 
The visual dot probe task included negative evaluation, social situation, somatic 
sensation and physical threat word groups. Sixteen words were selected for each of the 
four groups taken from previous social phobia literature (Asmundson & Stein, 1994; 
Hope et al., 1990; Lundh & Ost, 1996; Maidenberg et al., 1996; McNeil et al., 1995). 
Each threat word. was paired with a neutral word, and a further two hundred and twenty- 
seven neutral-neutral word pairs were created. All word pairs were matched for length 
and frequency of usage in the English language (Kucera & Francis, 1967). The 582 
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words were rated by 17 postgraduate students from the University of Sheffield. They 
were instructed to rate how socially threatening each particular word would be to a 
socially anxious individual (see Appendix 1 for the booklet used to rate each word). 
Please see Appendix 2 for the mean rating score (and standard deviations) for every word 
included in the booklet'. The words included in this study were selected on the basis of 
having a high overall mean threat rating and that the neutral words had a low overall 
mean rating. The 12 words for each threat category with its paired neutral word that were 
included in this study are presented in Table 3.1. One hundred and sixty-eight neutral- 
neutral words pairs were also selected to act as filler words. Four word lists contained 
the 48 threat-neutral (12 from each word category) and 168 neutral-neutral word pairs 
presented in a different random order. The participant was randomly allocated to a word 
list. 
' It is important to note that as the postgraduate students were not necessary socially 
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The Modified Dot Probe Task 
All stimuli were presented to participants using a PC. The visual dot probe task 
comprised a total of 216 trials. Each trial began with a black cross in the centre of the 
screen for 500 milliseconds, together with a computer generated auditory tone, to serve as 
a fixation cue. A randomly chosen word pair was then presented, with one word 
appearing just above and the other word appearing just below the position of the fixation 
cue. All word pairs were presented in upper case for 500 ms and were 3cm apart. On 96 
critical trials (12 threat-neutral pairs from each word group and 48 neutral-neutral word 
pairs), the word pairs were replaced with a dot probe appearing in either the upper or 
lower location after a 25 msec delay. The participant was instructed to press the spacebar 
on the keyboard as soon as they saw the dot probe and the dot remained on the screen 
until detected. The probability of the threat word and subsequent dot probe appearing at 
either the upper or lower position on the monitor was equated. On the non-probed trials, 
the next randomly chosen word pair followed after an inter-stimulus delay of 1 sec. 
Standardised Measures 
Levels of social anxiety were measured using the FNE and SAD scales. Trait and 
state anxiety were assessed by the use of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S/T: 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983). The Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI: Beck, Ward, Mendelsohn, Mick & Erbaugh, 1961) was used to determine 
participants' levels of depression. The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SDS: 
Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was included to measure whether there was any difference in 
the levels of repressed coping style between the two groups. This was because Mogg, 
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Bradley, Miller, Potts, Glenwright and Kentish (1994) argued that a low level of trait 
anxiety and a high score on the SDS is a potential confounding variables, as these 
individuals with their repressive coping style can behave in a similar way to high anxious 
individuals during cognitive experimental techniques. The same standardised 
questionnaires were used in experiments one, two and three. 
Procedure 
Ethical approval for this experiment was obtained from the University of 
Sheffield's ethics committee. The participants were tested individually in a research 
cubicle and were seated approximately 80 cm from the computer screen. The computer 
used was an Acer Veriton 7200D PC with Pentium 4 processor running under Windows 
2000 and the monitor was a CTX Ultra Screen 21" CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 
60hz. On arrival, they were told they would complete some questionnaires, take part in a 
reaction time test and possibly perform a mildly stressful task. Following consent, all 
participants completed the FNE, SAD, STAI-T and STAI-S scales. Upon completion, 
half of the participants in each of the social anxiety groups were then given the following 
social-evaluation induction, based on Mansell et al. 's (1999) instructions: 
The next part of this experiment is an assessment of your social skills and 
public speaking ability. This camera present in the corner of the room will 
be recording you whilst you are doing the computer task. Then I am going 
to ask you to make a speech on a controversial topic. I will tell you what 
the topic is after the computer task and you will have 3 minutes to prepare 
for it. I will take you through to the room next door where you will give 
your speech, which will also be recorded. I will watch you give the 
speech and rate you on several different measures of the effectiveness of 
your presentation. The video camera is recording you so that later some 
expert psychologists can make ratings of your ability as well. Right, now 
it is time to start the main computer task and one final point to remember 
is that your performance here today has been shown to predict your final 
degree mark. I will give you full feedback after the experiment. 
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The remaining participants in the non-evaluation condition were told: 
The next part of this experiment is a computer-based task. Please ignore 
this camera in the corner of the room. It will not be recording you whilst 
you are doing the computer task. The camera is unplugged and it used for 
other experiments that take place in this room (experimenter goes over to 
the camera and shows participant that the camera is unplugged and points 
the camera away from the individual). Right, now it is time to start the 
main computer task and one final point to remember is that your 
performance here today has been shown to predict your final degree mark. 
I will give you full feedback after the experiment. 
Next, they performed the dot-probe task, beginning with 10 practise trials that 
were repeated until the participant had completed them successfully. All participants 
then completed the STAI-S scale once again. Next, the participants completed the main 
experimental dot-probe trials. At the end of the computer task, the participants in the 
social-evaluative condition were advised that they would not have to give a speech and 
all participants completed the STAI-S, the BDI and the SDS measures. Finally, they 
were thanked and fully debriefed. 
Results 
The aim of this study was to ascertain the nature of the attentional bias in social 
anxiety, in relation to the specificity of the stimuli, under either a social-evaluation or a 
non-evaluation condition. Preliminary analyses were performed throughout to ensure no 
violation of assumptions, such as normality, linearity and homogeneity of variance. 
The participants' scores on the FNE initially determined the high and low social 
anxiety groups. However, subsequent analyses of the reaction time data failed to find any 
significant main effects or interactions (all Fs <1). The data was also analysed using the 
same 80 participants with the social anxiety groups classified by a median split of the 
scores on the SAD scale. Scores of 4 or less classified the low social anxiety group and 5 
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or more represented the high social anxiety group. In terms of participant movement 
between social anxiety groups, 28% of the high FNE group was re-classified to the low 
SAD group and 23% of the low FNE group was re-assigned to the high SAD group. The 
relationship between the FNE and the SAD measures was investigated using Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient. There was a strong positive correlation between 
the two questionnaires, r= . 637, n= 80, p <. 001. The participant characteristics and the 
social-evaluation manipulation results are presented below in consideration of both 
questionnaires, with the emphasis on the SAD scale. 
Participant Characteristics 
The participants' scores on each of the questionnaires were subjected to a two- 
way, social anxiety group (high vs. low) by threat induction (social-evaluation vs. non- 
evaluation) ANOVA. There was no main effect of threat and no two-way interaction (all 
Fs < 1) for any of the questionnaire measures, as would be expected from the random 
allocation of participants to the social-evaluation and non-evaluation conditions. The 
main effect of social anxiety group (see Tables 3.2. & 3.3. ) indicated that the high 
socially anxious group, determined by both the FNE and the SAD scales, scored higher 
than the low socially anxious on the SAD, FNE, STAI-T and BDI measures. The low 
socially anxious scored higher on the SDS than the high socially anxious when the groups 
were based on the SAD scale, but there were no group differences with the SDS 
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Chapter Three: Experiment One 
Threat Induction 
Levels of state anxiety were measured at three different time-points throughout 
the study. This was at the beginning of the study (before), after the experimental 
manipulation (during) and at the end of the study (after) using the STAI-S scale. Please 
see Figure 3.1. for full details of the mean STAI-S score for each social anxiety group for 
each time-point in the non-evaluation and social-evaluative condition. A three-way 
ANOVA was conducted with two between-participant factors of social anxiety group 
(high SAD vs. low SAD) and threat induction (social-evaluation vs. non-evaluation) and 
a within-participant factor of time-point (before, during, after). Please note that similar 
results were found when the groups were defined using the FNE scale. 
Social Anxiety Group Differences: There was a significant main effect of SAD 
group, F(1,76) = 26.2, p< . 001, partial if = . 26. Pairwise comparisons showed that the 
high SAD group (M = 42.6), when compared to the low SAD group (M = 32.4), had 
greater levels of state anxiety (p < . 001). 
Time-Point Differences: There was a significant main effect of time, F(2,152) = 
29.32, p< . 001, partial rf= . 28. Pairwise comparisons showed that the 
before (M = 
37.9), during (M = 41.2) and after (M = 33.3) time-points were all significantly different 
from one another (all ps < . 01). There was a two-way interaction between time and threat 
induction, F(2,152) = 11.38, p< . 001, partial rf = . 13. This interaction was explored 
using repeated measures ANOVAs to ascertain if the social evaluation manipulation 
increased levels of state anxiety in both participant groups. There was a significant main 
effect of time in the non-evaluation condition, F(1.7,78) = 6.09, p= . 007, partial n= 
. 14, and the social-evaluation condition, F(1.7,78) = 31.64, p <. 001, partial n=. 45. . 45. 
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Non-Evaluation Condition: Pairwise comparisons revealed that levels of state 
anxiety did not differ from entering the room (M = . 
38.6) and beginning the dot-probe task 
(M = 37.6), and that it dropped significantly at the end (M = 34.1) of the experiment (p = 
. 001). These results 
indicate that the participants were not experiencing any increase in 
the level of state anxiety during the experiment. At the end of the study, the participants' 
levels of state anxiety dropped which was probably due to relief of finishing the 
experiment. 
Social-Evaluative Condition: Pairwise comparisons showed that levels of state 
anxiety at the start of the study (M = 37.0) increased after being advised of the social- 
evaluative induction (M = 44.1) and reduced significantly at the end (M = 32.2) of the 
experiment (all ps < . 001). These results show the effectiveness of the social-evaluation 
manipulation, as after being given the induction the levels of state anxiety significantly 
increased in all the participants. After being advised that they would not have to give a 
speech, the participants' level of state anxiety dropped, once again probably due to relief 
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Reaction Time Data Analysis 
On the probe detection task, the percentage of outliers that were removed 
throughout the entire analysis was 3.8%. This was by excluding latency data that fell 
outside two standard deviations from the mean score for each participant. Repeated 
measures ANOVAs were undertaken with social anxiety group (high vs. low) and 
condition (social-evaluation vs. non-evaluation) as between-participant variables, and 
word type (somatic, negative evaluation, situational, physical), probe position (upper vs. 
lower) and word position (upper vs. lower) as within-participant variables. See Table 3.4. 
for details of mean scores for each of these variables. The analysis with the FNE as a 
group predictor revealed no significant main effects or interactions (all Fs < 1), 
subsequently the analyses below are based on the SAD scale2. 
This analysis revealed that there were no significant main effects of group, threat 
induction, word type, word position or probe position (all ps > . 05). However, there were 
significant three-way interactions between word type x threat induction x social anxiety 
group, F(3,228) = 3.18, p =. 025, partial 2= . 04, and word type x probe position x threat 
induction F(3,228) = 2.79, p =. 041, partial 2= . 04. There was also a 
four-way 
interaction between word type x probe position x threat induction x social anxiety group, 
F(3,228) = 3.42, p= .0 18, partial 
2= 
. 04, and a significant five-way interaction involving 
word type x probe position x word position x threat induction x social anxiety group, 
F(3,228) = 5.44, p= . 001, partial 
2= 
. 07. 
2 As suggested by Howell (1997) the reaction time data was also log transformed (LG10) 
to reduce the positive skewness of response distribution. Notably however, the pattern of 
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Chapter Three: Experiment One 
To explore this interaction further, attentional bias scores (cf. MacLeod et al., 
1986) were calculated for each word group using the following equation: 0.5 x [(UpLt- 
UpUt) + (LpUt-LpLt)], where U= upper position, L= lower position, p= probe, t= 
threat word. The bias score reflects the word position x probe position interaction with 
positive values reflecting selective attention towards and negative values reflecting an 
attentional bias away from the threatening words. 
The bias scores were analysed using repeated measures ANOVAs with the social 
anxiety group (high SAD vs. low SAD) and threat induction (social-evaluation vs. non- 
evaluation) as the between-participant variables and the within-participant factor being 
word type (somatic, negative evaluation, situational, physical). This produced a 
significant word type x condition x social anxiety group interaction, F(3,228) = 5.44, p= 
. 001, partial 
2= 
. 07, which corresponded to the five-way 
interaction found for the latency 
data. 
Attentional Bias Score for each Word Group 
To clarify the results further analyses of bias scores was conducted separately for 
each category of word group. Univariate ANOVAs were conducted for each word 
groups bias scores (negative evaluation, somatic sensation, social situation and physical 
threat) with social anxiety group (high SAD vs. low SAD) and threat induction (social- 
evaluation vs. non-evaluation) as between-participant factors. Please see Figure 3.2. for 
details of each word groups bias score for each social anxiety group and threat induction. 
110 












Somatic Sensation Negative Evaluation Social Situation Physical Threat 





43 L 5.5 -5.2 -8.4 
Figure 3.2. Bar Chart Displaying the Mean Attentional Bias Score 
, 
for each Word 
Group and Social Anxiety Group by Condition 
Somatic Sensation Word Group: There were no main effects of social anxiety 
group or threat induction (all Fs < 1), but there was a significant interaction, F(I, 76) = 
4.13, p= . 
046, partial 2= . 
05. An independent samples t-tests revealed that there were no 
significant differences between the social anxiety groups in the non-evaluative condition, 
t(38) = . 
387, p= . 
701. In the social-evaluative condition, an independent samples t-test 
showed that there was a significant difference between the groups, with high social 
anxiety group attending towards, and the low social anxiety group attending away, from 
the somatic sensation words, t(24.48) = 2.33, p= . 
028, d=-. 79. 
Negative Evaluation Word Group. There were no main effects of social anxiety 
group or threat induction (all Fs < 2.7), but there was a significant interaction, F(1,76) = 
6.85, p= . 
011, partial 2= . 
08. An independent samples t-test showed that in the non- 
evaluative condition, the high socially anxious attended towards the threatening words, in 
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comparison to low socially anxious who attended away, L(38) = -3.01, p= . 005, d=-. 94. 
There were no significant differences between the social anxiety groups in the social- 
evaluative condition, t(38) = . 702, p= . 487. 
Social Situation Word Group; There were no main effects of social anxiety group 
or threat induction, or interactions (all Fs < 1). 
Physical Threat Word Group: There were no main effects of social anxiety group 
or condition (all Fs < 1). The interaction between social anxiety group and threat 




Correlations between the attentional bias scores for each word group and 
questionnaire measures showed no significant results in the low social anxiety group (all 
ps > . 05). In the high social anxiety group, bias scores for physical threat words 
correlated positively with SAD scores (r = . 34, p= . 037) and BDI scores (r = . 42, p= 
. 009). Bias score for social situation words positively correlated with STAI-T scores 
(r = 
. 38, p= . 018) and BDI scores (r = . 36, p= . 028) in the high social anxiety participants. 
Thus, in the high social anxiety participants, increased social avoidance and distress and 
depression is associated with greater vigilance for physical threat words, whereas 
increased trait anxiety and depression is associated with greater vigilance for social 
situation words. 
Discussion 
The aim of the first experiment in this thesis was to ascertain the nature of the 
attentional bias to specific categories of threatening words in social anxiety, when 
conditions of social-evaluation were manipulated. A further aim was to address the 
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aforementioned theoretical conflict in relation to the predicted direction of this bias (Beck 
et al., 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The results have revealed 
differences in attentional bias with individuals who experience different levels of social 
avoidance and distress. Furthermore, this bias was not only dependent on the levels of 
social-evaluation, but also on particular category of threatening word. The results 
showed that in the non-evaluation condition, the high socially anxious, in comparison to 
the low socially anxious, displayed an attentional bias towards the negative evaluative 
words, which they lost in the social evaluation condition. Also, in the social-evaluative 
condition, in comparison to the low socially anxious, the high social anxiety group 
demonstrated an attentional bias towards the somatic sensation words. 
These findings have important implications for the previously detailed cognitive 
approaches to social phobia. In consideration of both Beck et al. (1985) and Rapee and 
Heimberg (1997), no attentional bias effects were expected in the non-evaluation 
condition. However, the results from this study suggest that the high socially anxious 
attended towards the socially threatening negative evaluative words in this condition. 
Furthermore, they predicted that individuals high in social anxiety would selectively 
attend towards all socially threatening information in the social-evaluation condition. 
This study only found an attentional bias towards somatic sensation words in the social- 
evaluation condition to be associated with high levels of social anxiety. Thus, the 
evidence reported here provides limited support for these cognitive theoretical 
perspectives, as the attentional bias seems to be far more selective than they suggest. 
These theories may need to take into account not only the saliency of the stimuli, but also 
other cognitive and motivational factors (i. e., somatic sensations being of primary 
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attentional concern when expecting to give a speech) that may underlie selective 
attentional processes. 
With respect to the cognitive model of social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995), the 
findings mainly supported the proposed role of self-focused attention. Insofar as in the 
non-evaluative condition, the high socially anxious displayed by an attentional bias 
towards negative evaluation words, indicating a pre-occupation with thoughts relating to 
negative assessment by the self and others. Additionally when aroused, the high socially 
anxious attended towards the somatic sensations words, highlighting a pre-occupation 
with internal bodily sensations in this condition. In further support of this model, no 
attentional bias effect was present for the social situation words that could be considered 
as externally cued information. Therefore, the present results were largely supportive of 
Clark and Wells' theory, although the predicted attentional bias towards the negative 
evaluational words in the social-evaluative condition was not evident. Two Stroop 
studies have also found that individuals with social phobia did not display an attentional 
bias towards negative evaluational words under conditions of social arousal (Amir et al., 
1996; Amir et al., 2002). Taken together, it seems fair to suggest that, contrary to the 
Clark and Wells prediction, negative evaluation may not be the primary focus of attention 
in high socially anxious individuals during a social-evaluation situation such as the 
anticipation of giving a speech. 
Interestingly, studies with the clinical population have also found individuals with 
social phobia to attend towards their physical sensations when in a socially threatening 
situation. For example, Johanson and Ost (1982) reported that social phobics were 
particularly accurate in the estimation of their heart-rate changes during a social 
114 
Chapter Three: Experiment One 
encounter, suggesting an enhanced awareness of interoceptive information. Additionally, 
Maidenberg et al. (1996) also found that social phobia patients were as interested in their 
physical sensations as panic disordered patients and went on to suggest that this was 
restricted to social contexts. In view of this and the current findings, it seems fair to 
propose that somatic sensations are indeed of major attentional focus to the socially 
anxious when in a social-evaluative situation, such as believing they are going to be 
recorded and assessed whilst giving a speech. 
This study was consistent with Mogg and Bradley's (2002) proposal that social 
avoidance and distress, as indicated by scores on the SAD scale, is an important factor in 
identifying dysfunctional attentional processing in social anxiety. Indeed, there were no 
significant findings when the FNE scale was used to determine high and low social 
anxiety groups. In a large-scale epidemiological study by Kessler et al. (1998), it was 
notable that although fear of public speaking was common, it was social phobia with 
more extensive fears that was the most persistent and disabling in the general population. 
Consequently, as Watson and Friend (1969) designed the SAD measure to assess the 
more multiple social fears, it seems fair to suggest that this questionnaire may be more 
sensitive to general and disabling effects of social anxiety. The FNE scale on the other 
hand, measures the more common fear of being evaluated in a negative fashion. Although 
it is important to note that research (e. g., Mansell et al., 1999; Pishyar et al., 2004) has 
reported attentional bias effects using the FNE scale too. Turner et al. (1987) explored the 
reliability and validity of the SAD and the FNE questionnaires within a clinical 
population. They argued that the questionnaires lacked discriminant validity and may be 
inappropriate for the use in participant selection. However, Cox and Swinson (1995) and 
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Heimberg et al. (1988) both reviewed this topic and concluded that both questionnaires 
appeared to be reliable measures of social anxiety and social phobia. Essentially, the 
issue of which questionnaire to use when determining high and low levels of social 
anxiety in analogue studies needs to be researched further. In view of this, chapter six of 
this thesis presents a psychometric analysis of these measures. 
The implications from this research are that in contrast to previous analogue 
studies (Mansell et al., 2002; Pishyar et al., 2004), word stimuli can be employed within 
cognitive experimental paradigms to identify the subtle differences in attentional 
processing styles of the socially anxious. This study has demonstrated that any 
attentional biasing effect is dependent not only on levels of social-evaluation, but also on 
the specific type of the threat word used in a visual dot-probe task. Future research needs 
to incorporate stimuli relating to somatic sensations, as well as other key socially 
threatening words, when exploring cognitive biases in both analogue and clinical socially 
anxious samples. 
The first limitation of this experiment was that it utilised a sample of 
undergraduate students, rather than individuals experiencing clinical levels of social 
phobia. Future research therefore needs to focus on a clinical sample diagnosed with 
social phobia to ascertain if these findings are applicable to patients with this disorder. 
This is investigated in chapter five of this thesis using a sample of participants with 
clinical levels of social phobia. The second limitation regards the data that represented 
the mean score for each data point in the initial reaction time analysis. The twelve words 
per threat word group basically allowed for three of the participant's reaction times to be 
included in each mean score, as there were four data points per word group. (e. g., see 
116 
Chapter Three: Experiment One 
Table 3.4. ). Indeed, there was concern that three reaction times was not sufficient to be 
representative of the actual mean score. This concern was heightened further as after 
removing the extreme scores, in certain cases there was only one of two data point per 
mean. In order to address this issue, the recommendation here is to increase the number 
of critical trials by either including more threat words and/or presenting the trials more 
than once. This would allow for more reaction time data to be included into the mean 
data points after the extreme scores had been removed. In view of this, both experiments 
two and three in this thesis have increased the number of threat words per category. 
In summary, the current experiment has identified that the nature of the cognitive 
attentional biasing effect in the trait socially anxious is dependent on a complex 
interaction of the saliency and interoceptive nature of the threatening word to the socially 
anxious individual, together with their current level of social-evaluative anxiety. The 
findings suggest that the high socially anxious' primary concern is with a general pre- 
occupation of being evaluated in a negative fashion, which changes during a social- 
evaluation situation to an attentional bias towards somatic sensations. Thus providing 
further evidence of the self-focusing internal processing style of the socially anxious as 
proposed by Clark and Wells (1995). 
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Chapter, 4 
Attentional Bias in Social Anxiety: 
Manipulation of Stimulus Duration and 
Social-Evaluative Anxiety 
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Experiment Two 
Introduction 
This experiment was designed to replicate the findings from experiment one and 
to extend the research further by examining pre-attentional processing in a socially 
anxious analogue sample. Thus, the visual dot-probe task incorporated the same 
categories of threatening semantic stimuli as in the previous experiment, but increased 
the number of words per threat category from twelve to sixteen. The stimuli were 
presented for 14 ms (+ 486 ms mask) to assess pre-attentive processing and for 500 ms 
(no mask) to investigate conscious attentional processing and there was the same threat 
induction procedure as in experiment one. 
The anxiety theories presented in chapter one highlighted the importance of 
understanding the specific mechanisms that underlie the pattern of attentional processing 
in anxious populations (e. g., Eysenck, 1992; Williams et al., 1988). Indeed, they predict 
that individuals experiencing high levels of anxiety possess an enduring tendency to 
focus their attention towards threat, whereas low trait anxious people actively shift their 
attention away from such aversive stimuli. Furthermore, when levels of state anxiety are 
low, there are no obvious cognitive differences between those with high or low levels of 
anxiety. However, as the level of state anxiety increases, their predisposition to allocate 
processing resources towards or away from threat respectively, becomes more evident. 
Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) have suggested a theoretical distinction between two stages 
of attentional processing, namely the automatic and the strategic level. They proposed 
that the automatic stage is a fast, unconscious and involuntary process. The strategic 
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level on the other hand, is a more effortful, intentional and controlled stage. In 
consideration of this distinction, these biases are predicted to occur throughout the 
attentional system, both at an automatic and a strategic capture of attention. 
Indeed, Mogg and Bradley (2002) have proposed that a key issue in cognitive 
conceptualisations of anxiety is the potential role of pre-attentive biases in the aetiology 
and maintenance of anxiety disorders. In support, Mathews, Ridgeway and Williamson 
(1996) detailed that it is important to determine whether an automatic bias exists, as it 
may help to explain how anxiety episodes occur outside of the person's awareness. 
Furthermore, the identification of the nature of automatic processing in anxiety, may lead 
to improved methods of clinical treatment that concentrates on the unhelpful selective 
attentional patterns associated with the particular anxiety disorder (e. g., Luecken et al., 
2004). Thayer and Lane (2000) also argued that automatic hypervigilance towards 
potential threat serves to perpetuate anxiety and associated physiological arousal, even 
when there is no actual threat present. Thus, it is important to determine the nature of 
attentional processing in anxious populations at a pre-conscious level of processing. 
One way in which cognitive research examines automatic attentional biases is to 
use a computerised visual attention task incorporating brief, masked visual stimuli. This 
allows for the awareness of the presentation to be restricted and not consciously 
processed (Holender, 1986). As described in chapter one, studies have used the 
emotional Stroop and the visual dot-probe task to assess pre-attentive and conscious 
attentional processing in anxious populations. Stroop research has shown that individuals 
with generalised anxiety disorder and trait anxiety are associated with prolonged colour- 
naming latencies for disorder-specific words, even when these are masked to prevent 
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conscious awareness (e. g., Bradley et al., 1995; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Mogg et 
at., 1993a; Mogg et al., 1993b). Additionally, the interference effect of masked threat 
words in a Stroop task has been shown to reduce in patients following successful 
treatment for generalised anxiety disorder (Mogg et al., 1995a). 
Visual dot-probe studies on the other hand, have reported inconsistent evidence of 
pre-attentional processing in anxious populations. For example, Mogg et al. (1995b) 
have reported evidence of subliminal attentional bias towards negative words in clinically 
anxious participants. Whereas, Mogg et al. 's (1994) results suggested that preconscious 
processing differs as a function of trait and state anxiety. In this study, an attentional bias 
towards threat was only found in the masked trials in the low stress condition. Overall, 
there appears to be a lack of cognitive experimental studies concentrating on the role of 
state anxiety variables and its influence on preconscious processing biases in anxious 
populations. 
Fox (1996) has suggested that much of the work demonstrating unconscious 
attentional biases may simply reflect conscious priming. Fox proposed that as the 
masked and unmasked trials were intermixed, participants were aware that threat-related 
words were sometimes being presented. This procedure means that the conscious 
presentation of threatening stimuli will activate a search for further threat in anxious 
individuals. Consequently, any pre-conscious automatic attentional bias effects may be 
as a result of conscious strategic processes. In a series of studies addressing this issue, 
Fox (1996) reported evidence that an attentional bias to masked threat stimuli only 
occurred in a context where unmasked and masked trials were randomly intermixed or 
where a block of unmasked trials preceded the masked trials. In either case, the 
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participants were consciously aware that threat words were being presented. Conversely, 
a study by Wikström et al. (2003) that only included masked threat word trials, reported 
that high trait anxious individuals demonstrated an attentional bias for threatening stimuli 
at a preconscious level. With such conflicting evidence it is clear that this issue of 
priming needs to be explored further. 
The studies mentioned so far include trait anxious participants or individuals with 
generalised anxiety disorder. Clark (1999) suggested that different types of anxiety are 
associated with different patterns of attentional processing. Indeed as presented in 
chapter two, Clark and Wells (1995) proposed that individuals with this social anxiety 
and social phobia are generally pre-occupied with negative evaluation. In a social 
situation, they argued that their attentional focus is on internal threat cues (e. g., negative 
evaluational and visible anxiety symptoms). In contrast, Beck et al. (1985) and Rapee 
and Heimberg (1997) have suggested that consistent with other anxiety disorders, socially 
phobic individuals show preferential processing of disorder-specific threatening stimuli. 
This style of information processing results in an attentional bias towards all socially 
threatening information, including external cues such as social situations and negative 
reactions from people. Musa and Lepine (2000) propose that it is generally assumed 
from these theories that the attentional bias is an automatic as well as a conscious 
process. In support of the latter two theories, Mogg and Bradley (2002) reported that 
socially anxious individuals displayed a bias towards masked threatening faces, 
suggesting an automatic attentional bias towards external disorder-specific threat. To 
date, this is the only study to examine pre-attentive processing in the socially anxious 
using the visual dot probe task. 
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The aims of this current study was to not only replicate the conscious attentional 
bias results from experiment one, but also to provide a clearer understanding of the 
pattern of pre-attentional processing in social anxiety. The experimental design and 
procedure were thus similar to experiment one. However, to address Fox's (1996) 
concern that pre-attentive biases are influenced by conscious priming of threat in the 
post-conscious trials, the masked trials (automatic processing) were completed first, 
before the unmasked trials (strategic processing). Also, the participants were selected 
using the SAD scale, as the previous experiment showed it to be a better predictor of 
attentional biases in socially anxious samples. The FNE scale was also included to 
provide further clarity on this issue. 
As this is the first study to explore the interplay of pre-attentive biases in the 
socially anxious to semantic stimuli and the influence of social-evaluation upon this, the 
hypotheses were considered in light of several theoretical viewpoints. All predictions are 
based on comparing the high socially anxious individuals with the low socially anxious 
participants. First, in direct consideration of the theoretical perspectives of Beck et al. 
(1985), Rapee and Heimberg (1997) and Williams et al. (1988), the high socially anxious 
were predicted to display an attentional bias towards all socially threatening stimuli (e. g., 
negative evaluation, somatic sensation and social situation words). Furthermore, these 
models suggested that this attentional bias would be at an automatic and strategic level of 
processing, but only occurring under conditions of social-evaluation. Second, Eysenck 
(1992) proposed that the socially anxious would initially be hypervigilant towards all 
social and physical threat stimuli demonstrated by an automatic pre-attentional bias 
towards all the threat words. At a conscious level of processing, he suggested that the 
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attentional bias would be towards all socially threatening stimuli. He also suggested that 
the intensity of the attentional bias effect would be greater in the social-evaluation 
condition, than the non-evaluation condition. Third, the Clark and Wells (1985) model 
predicted a pre-conscious and conscious bias towards negative evaluation in the non- 
evaluation condition. Under söcial-evaluative conditions, this model would predict a pre- 
attentive and conscious processing bias towards interoceptive threat such as negative 
evaluation and somatic sensation words. 
Finally, the predictions in the conscious processing stage were also based on 
replicating the findings from experiment one. Therefore, the high socially anxious would 
be expected to display an attentional bias towards negative evaluation words in the non- 
evaluation condition and towards somatic words in the social-evaluation condition. 
Method 
Participants 
Students from Sheffield Hallam University (n = 561) studying for a health-related 
or psychology degree were screened using the SAD and the FNE scales. Those scoring 
in the upper (8 and over) and lower (3 and under) tertiles of the SAD questionnaire were 
invited to take part. A total of 103 students participated in the main study, of which 21 
participants were excluded because their SAD score on the day was not consistent with 
their screening score. The remaining participants consisted of 67 females and 15 males. 
There was a predominance of females due to the sex distribution of students on health 
and psychology courses. The age range was 18 to 55 years, with mean age of 23.7 years 
(SD = 8.7). There were no social anxiety group differences in age and gender ratio across 
experimental conditions (2<1). Gender was equally distributed across the social anxiety 
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groups and participants were randomly allocated to either the social-evaluation or the 
non-evaluation condition. 
Materials 
All the words included in this study came from the original word selection criteria 
detailed in experiment one. To address the methodological concern of the possibility that 
mean score for each data point was based on an insufficient number of reaction time 
latencies, this experiment included 16 words per threat group (negative evaluation, 
somatic sensation, social situation and physical threat). See Table 4.1. for details of the 
64 threat-neutral word pairs. The words were randomly divided into two word sets (A 
and B). Each word set consisted of the 32 threat words (8 words from each group), 
paired with a neutral word and 64 neutral-neutral word pairs. The allocation of the word 
sets to the masked and unmasked conditions was balanced across participants, with half 
of them receiving set A pre-attentively and set B consciously, and vice versa. In total, the 
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The Modified Dot Probe Task 
All stimuli were presented on a computer. As in experiment one, each trial began 
with a black cross in the centre of the screen for 500 milliseconds, together with a sound 
. of a bleep, to serve as a fixation cue. 
A randomly chosen word pair replaced this, with 
one word appearing just above and the other word appearing just below the location of 
the preceding black cross. The words were presented in upper case and were 3 cm apart. 
The main task consisted of a total of 576 trials, 288 per exposure condition (pre- 
attentional and conscious processing). The pre-attentional condition was always 
presented first to address the aforementioned concerns of Fox (1996). 
Consistent with previous studies investing pre-attentive processing biases (e. g., 
Mogg et al., 1994; Mogg et al., 1995; Fox, 1996), the masked trials consisted of the word 
pairs being displayed for 14 ms, followed by a pair of masks (e. g. XXXX) that were 
presented for 486 ms. The masked pair were matched for word length and word position, 
so that they completely obscured the previously presented words. The stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA) was 14 ms. In the unmasked trials, word pairs were displayed for 500 
ms and there was no masking of the words. 
In both masked and unmasked visual dot probe trials, there were 96 threat-neutral 
and 48 neutral-neutral word pairs with the dot probe appearing after a 25 msec delay. 
There was an additional 144 non-probed neutral-neutral words trials to act as fillers. The 
participant was instructed to press the spacebar as soon as they saw the dot-probe and the 
dot remained on the screen until detected. If no dot appeared on the screen they were told 
to simply wait for the next trial. The probability of the threat word and subsequent dot 
probe appearing at either the upper or lower position on the monitor was equated. On the 
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non-probed trials, the next randomly chosen word pair followed after an inter-stimulus 
delay of 1 sec. 
Awareness Checks 
The participants completed two awareness checks in a well-lit room and the 
participants were light adapted (cf. Holender, 1986). First, they attempted the 
presence/absence task (Cheesman & Merikle, 1985; Merikle & Reingold, 1990). This 
involved randomly presented `word present' and `word absent' trials. The task began 
with a 500 ms fixation point, then a word pair (word present) or a blank screen (word 
absent) was displayed for 14 msec, followed by a pair of pattern masks for 486 msec. 
Participants were told that on 50% of the trials a word pair was being presented and on 
the remaining 50% a blank screen (cf. Kemp-Wheeler & Hill, 1988). They were 
instructed to press either "Yes" (word pair present) or "No" (word pair absent) keys. And 
the response accuracy was recorded. This was followed by the lexical-decision task 
consisting of same exposure conditions and instructions. On half of the trials, word pairs 
were presented and on the other trials a pair of non-words were shown and then followed 
by pattern masks. Each non-word in a pair was matched for length (e. g., 
GNUSE/SKORT). The order of the trials was fully randomised and the participant 
pressed the "Yes" (word pair) or the "No" (non-word pair) keys and the response 
accuracy was recorded. Both awareness tasks began with 10 practise trials before the 40 
experimental trials. All the stimulus word pairs were a subset of those presented in the 
masked condition of the probe task, with an equal number of word pairs from the 
somatic, situational, negative evaluation, physical threat and neutral word groups. 
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Standardised Measures 
This study included the same questionnaires as detailed in experiment one, except 
that a more up-to-date version of the BDI-II (Beck, Steer & Brown 1996) was used. This 
version of the questionnaire assesses symptoms of depression that are more consonant 
with the DSM-III-R and the DSM-IVIV criteria, such as increases and decreases in sleep 
patterns and appetite. Beck et at. (1996) have reworded lots of the items and the clinical 
implications were also attached to some of the items too. 
Procedure 
Ethical approval for this experiment was obtained from the University of 
Sheffield's ethics committee. The participants were tested individually in a cubicle, 
where they were seated approximately 80 cm from the computer screen. The computer 
used was an Acer Veriton 7200D PC with Pentium 4 processor running under Windows 
2000 and the monitor was a CTX Ultra Screen 21" CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 
60hz. On arrival, they consented to completing some questionnaires, taking part in a 
reaction time test and to the possibility of performing a mildly stressful task. First, the 
participants completed the FNE, SAD, STAI-S and STAI-T scales. Following this, half 
of the participants were given the social-evaluation instructions, and the remaining 
participants were given the non-evaluation induction that was detailed in experiment one. 
Next, they performed the computerised task which began with 10 practise masked and 10 
practise unmasked trials. They had to successfully complete both practise trials before 
continuing. After this, they completed the STAI-S once again and then the first block of 
masked visual dot trials. Next, the participants were given a 2-minute rest period before 
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completing the unmasked word trials. At the end of the computer task, the participants in 
the social-evaluative condition were advised that they would not have to give a speech. 
The presence/absence task, followed by the lexical decision task, was then performed. 
Finally, all participants completed the STAI-S, the BDI and the SDS questionnaires. The 
participants were thanked and fully debriefed before leaving. 
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Results 
The aim of this study was to ascertain the nature of pre-attentive and conscious 
attentional biases in social anxiety, in relation to the specificity of the stimuli, under 
either a social-evaluation or a non-evaluation condition. Preliminary analyses were 
performed throughout to ensure no violation of assumptions, such as normality, linearity 
and homogeneity of variance. 
Awareness Decision Tasks 
All participants reported that they were unable to perceive the stimuli presented 
under the masked exposure condition. On both awareness check tasks, the proportion of 
trials with the correct and incorrect responses was calculated for each participant. As the 
participants were aware that there was an equal probability on each trial that either a 
word/non-word or that a word was present/absent behind the masking, the proportion of 
correct responses expected by chance would be 0.5 (cf. Kemp-Wheeler & Hill, 1988). A 
supplementary analysis, d (a measure of sensitivity derived from signal detection theory) 
was also calculated for each participant. 
Presence/Absence Discrimination Task: The mean response probabilities for 
the proportion of correct hits were 0.319 (SD 0.206) and false alarms were 0.681 (SD 
0.206). Mean d score was -1.362 (SD 0.411), which was significantly different than 
zero, t(81) = 30.00, p <. 001. None of these values differed between the SAD groups (p > 
1). One sample t-tests were conducted to assess the extent to which participants' 
proportion of correct hits deviated from chance (0.5). This revealed that the overall 
performance of the sample (n = 82) differed from that expected by chance, t(81) = 7.97, p 
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< . 001. This suggests that the participants were aware that stimuli were being presented 
before the pattern masks. 
Lexical Decision Discrimination Task: The mean response probabilities for 
the proportion of correct hits were 0.500 (SD 0.703) and false alarms were 0.501 (SD 
0.702). The mean value of d was -1.00 (SD . 1415), which was significantly 
different 
from zero, t (81) = 64.14, p< . 00 1. There were no SAD group 
differences between these 
values (p > 1). One sample t-tests were undertaken to ascertain the extent that the 
participants' proportion of correct hits deviated from chance (0.5) and revealed that the 
participants did not differ from chance, t (81) = . 147, p= . 883. This suggests that 
participants were generally unaware of the lexical content of a word. 
Overall, the awareness checks indicate that a substantial proportion of the sample 
were able to detect the presence versus the absence of the stimuli, but were generally 
unaware of the lexical content of the word, when masked. Thus, is seems safe to assume 
that the distracting words were below at least a subjective threshold of awareness (cf. 
Kemp-Wheeler & Hill, 1988). These findings are consistent with previous studies 
investigating pre-attentive biases in anxiety (e. g., Fox, 1996; Mogg et al., 1994). 
Participant Characteristics 
The participants' scores on each of the questionnaires were submitted to a two- 
way social anxiety group (high SAD vs. low SAD) by threat induction (social-evaluation 
vs. non-evaluation) ANOVAs. There was no main effect of threat and no two-way 
interaction (all Fs < 1) for any of the questionnaire measures, as would be expected from 
the random allocation of participants to the social-evaluation and non-evaluation 
conditions. The main effect of social anxiety group (see Table 4.2. ) indicated that the 
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high socially anxious group scored higher than the low socially anxious on the SAD 
(recruitment and experiment), FNE, STAI trait anxiety scale and the BDI-II. The low 
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Threat Induction 
As in experiment one, levels of state anxiety were measured at three different 
time-points throughout the study. This was at the beginning of the study (before), after 
the experimental manipulation (during) and at the end of the study (after) using the 
STAI-S scale. Please see Figure 4.1. for full details of the mean STAI-S score for each 
social anxiety group for each time-point in the non-evaluation and social-evaluation 
condition A three-way ANOVA was conducted with two between-participant factors of 
social anxiety group (high SAD vs. low SAD) and threat induction (social-evaluation vs. 
non-evaluation) and a within-participant factor of time-point (before, during, after). 
Social Anxiety Group Differences: There was a significant main effect of social 
anxiety group, F(1,78) = 32.9, p< . 001, partial 
2= 
. 30. Pairwise comparisons revealed 
that throughout the experiment, the high socially anxious (M = 41.4), when compared to 
the low socially anxious (M = 32.5), had greater levels of state anxiety (p < . 00 1). 
Time-Point Differences: There was a significant main effect of time, F(2,156) _ 
16.4, p< . 001, partial 
2= 
. 17. Pairwise comparisons showed that the 
before (M = 37.0), 
during (M = 39.6) and after (M = 34.3) time-points were all significantly different from 
one another (p <_ . 01). There was also a 2-way interaction 
between time and condition, 
F(2,156) = 29.0, p< . 00 1, partial 
2= 
. 27. This interaction was explored using repeated 
measures ANOVAs to ascertain if the social evaluation manipulation increased levels of 
state anxiety in both participant groups. There was a significant main effect of time in 
the non-evaluation, F(2,80) = 5.62, p= . 011, partial 
2= 
. 12, and social-evaluation, F(2, 
80) = 37.95, p <. 001, partial 2= . 49 condition. 
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Non-Evaluation Condition: Pairwise comparisons revealed that levels of state 
anxiety in the non-evaluative condition reduced from entering the room (M = 38.6) and 
beginning (M = 34.5) the dot-probe task (p = . 013) and that it remained constant (M = 
34.4) at the end of the experiment (p = . 895). These results indicate that the participants 
were not experiencing any increase in the level of state anxiety during the experiment. At 
the end of the study, the participants' levels of state anxiety dropped which is probably 
due to relief of the experiment being over. 
Social-Evaluation Condition: Pairwise comparisons showed that levels of state 
anxiety increased from entering the room (M = 35.3) and after being advised (M = 44.6) 
of the manipulation (p < . 001) and reduced significantly at the end (M = 34.3) of the 
experiment (p < . 001). As in experiment one, these results show the effectiveness of the 
social-evaluation manipulation, as after being given the induction participants' level of 
state anxiety increased significantly. After being advised that they would not have to 
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Reaction Time Data Analysis 
On the probe detection task, the percentage of outliers that were removed from the 
entire analysis was 2.8% in the masked trials and 4.3% in the unmasked trials. This was 
by excluding latency data that fell outside two standard deviations from the mean score of 
each participant. The data from the subliminal and supraliminal trials were analysed 
separately. All analyses were based on the participants' level of social avoidance and 
distress as determined by the SAD scale'. 
Masked Condition 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with social anxiety group (high 
SAD vs. low SAD) and threat induction (social-evaluation vs. non-evaluation) as 
between-participant variables. The within-participant variables were word type (somatic, 
negative evaluation, situational and physical), probe position (upper vs. lower) and threat 
word position (upper vs. lower). See Table 4.4. for details of mean scores for each of 
these variables. This analysis revealed that there was a main effect of word type, F(3, 
234) = 4.41, p =. 005, partial 2='. 05. Overall, participants were quicker to respond to 
negative evaluation (M = 343) than physical threat (M = 346) words (p = . 037) and than 
somatic sensation (M = 347) words (p = . 001). There was also a main effect of threat 
word position, F(1,78) = 4.60, p= . 035, partial 
2 ... 06, with participants demonstrating 
slower reaction times when the threat word was on the top (M = 346) when compared to 
' The participants' scores of fear of negative evaluation based on the FNE scale did not 
produce any significant effects or interactions in the main analyses (all Fs <1). All 
analyses is based on the SAD scale. The reaction time data was log transformed (LG10) 
to reduce the positive skewness of response distribution as suggested by Howell (1997). 
Notably however, the pattern of findings was identical to those reported above 
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the lower (M = 344) part of the screen. There were no other significant main effects (all 
Fs < 3.3). There was a significant two-way interaction between probe position x threat 
induction, F(3,228) = 3.18, p =. 025, partial 2= . 04, and a significant five-way interaction 
involving word type x probe position x word position x threat induction x social anxiety 
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Chapter Four: Experiment Two 
To explore this interaction further, attentional bias scores (cf. MacLeod et al., 
1986) were calculated for each word group using the following equation: 0.5 x [(UpLt- 
UpUt) + (LpUt-LpLt)], where U= upper position, L= lower position, p= probe, t= 
threat word. The bias score reflects the word position x probe position interaction with 
positive values reflecting selective attention towards and negative values reflecting an 
attentional bias away from the threatening words. 
The bias scores were analysed using repeated measures ANOVAs with the social 
anxiety group (high SAD vs. low SAD) and condition (social-evaluation vs. non- 
evaluation) as the between-participant variables and the within-participant factor being 
word type (somatic, negative evaluation, situational, physical). This produced a 
significant word bias x threat induction x social anxiety group interaction, F(3,234) = 
2.75, p= . 044, partial 
Z= 
. 03, which corresponded to the 
five-way interaction found for 
the latency data. 
Attentional bias for each Word Group 
To clarify the results further analyses of bias scores was conducted separately for 
each category of word group. Each analysis consisted of a two-way ANOVA with social 
anxiety group (high SAD vs. low SAD) and condition (social-evaluation vs. non- 
evaluation) as between-participant factors and each word group's bias scores (negative 
evaluational, somatic, situation and physical) as dependent variables were conducted. 
Please see Figure 4.2. for details of each word group's bias score for each social anxiety 
group and experimental condition. 
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Somatic Sensation Negative Evaluation Social Situation Physical Threat 
0 Low SAD (Non-Eval)   High SAD (Non-Eva[) ® Low SAD (Soc-Eval) 93 High SAD (Soc-Eval) 
Figure 4.2. Bar Chart Displaying each Word Group's Mean Attentional Bias Score 
(Masked Trials) for each Social Anxiety Group and Threat Induction 
Somatic Sensation. Negative Evaluation and Social Situation Word Groups: 
There were no main effects or interactions (all Fs < 2.5) with these word groups. 
Physical Threat Word Group: There were no main effects of social anxiety group 
or condition (all Fs'< 1), but there was a significant interaction, F(1,78) = 8.42, p= . 005, 
partial 2=. 10, which was explored with independent samples t-tests. This showed that in 
the social-evaluative condition, there was a significant difference between the high social 
anxiety group who attended towards, and the low social anxiety group who attended 
away, from the physical threat words, t(39) = 2.36, p= . 023, d= . 72. Furthermore, the 
attentional shift from away in the non-evaluation condition to towards in the social 
evaluation condition was significant in the high socially anxious group, t(39) = 2.70, p= 
. 01, d=. 82. 
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Unmasked Condition 
Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted with social anxiety group (high 
SAD vs. low SAD) and condition (social-evaluation vs. non-evaluation) as between- 
participant variables. The within-participant variables were word type (somatic, negative 
evaluation, situational and physical), probe position (upper vs. lower) and threat word 
position (upper vs. lower). See Table 4.5. for details of mean scores for each of these 
variables. This analysis revealed that there were no significant main effects of social 
anxiety group, condition, word type, word position or probe position (all Fs < 1). There 
was a significant two-way interaction between probe position x condition, F(1,78) = 
4.66, p =. 034, partial 2= . 06. There were no other significant interactions (all Fs < 3.7). 
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Somatic Sensation Negative Evaluation Social Situation Physical Threat 
D Low SAD (Non-Eval)   High SAD (Non-Eval) ® Low SAD (Soc-Eval) M High SAD (Soc-Eval) 
Figure 4.3. Bar Chart Displaying Each Word Group's Mean Attentional Bias Score 
(Unmasked Trials) for Each Social Anxiety Group and Experimental 
Condition 
Correlational Analyses 
Correlations between the attentional bias score for each word group and 
questionnaire measures showed that in the low social anxiety group, bias scores for the 
masked somatic words negatively correlated with SDS scores (r = -. 35, p= . 023). In the 
unmasked trials, bias scores for the somatic words positively correlated with SAD scores 
(r = . 32, p= . 039) and negatively with BDI scores (r = -. 36, p= . 
023). In the high social 
anxiety group, bias scores for masked negative evaluation words correlated positively 
with SAD scores (r = . 34, p= . 028). Thus, in low social anxiety participants, 
increased 
social desirability is associated with less vigilance for masked somatic words. This group 
also showed that increased social avoidance and distress is associated with greater 
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vigilance, whereas increased depression is associated with less vigilance for unmasked 
somatic words. In the high social anxiety group, increased social avoidance and distress 
is associated with greater vigilance for masked negative evaluation words. 
Discussion 
The aims of this study were to ascertain the nature of the attentional bias in social 
anxiety, in relation to automatic and strategic attentional processing (Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977), when conditions of social-evaluation are manipulated. The results 
revealed that the high socially anxious participants, compared with those low in social 
anxiety, displayed an attentional bias towards physically threatening masked words, but 
only in the social-evaluation condition. There was no evidence of any further pre- 
attentive processing differences between the social anxiety groups to masked stimuli in 
either experimental condition. In the unmasked trials, there were no differences between 
the social anxiety groups in the nature of the attentional processing under conditions of 
non-evaluation or social-evaluation. All the findings were primarily a function of social 
avoidance and distress as measured by the SAD scale and not fear of negative evaluation 
as measured by the FNE scale. Thus, providing further support for Mogg and Bradley's 
(2002) proposal that the SAD is a better measure for determining attentional bias effects 
in a socially anxious analogue population. 
This study has, therefore, found evidence of a selective pre-attentive bias in the 
high social anxiety group, in comparison to the low socially anxious, towards physical- 
threat words, under conditions of social evaluation. These findings do not support the 
theoretical conceptualisations that predict an attentional bias towards socially threatening 
stimuli occurring at a pre-conscious level of processing (Beck et al., 1985; Clark & 
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Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Williams et al., 1988; 1997). Eysenck's (1992) 
theory, however, is partially supported by this finding, as he proposed a hypervigilance to 
physical and social threat at an automatic level of processing. Although, there was not 
any evidence of this bias in the non-evaluative condition and with socially threatening 
stimuli, which was part of Eysenck's predictions. He also suggested that there would be 
an attentional bias towards social threat at a conscious level of processing which, was not 
found in this experiment. 
The pre-attentional results from this study also contrast with Mogg and Bradley's 
(2002) research, which found a vigilance effect for masked threat faces (external social 
threat) with individuals high in social avoidance and distress, under a no threat condition. 
Heinrichs and Hofmann (2001) have argued that the differences in findings with facial 
and semantic stimuli might be indicative of a separate encoding system for different types 
of information in social phobia. Thus it is difficult to compare the findings from visual 
dot-probe studies using different types of threatening stimuli, such as faces and words. 
Further work is needed in this area, as there is limited research investigating pre-attentive 
biases in the socially anxious to semantic and facial stimuli. 
The results also demonstrate the importance of being in a social-evaluative 
condition for socially anxious individuals, as there were no significant findings with the 
masked word stimuli in the non-evaluation condition. These findings are in contrast to 
Mogg et al. (1994), who only found an attentional bias towards threatening words under 
conditions of low stress in the high trait anxious. Two conclusions can be drawn from 
these two studies. First, that the pattern of attentional processing is different for the trait 
anxious and the socially anxious. Second, as Mogg and colleagues intermixed their 
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masked and unmasked trials, the possibility of priming effects may have influenced the 
results in some way (Fox, 1996). 
Furthermore, this study challenges the argument posed by Fox (1996), that 
automatic processing differences are only evident in the presence of unmasked trials. It 
is important to note however, that the possibility still remains that the effect on masked 
physical-threat words was as a consequence of short-term "post-conscious" priming 
(Bargh, 1994). In that, although the present study guarded against Fox's (1996) argument 
by presenting the unmasked trials first to the participants, the possibility still remains that 
the questionnaires that were completed before the main dot-probe task (SAD, FNE, 
STAI-S & STAI-T) may have inadvertently caused priming effects. Furthermore, as 
these measures pertain predominantly to anxiety either trait, state or by thinking about 
socially anxious concerns, such as fear of negative evaluation or social avoidance and 
distress, it may be that they influenced the participants' attentional processing. This may 
explain why the only significant findings were with the physical threat words, as the 
indirect anxiety priming together with the social-evaluation manipulation inadvertently 
raised state anxiety in the participants, activating a hypervigilance to general anxiety 
threat in the high socially anxious. Future research should consider this possibility when 
designing attentional studies and consider whether the ordering of the questionnaires may 
have priming effects on the participants. 
Another point to consider in the interpretation of results from the masked 
exposure condition is whether the stimuli were presented outside of the awareness of the 
participants. Two objective forced-choice threshold awareness checks were included in 
this study, a presence-absence task (Kemp-Wheeler & Hill, 1988) and a lexical decision 
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task (Cheesman & Merikle, 1985). The, results from these objective measures yielded 
different results, as the participants were generally aware of the presence of stimuli 
behind the pattern masking, but unaware of its lexical content. The participants often 
stated during the awareness tests, that the combined display of a word pair and mask 
seemed to flicker slightly as the words changed to a mask, thus detecting a physical 
presence of a stimulus. Previous masking studies have also found that participants were 
able to detect the presence of stimuli without being able to determine their lexical content 
(e. g., Fox, 1996; Mogg et al., 1994) 
The results from the unmasked trials did not show any evidence of attentional 
processing differences between the social anxiety groups in either experimental 
condition. It is important to emphasise that the unmasked trials were completed after the 
masked trials to address the issues posed by Fox (1996), although this may have caused 
fatigue and/or boredom effects in the participants. The masked trials took approximately 
twelve minutes to complete and then the individuals had a two-minute rest period before 
commencing the unmasked trials, that also took twelve minutes. After this, the 
participants regularly commented that they found the second unmasked task a strain on 
the eyes and that it was difficult to keep focused. Also, the participants had a greater 
percentage of trials removed from the analysis due to them taking too long to respond to 
dot during the unmasked presentation condition (4.3% in the unmasked trials vs 2.8% in 
the masked trials). This also suggests that the participants were getting tired and/or bored 
of the task and not concentrating as accurately as in the masked trials on pressing the 
spacebar as soon as the dot appeared on the screen. Thus, depletion in attentional focus 
and effort may explain the non-significant findings in the unmasked trials. 
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Dijksterhuis and Smith (2002) provides a further explanation of the unmasked 
findings, by arguing that repeated exposure to threatening stimuli could decrease the 
intensity of reaction in the evaluative system. In support, Luecken et at. (2004) found 
that presenting the same threatening stimuli pre-attentively and then consciously in a 
visual dot-probe task, disrupted evidence of attentional biases in a trait anxious sample in 
the unmasked exposure condition. These authors concluded that the lack of findings 
could be due to affective habituation of the threat words in the masked trials, resulting in 
a reduced attentional focus in the unmasked trials to the same threatening word stimuli. 
The current study presented the same category of words three times within each task, but 
the actual words were different in the masked and unmasked trials. Thus, it seems fair to 
speculate that being exposed subliminally and supraliminally to the same categories of 
words six times in total, may have inadvertently caused affective habituation 
(Dijksterhuis & Smith, 2002). Luecken et al. (2004) proposed that as repeated pre- 
conscious exposure to threat appeared to deactivate unhelpful threat processing patterns 
at a more strategic level of attentional focus, this might have important implications. For 
example, the inducement of affective habituation subliminally in therapeutic 
interventions may reduce strategic dysfunctional processing in the anxious population. 
The findings from this study provide further evidence in support of this speculative 
proposal and future research is needed on this issue. 
Experiment one found evidence for an attentional bias for threat associated with 
high social anxiety. The findings from the unmasked trials in the current study are 
inconsistent with this. However, the possibility of fatigue effects and/or affective 
habituation may make direct comparisons between these two studies not possible. It is 
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difficult to explain the lack of supraliminal finding in relation to the social phobia (Beck 
et al., 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) and anxiety (Eysenck, 
1992; Williams et al., 1988; 1997) theories also. Indeed, all these theories would predict 
an attentional bias towards socially threatening (internal and/or external) words under 
presentation times of 500ms. Although, in view of the aforementioned confounding 
variables, it seems fair to suggest that the results from the conscious processing trials 
were influenced to some extent by the pre-attentive trials being presented first. 
An alternative interpretation of the results from the unmasked trials could be that 
the socially anxious do not possess a strategic attentional bias towards threatening 
semantic stimuli. In support of this, recent research (Mansell, et al., 2002; Pishyar et al., 
2004) has documented that there was no evidence of an attentional bias towards word 
stimuli in a non-clinical sample with social anxiety. Indeed, they argued that the facial 
dot probe task was a more ecologically valid and sensitive index of attentional bias. 
However, it is notable that previous dot-probe research with individuals experiencing 
clinical levels of social phobia has found an attentional bias favouring threatening word 
stimuli (Musa et al, 2003). Furthermore, the findings from the previous study in this 
thesis also challenges this proposal by suggesting that the nature of the conscious bias in 
the socially anxious is dependent on the specific word category of the threat and levels of 
social evaluation. Plus, the current finding of an automatic attentional bias towards 
masked physical-threat words, under social-evaluation conditions, provides further results 
to contradict this proposal. Thus, it seems quite possible that fatigue or habituation 
effects may have influenced the strategic findings in this current study. More research is 
needed on this, which focuses on exploring the nature of the attentional focus at 
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automatic and strategic level of processing separately, to specific word categories, and 
the influence of social-evaluation upon this. Furthermore, the application of this to 
clinical populations is also required. This is the aim of the next experiment in this thesis, 
by exploring the nature of conscious processing in a individuals with generalised social 
phobia. 
In summary, these results suggest that the high socially anxious, in comparison to 
those low in social anxiety, display an attentional bias towards general physical threat at a 
pre-attentive stage of processing, under conditions of social-evaluation. This study has 
also shown that by completing the masked trials first, to address issues of priming (Fox, 
1996), it may have inadvertently have affected the findings from the unmasked trials. 
More specifically, either fatigue effects or affective habituation (Dijksterhuis & Smith, 
2002) to the categories of threat may have reduced the attentional focus to socially or 
physically threatening stimuli at a strategic level of processing. The notion of habituation 
is indeed of clinical importance in reducing the dysfunctional processing pattern in 
anxious populations and this paper supports Luecken et al. 's proposal that further 
research on this issue is needed. 
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Chapter 5 
The Nature of the Attentional bias for Words 
in Social Phobia 
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Experiment Three 
Introduction 
This experiment was designed to investigate the nature of selective attention in 
social phobia, rather than social anxiety, which was explored in experiments one and two. 
The same visual dot-probe task and categories of threatening semantic stimuli were used 
as in the previous two experiments and the stimuli were presented for 500 ms. No social- 
evaluation condition was included, because it was felt that the experimental process 
would be a social-anxiety provoking situation in itself for participants experiencing 
clinical levels of social anxiety. 
As detailed in chapter two, social phobia is the most common anxiety disorder 
and the third most frequently occurring psychiatric disorder after depression and 
alcohol/drug dependence (e. g., Kessler et al, 1998). It is defined as a "marked and 
persistent fear of one or more social or performance situations in which the person is 
exposed to unfamiliar people or to possible scrutiny by others" (APA: American 
Psychological Association, 1994, p. 411). A seminal review by Liebowitz, Gorman, Fyer 
and Klein (1985) identified the magnitude of the problem of social phobia in terms of its 
prevalence, co-morbidity with other disorders and attendant disability. Indeed, Heimberg 
et al. (2000) have detailed that this disorder has been associated with serious social, 
educational, and a high level of occupational impairment, considerable co-morbidity with 
other mental disorders and reduced life satisfaction. 
The theoretical review of social phobia in this thesis has shown that idiosyncratic 
differences in the attentional processing of emotional information play a key factor in 
vulnerability to, and maintenance of, social phobia (Beck et al., 1985; Clark & Wells, 
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1995, Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). More specifically, these models propose that social 
phobia is associated with enhanced selective attention towards social threat cues, such as 
personal indications of poor performance (e. g., blushing, stuttering and shaking) or signs 
of boredom and criticism from others. As previously detailed, these cognitive 
perspectives proposed different theoretical predictions regarding the specific nature of 
selective attention in this disorder. In particular, Beck et al. (1985) and Rapee and 
Heimberg (1997) hypothesised that during a social encounter, individuals with social 
phobia are constantly scanning the `self' and the environment for threatening social 
information. They proposed that environmental scanning for threat (e. g., perceiving 
signs of social rejection) helps to maintain the social anxiety by confirming pre-disposed 
negative expectations. In contrast, the Clark and Wells model (1995) predicted that in a 
social situation a person with social phobia focuses solely on interoceptive information, 
thus concentrating on their own somatic responses and personal negative social- 
evaluation thought processes. The model also suggested that a consequence of such a 
heightened self-focus is a reduced attentional bias to external social cues. 
Stroop research has reported that social phobia is associated with an attentional 
bias towards socially threatening semantic stimuli (e. g., Hope et al., 1990; Mattia et al., 
1993).. This is demonstrated by a greater interference in response latencies to colour 
name socially threatening words. Additionally, this interference effect is attenuated 
when arousal to social threat is increased (Amir et al., 1996; Amir, et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, the issue of specificity, described as both the valence and the content of the 
information presented being of unique relevance to the disorder, has been explored in 
studies involving the Stroop task. Evidence of an attentional bias towards social threat in 
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social phobia, and panic patients towards physical sensations, in comparison to non- 
anxious controls has been reported (Maidenberg et al., 1996). 
Interestingly, visual-dot probe studies that have included socially and physically 
threatening words have failed to find any evidence of selective attention towards threat to 
be associated with social phobia (Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Horenstein & Segui, 1997). 
This is with the exception of a recent study by Musa et al. (2003), who investigated the 
nature of the attentional bias in socially phobic patients with and without concurrent 
depression and non-anxious controls. The study included socially threatening and 
physically threatening words and found that social phobia without concurrent depression, 
in comparison to non-anxious controls, was associated with an attentional bias towards 
both word groups. There were no such attentional biasing effects with social phobia and 
concurrent depression patients. This study provides evidence that the presence of 
concurrent depression abolishes the attentional bias that would normally be associated 
with the anxiety disorder. Similar findings have been reported in generalised anxiety 
disorder patients with high levels of depression (Bradley et al., 1995). 
As well as the clinical studies, there is also a lack of evidence for attentional bias 
in non-clinical high socially anxious participants using social threat words in a visual dot- 
probe task (e. g., Mansell et al., 2002; Pishyar et al, 2004). It is notable however, that 
experiment one in this thesis found that high socially anxious participants, in comparison 
to a low socially anxious sample, preferentially attended towards negative evaluation 
(under low anxious conditions) and somatic sensations (under social-evaluative 
conditions) words. Furthermore, the results from experiment two showed that compared 
with low socially anxious participants, the high socially anxious demonstrated a pre- 
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attentional bias towards physical threat words under social-evaluative conditions. Taken 
together, the first two experiments in this thesis have demonstrated selective attention to 
threat being evident in high socially anxious participants, under non-evaluative and 
social-evaluative conditions. Indeed, it is suggested in chapter two that the non- 
significant findings with social phobia and the dot-probe studies using word stimuli (e. g., 
Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Horenstein & Segui, 1997) may be attributable to the type of 
words used in each -category of threat. The two analogue studies in this thesis have 
shown the importance of categorically distinct words in ascertaining the nature of the 
attentional focus in socially anxious samples using the visual dot-probe task. There is a 
need to extend this notion to a sample of individuals with social phobia to ascertain if the 
nature of the bias is reliant on the categories of threat being distinct from one another in 
the clinical form of this disorder. 
The aim of this present study, therefore, is to examine the attentional processes of 
individuals with social phobia to negative evaluation, somatic sensation, social situation 
and physical threat words. This will allow for the exploration of the key constructs that 
are of specific concern to persons with social phobia. A further. aim is to address the 
theoretical conflict of whether the focus of attention is solely interoceptive in nature 
(Clark & Wells, 1995), or whether it also includes external threat cues (Beck et al., 1985; 
Kapee & Hiemberg, 1997). A social-evaluation condition was not included because 
being in an experimental environment such as this, is considered to be a socially 
threatening situation for an individual with social phobia (e. g., Hope et al., 1990). 
The hypotheses for this study are considered in view of the theoretical predictions 
and the findings from experiment one. In consideration of the Clark and Wells (1995) 
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model, individuals with social phobia, in comparison to the low anxious, would be 
expected to display an attentional bias towards word groups relating to self focus, such as 
negative evaluation and somatic sensation words. In contrast, Beck et al. (1985) and 
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) would predict that individuals with social phobia would 
display an attentional bias towards all socially threatening words (negative evaluation, 
somatic sensation and social situation), when compared to the low anxious participants. 
Additionally, consistent with experiment one, an attentional bias towards somatic 
sensations only is expected in the social phobia group, compared to the controls. 
Method 
Participants 
The social phobia group consisted of 16 individuals (5 male, 11 female; mean age 
= 25.4 years, SD = 11.0) with a primary diagnosis of generalised social phobia as 
determined by the ADIS-IV. The ADIS-IV is a diagnostic interview schedule that was 
developed to allow for differential diagnosis among the spectrum of anxiety disorders and 
also to identify commonly co-occurring disorders. The assessment interviewer also rated 
the participants on the 0-8 severity rating scale included in the ADIS-IV. Participants 
were only included if they received a rating of 4 (moderately impaired) or greater3. From 
the social phobia group, 5 participants were recruited from local GP surgeries, 8 from 
student counselling services and 3 from emails sent to students from the University of 
Sheffield advertising for participants. The advertisements asked for individuals who felt 
that they experienced high levels of social anxiety and distress in social situations that 
3 Please note that there was originally 19 people who volunteered to take part, but three 
of them were removed from the analysis as they did not have a primary diagnosis of 
generalised social phobia as defined by the ADIS-IV. 
158 
Chapter Five: Experiment Three 
significantly interfered with daily living. Individuals were excluded if there was any 
evidence of co-occurring drug or alcohol dependence or if generälised social phobia was 
not their primary diagnosis. The 16 controls (5 male, 11 female; mean age = 21.7 years, 
SD = 5.9) were individually matched as closely as possible for age, sex, and years of 
education. They consisted of community volunteers who were recruited by email to staff 
and students from the University of Sheffield that asked for people who were confident in 
all social situations. The control group had no known history of any psychological 
disorders and were not experiencing any current psychological problems as determined 
by the ADIS-IV. 
Materials 
To address the methodological concern of the possibility that mean score for each 
data point was based insufficient reaction time latencies (see discussion in experiment 
one for full details), this experiment included the same 16 words per threat group 
(negative evaluation, somatic sensation, social situation and physical threat) as used in 
experiment two were included in this study. The 224 filler neutral-neutral word pairs 
were also the same as in experiments one and two. 
The Modified Dot Probe Task 
The same modified dot probe task was used as in experiment one with the only 
difference being the number of experimental trials. There were 128 critical trials which 
reflected the increase in number of threat-neutral word pairs (16 from each word group 
and 64 neutral-neutral word pairs), and 160 filler trials. The stimuli were presented for 
500ms to explore conscious attentional processing. 
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Procedure 
Ethical approval from the Northern General Ethics Committee and clinical 
governance from Community Health Sheffield was obtained for this study. The 
experiment began with the assessor interviewing each participant using the ADIS-IV. 
Immediately after the interview, the SAD, FNE, STAI-S/T, BDI-II and SDS were 
completed. Next, the participant was presented with instructions on the computer screen 
that described the dot probe task and attempted 10 practise trials, and repeated them until 
they had completed successfully. After any questions had been answered, the participant 
proceeded with the main dot-probe task. The computer used was a Toshiba Satellite Pro 
Mio PC with Pentium 4 processor running under Windows XP and the monitor was a 
CTX Ultra Screen 16" CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 60hz. Upon completion, the 
participant was fully debriefed and any travel expenses paid. 
Results 
The aim of this study was to ascertain the nature of the attentional bias in social 
phobia, in relation to the specificity of the stimuli. 
Participant Characteristics 
The participants' scores on each of the questionnaires were submitted to 
independent t-tests. This analysis indicated that in comparison to the low anxious 
controls, the social phobia group had expected higher levels of SAD, FNE, STAI-T, 
STAI-S, and BDI-II scores. The low anxious controls had higher levels of SDS than the 
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Reaction Time Data Analysis 
On the probe detection task, the percentage of outliers that were removed 
throughout the entire analysis was 4%. This was by excluding latency data that fell 
outside two standard deviations from the mean score for each participant. A 
. 
repeated 
measures ANOVA was undertaken with participant group (social phobia vs. low anxious 
control) as the between-participant variable and word type (somatic sensation, negative 
evaluation, social situation and physical threat), probe position (upper vs. lower) and 
word position (upper vs. lower) as within-participant variables. Please see Table 5.2. for 
full details of the reaction time means for each word group. This revealed no significant 
main effects of group, word type, word position or probe position (all ps < . 05). There 
was a significant four-way interaction involving word type x probe position x word 
position x group, F(3,90) = 2.95, p= . 037, partial 
2= 
. 09. 
To explore this interaction further, attentional bias scores (cf. MacLeod et al., 
1986) were calculated for each word group using the following equation: 0.5 x [(UpLt- 
UpUt) + (LpUt-LpLt)], where U= upper position, L= lower position, p= probe, t= 
threat word. The bias score reflects the word position x probe position interaction with 
positive values reflecting selective attention towards and negative values reflecting an 
attentional bias away from the threatening words. 
The bias scores were analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA with group 
(social phobia vs. controls) as the between-participant variable and the within-participant 
factor being word type (somatic sensation, negative evaluation, social situation and 
physical threat). This produced a significant word type x group interaction, F(3,90) = 
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2.95, p= . 037, partial 
2= 
. 09, which corresponded to the 
four-way interaction found for 
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Attentional Bias Score Analysis for each Word Group 
To clarify the results further, independent t-tests were conducted on each word 
group (somatic sensation, negative evaluation, social situation and physical threat). 
Please see Figure 5.1. for details of each word groups bias score for each social anxiety 














Somatic Sensation Negative Evaluation Social Situation Physical Threat 
D Low Anxious   Social Phobia 
Figure 5.1. Bar Chart Displaying Each Word Group's Mean Attentional Bias Score 
for the Social Phobia and Low Anxious Control Groups 
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Somatic Sensation Word Group: 
There was no significant difference between the social phobia group and the low 
anxious controls with this word group, t(30) = . 71, p= . 483. 
Negative Evaluation Word Group: 
There was no significant difference between the social phobia group and the low 
anxious controls with this word group, t(30) = . 65, p= . 520. 
Social Situation Word Group: 
There was no significant difference between the social phobia group and the low 
anxious controls with this word group, t(30) =1.54, p= . 135. 
Physical Threat Word Group: 
This revealed a significant difference between the social phobia group and the low 
anxious controls and the physical threat bias scores. The social phobia group displayed 
an attentional bias towards the physical threat words, in comparison to the control group 
who attended away from this word group, t(30) = 2.27, p= . 031, d= . 78. 
Correlational Analyses 
Correlations between the attentional bias scores for each word group and 
questionnaire measures showed that in the low social anxiety group, bias scores for 
negative evaluation words correlated positively with STAI-T scores (r = . 53, p= . 037), 
whereas bias scores for the physical threat words negatively correlated with BDI scores (r 
_ -. 69, p= . 003). In the generalised social phobia group, bias scores for physical threat 
words negatively correlated with SDS scores (r = -. 53, p= . 036). Thus, in the low social 
anxiety participants increased trait anxiety is associated with greater vigilance for 
negative evaluation words, and increased depression is associated with less vigilance for 
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physical threat words. In the generalised social phobia group, increased social 
desirability is associated with less vigilance for physical threat words. 
Discussion 
This experiment investigated the nature of the attentional bias in generalised 
social phobia to different categories of socially and physically threatening word groups, 
in order to ascertain whether the focus of attention in social phobia is solely interoceptive 
in nature (Clark & Wells, 1995), or whether it also includes external threat cues (Beck et 
al., 1985; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). A further aim was to investigate whether the 
attentional bias results from experiment one in a high socially anxious sample, could be 
replicated in a sample of individuals with social phobia. The results have revealed that 
individuals with social phobia, in comparison to the low anxious matched controls, 
displayed an attentional bias towards the physical threat words. There were no 
attentional bias effects differences between the two participant groups with the three 
categories of social threat words. 
This current study has failed to provide any support for the theories discussed 
earlier. More specifically, the Clark and Wells model (1995) suggested that during a 
social encounter, individuals with social phobia would display an attentional bias towards 
interoceptive information, such as negative evaluation thoughts and somatic sensations 
relating to the experience of anxiety. In contrast, Beck et al. (1985) and Rapee and 
Heimberg (1997) proposed that as well as the `self' focus, an attentional bias towards 
external social threat cues, such as social situations would be evident. The non-significant 
differences between the social phobia and non-anxious group with the negative 
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evaluation, somatic sensation and social situation word groups do not provide support 
any of these theoretical notions. 
Furthermore, these results do not replicate the findings from experiment one of an 
attentional bias towards somatic sensations words in high socially anxious individuals, 
when compared to the low socially anxious, under a social-evaluation condition. This is 
despite similar state anxiety scores determined by the STAI-S for the social phobic group 
in this study (M = 51.3) and the high socially anxious group in the social-evaluation 
condition from experiment 1 (M = 51.6). An important consideration for the differences 
in results between the two studies could be attributed to the different ways in which 
levels of state anxiety were raised. Insofar as, experiment one increased levels of state 
anxiety by advising the participants that they would be recorded throughout the 
experiment and that they would have to give a speech. This study however, increased 
state anxiety in the individuals with social phobia purely by taking part in the experiment. 
It is also quite possible that levels of state anxiety were raised further by the ADIS-IV 
interview. This interview involves the person recalling and describing past anxiety 
provoking experiences, thus distressing the individual and raising levels of anxiety 
arousal, as indicated by the STAI-S. All the participants performed the visual dot-probe 
task immediately following the interview and questionnaire completion, when levels of 
state anxiety were still high in people with social phobia. Interestingly, the low anxious 
controls did not find the ADIS-IV or taking part in the study an anxious event, as their 
STAI-S scores were particularly low (M = 25.9). Thus, the suggestion here is that 
although both studies raised levels of state anxiety in the high socially anxious and social 
phobia groups, the source of this induction was different. In that experiment one raised 
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social-evaluative anxiety, whereas the current study raised not only social-evaluative 
anxiety, but also a whole range of socially anxious concerns and fears during the ADIS- 
IV interview. 
This current experiment has shown that individuals with social phobia at a 
conscious level of processing preferentially attend towards physical threat words. Musa 
et al. (2003) have also reported that patients with social phobia (without concurrent 
depression) demonstrated an attentional bias towards physically threatening words, as 
well as negative evaluation words. Interestingly, experiment two found evidence of a 
pre-attentional bias towards physical threat words under social evaluation conditions in 
high socially anxious students, when compared to low socially anxious participants. 
Experiment one however, showed that high social anxiety was not associated with a 
conscious attentional bias towards physical threat in the social-evaluation condition. This 
suggests that physical threat is of attentional concern to socially anxious people during a 
social encounter at a pre-conscious and not a conscious level of processing. Individuals 
with social phobia on the other hand, displayed a conscious attentional bias towards 
physical threat in this current study. Taken together, these findings provide support for 
MacLeod (1991) theory presented in chapter one of this thesis. Specifically, this notion 
suggests that the key difference between clinical and trait anxious populations is that the 
latter group are able to consciously over-ride any pre-attentive biases for threat, which is 
exactly what was found in this series of experiments with the physical threat word group. 
Musa et al. (2003) suggested that one possible explanation for an attentional bias 
to physical threat being associated with social phobia could be due to presence of an 
additional secondary anxiety disorder influencing the information processing bias. In 
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support, Sanderson, DiNardo, Rapee and Barlow (1990) proposed that at least as many as 
fifty percent of patients with a primary diagnosis of an anxiety disorder also meet the 
criteria of an additional anxiety disorder. Indeed, social phobia is highly co-morbid with 
other psychiatric disorders (e. g., Kessler et al., 1999), especially anxiety and mood 
disorders (e. g., Brown & Barlow, 1990). It is notable that generalised anxiety disorder 
seems to be the most common additional disorder in patients with social phobia (Barlow 
et at., 1990; Turner et al., 1991). Also, cognitive 'studies have shown that patients with 
generalised anxiety disorder preferentially attend towards physical threat words using 
both the Stroop (e. g., Becker et al., 2001) and the visual dot-probe (e. g., Mathews et al., 
1986) paradigms. In the sample of people with a primary diagnosis of social phobia in 
this current study, three quarters of them also had a secondary anxiety disorder, mainly 
generalised anxiety and panic disorder. Thus, this study provides further support for the 
proposal that social phobia patients display an attentional bias towards physical threat due 
to the possibility of a secondary anxiety disorder, such as generalised anxiety disorder, 
influencing information processing. 
The lack of attentional bias towards socially threatening words in social phobia in 
this study is similar to that of previous studies (Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Horenstein & 
Segui, 1997). In a related vein, Stroop studies have also shown that the attentional bias 
towards social threat words is suppressed in social phobia during social evaluative 
situations (Amir et al., 1996) and high social anxiety arousal conditions (Amir et al., 
2002). Once again it is notable that this current study and the Amir et al. (1996) study 
reported similar levels of state anxiety in the socially phobic participants (mean STAI-S 
score was 51). Indeed, the Amir et al (1996) study also reported an attentional bias 
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towards physical threat and not social threat during the social-evaluation condition. The 
findings here provide further evidence that the expected attentional bias effect towards 
socially threatening words may be attenuated due to the interactive effects of high levels 
of state anxiety, similar to the findings from the Stroop studies. This is a tentative 
suggestion that needs to be explored further, by the systematic manipulation of levels of 
social-evaluational anxiety in social phobia patients. 
In contrast to the findings from this study, Musa et al (2003) reported evidence of 
an attentional bias towards negative evaluation words in individuals with social phobia. 
As previously mentioned, this difference may be due to the selection of words 
incorporated in each study. In consideration of this, Musa et al. used words that were 
relating to themes of negative evaluation (e. g., inept, inadequate and ridiculed) and to 
behaviour and feelings (e. g., withdrawn, clumsy and lonely) within the same social threat 
word category. The current study attempted to explore the specificity of the bias to 
different socially threatening stimuli and consequently was more selective in the words 
that went into the negative evaluation, somatic sensation and social situation groups. 
Thus, it seems fair to suggest the possibility that generalised social phobia is associated 
with an attentional bias to general social threat as shown in the Musa et al. study, and not 
to specific categories of socially threatening information. As this is the first study to 
attempt to assess which type of social threat is sensitive to an attentional bias in 
generalised social phobia, more research is needed on this issue. 
It is notable that one of the key limitations of this current study is that the issue of 
secondary anxiety and/or depression related disorders was not fully explored. Thus, as 
Heinrichs and Hofmann (2001) argued, it is difficult to ascertain whether the presence of 
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two or more disorders have no effect, an additive effect or an interactive effect on 
attentional biases in social phobia. The addition of further patient groups, such as 
individuals with a primary diagnosis of generalised anxiety disorder and/or depression, 
may have helped to highlight the differences and similarities between them. 
In summary, the results from this present study suggest that individuals with 
generalised social phobia are characterised by an attentional bias towards physically 
threatening words, in comparison to low anxious controls. This paper has also 
highlighted that idiosyncratic differences in social phobia samples, such as the presence 
of a secondary anxiety disorder or increases in state anxiety may influence the nature of 
the attentional bias. Therefore, theoretical conceptualisations need to consider the 
influence of these factors when predicting information processing biases in social phobia. 
6 
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Chapter 6 
Re-evaluation of the Psychometric Properties 
of the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale and 
the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale 
173 
Chapter Six: Study Four 
Study Four 
Introduction 
This study attempted to explore in more detail an interesting issue that became 
evident in experiments one and two. This was in relation to the choice of screening 
instrument used in analogue studies investigating cognitive biases in social anxiety. 
More specifically, both of the previous studies found non-significant results when using 
the FNE scale to determine high and low social anxiety groups. However, using the SAD 
scale to determine social anxiety levels yielded significant findings. It is also notable that 
Mogg and Bradley (2002) found a positive relationship with the SAD scale and an 
attentional bias towards aversive faces in their study too. Taken together, the main aim 
of this study was to explore the psychometric properties and characteristics of the SAD 
and the FNE scales. 
The literature review in chapter two showed that over the past few years, 
cognitive research has attempted to provide 
,a 
deeper understanding of the underlying 
cognitive processes in social phobia. In particular, dysfunctional attentional processing 
using the emotional Stroop task (e. g., Hope et al., 1990; Spector et al., 2003) and the 
visual dot-probe task (e. g., Musa et at., 2003; Mogg et al., 2004) with socially phobic 
individuals has been reported. Such findings not only provide evidence for current 
theoretical conceptualisations of social phobia (e. g., Beck et al., 1985; Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), but also yield important clinical implications. For 
example, 'Clark (1999) argued that information on the nature of the cognitive features of 
social anxiety provide a deeper understanding of dysfunctional processing biases, 
informing therapeutic intervention. 
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Chapter two also details that previous research into attentional processing has 
included both socially anxious analogue and clinical samples with social phobia. Stopa 
and Clark (2001) proposed that analogue studies allow for the recruitment of larger 
numbers of participants and more complex research designs. Also, Turner et al. (1986) 
reported similarities between a clinical social phobia and social anxiety analogue groups 
on various measures of social distress, anxiety symptoms and negative thought processes. 
Indeed, there is a growing body of research that has focused on the cognitive processes of 
the non-clinically socially anxious (e. g., Mansell et al., 1999; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; 
Pishyar et al., 2004). The use of participants from `normal' populations to examine 
cognitive processing has also proved beneficial in a number of other areas of 
psychopathology, such as depression (e. g., Bradley et al., 1997) and generalised anxiety 
disorder (e. g., Roemer, Molina & Borkovec, 1997). 
The FNE and the SAD scale are two self-report measures that have been widely 
used to ascertain the participant's levels of social anxiety. They are considered to be a 
practical assessment tool, allowing for the identification of high and low socially anxious 
non-clinical samples through quick and effective screening (Herbert et al., 2001). The 
FNE and SAD measures were developed using US students by Watson and Friend 
(1969). These authors determined that social anxiety comprised three components, 
namely social distress, social avoidance and fear of negative evaluation. The SAD scale 
assessed the first two factors, and the FNE measured the latter aspect. Whilst 
constructing these scales, Watson and Friend (1969) conducted comprehensive 
psychometric analysis. A series of experimental and correlational studies provided 
support for the test-retest reliability and concurrent validity of these scales. They 
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concluded that the FNE and the SAD questionnaires have high internal consistency and 
sufficiently discriminated from one another as reliable measures of different aspects of 
social anxiety. 
In support, recent reviews of assessment tools and self-report questionnaires 
concluded that the SAD and the FNE scales were useful and reliable measures of social 
anxiety (e. g., Cox & Swinson, 1995; Heimberg et al., 1988; Herbert et al., 2001). 
However, the appropriateness of their use with the clinical syndrome of social phobia has 
been debated (Heimberg et al., 1988; Turner & Beidel, 1988; Turner et al., 1987). Both 
scales have also been criticised for being too long which consequently limits their utility, 
especially when several questionnaires are being used in the study (e. g., Cox and 
Swinson, 1995; Heimberg, 1994; Leary, 1983a). In view of this, Leary (1983a) designed 
the brief version of the FNE to account for most of the variance of the longer FNE scale. 
He also changed the scoring key from a `true/false' response format to a five-point likert 
scale and this shortened form of the FNE has been used in the literature (e. g., Mansell et 
al., 2003; Mogg & Bradley, 2002). To date, there is no shortened version of the SAD 
questionnaire. 
Despite their extensive use and wide acceptance (e. g., Turner et al., 1987), few 
studies have assessed the psychometric properties of both the SAD and FNE scales. For 
example, Oei, Kenna and Evans (1991) employed factor analysis using an Australian 
clinical sample and identified two factors, namely fear of negative evaluation, and social 
avoidance and distress, which loaded onto the appropriate scales. It has also been 
suggested that the characteristics of these measures may not be applicable across different 
populations (Oei et al., 1991) and cultures (Chapman, Mannuzza & Fyer, 1995). Stopa 
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and Clark (2001) have similarly argued that normative data based on a sample of students 
from the United States should not be applied to UK studies. In view of this, these authors 
presented British norms and cut-off points for defining high and low social anxiety 
groups based on the FNE questionnaire. Stopa and Clark did not provide the same 
information for the SAD scale, as at that point analogue research had mainly used the 
FNE questionnaire. 
Since then, research has begun to use the SAD questionnaire to define high and 
low socially anxious analogue groups (e. g., Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mullins & Duke, 
2004). Interestingly, these studies, together with the two analogue experiments reported 
in this thesis, found that social anxiety groups based on the FNE and on the SAD 
displayed quite different processing biases. This highlights a further issue, in that these 
scales might not be equivalent and appear to be measuring different aspects of social 
anxiety, that lead to different processing biases. 
Thus, on the basis of the considerations outlined above, this study has several 
aims. First, to explore the psychometric properties and characteristics of both the SAD 
and the FNE instruments to ascertain whether these questionnaires reliably measure 
different constructs of social anxiety in a UK analogue sample. Norms and cut-off points 
to define high and low social anxiety groups will be proposed in order to guide future 
research. Second, to assess whether there is a relationship between the attentional biases 
reported in experiments one, two and three and the factors found in this current 
psychometric analysis. This will determine whether the relationship between cognitive 
biases and the SAD and FNE scales are equivalent. Third, to ascertain whether the 
BFNE (Leary, 1983a) encompasses the key characteristics of the longer version of this 
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Students (n = 561) from Sheffield Hallam University studying on health-related or 
psychology degree courses were screened for experiment two in this doctoral dissertation. 
The screening involved the completion of the FNE and the SAD questionnaires, to allow 
for the recruitment of 103 high and low SAD participants. The remaining students (n = 
468) that were used in the main factor analysis consisted of 64 males (14%), 384 females 
(84%) and 10 participants (2%) who did not record their gender and/or age on the 
questionnaire. The pre-dominance of females was consistent with the sex distribution of 
students on health and psychology degrees. The mean age of the males was 22.97, years 
(SD = 8.20), with an age range of 18 years to 50 years. The mean age of the females was 
21.12 years (SD = 5.80), with an age range of 18 years to 50 years. 
Standardised Measures 
The Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale: The FNE questionnaire is a 30-item 
true/false (17 true and 13 false) questionnaire measuring apprehension and distress about 
being negatively evaluated in social situations (Watson & Friend, 1969). Examples of 
the items are "If someone is evaluating me I tend to expect the worst" and "I rarely worry 
about seeming foolish to others". Higher scores on the questionnaire indicate greater 
levels of fear of negative evaluation. 
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The Social Avoidance and Distress Scale: The SAD questionnaire is a 28-item 
true/false (14 true and 14 false) questionnaire assessing both actual, and desire of, 
avoidance of social situations and the distress caused by being in a social interaction 
(Watson & Friend, 1969). Examples of the statements are "It is easy for me to relax when 
I am with strangers" and "I tend to withdraw from people". Higher scores suggest greater 
levels of social avoidance and distress. 
Procedure 
As part of the screening process for experiment two, the students were asked to 
complete the FNE and then the SAD scales just before a lecture began. Following 
completion of the questionnaires, all participants were asked to circle either `yes' or `no' 
to indicate whether they would like to take part in a future study. None of the students 
were advised directly that the study was looking at social anxiety. It took approximately 
15 minutes to fill in both questionnaires, which were returned to the experimenter. 
Results 
Normative data 
The responses to the items on each questionnaire were added together to produce 
total FNE and SAD scores. The FNIE and the SAD scales were moderately correlated, r= 
. 392, p< . 001, n= 458. The distribution of the data was examined. Figure 6.1 
'shows 
histograms of the FNE and SAD distribution of participants' scores and that neither of the 
questionnaires were normally distributed. The distribution of FNE scores was relatively 
flat, k= -. 89, SE=. 23, p <. 001, with a slight positive skew, s =. 20, SE _ . 11, p <. 05. 
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Figure 6.1. Histograms showing the distribution of FNE and SAD scores 
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The scores from the SAD scale were highly peaked, k= 1.90, SE=. 23, p <. 001, 
with a strong positive skew, s=1.424, SE = . 11, P ., C 0014. 
A Mann Whitney U test revealed no significant difference between the genders on 
FNE scores, Z=-. 762, p= . 446, n= 458, and on SAD scores, 
Z=-. 873, p= . 383, n= 
458. Due to the lack of gender differences, all following analyses were conducted on the 
entire sample. Table 6.1. shows the means, medians, modes, standard deviations and 
observed percentiles (5th, 10"', 25", 50'h, 750h, 90th, 95th) for the FNE and SAD 
questionnaires for the whole sample. 
4 Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for outliers and one case 
was identified as an outlier on the SAD scale. Removal of this participant from the 
analysis did not influence the findings and was subsequently left in the data set. ý There 
were no outliers with the FNE scale. 
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Table 6.1. Descriptive Statistics for the FNE and the SAD scales 
Means, medians, modes and standard deviations 
n Mean Median Mode SD 
FNE 458 14.43 14.00 10.00 7.43 
SAD 458 6.64 5.00 4.00 4.99 
Observed percentiles scores for the sample distribution 
n 5th 10th 25th 50th 750' 90th 95th 
FNE 458 3 4 9 14 20 25 27 
SAD 458 1 2 3 5 9 14 17 
Cut-Off Points to Define High and Low Social Anxiety Groups 
Stopa and Clark (2001) proposed two methods to determine high and low group 
cut-off points. They suggested either to take the mean plus or minus one standard 
deviation, or to select the upper (75" percentile) and lower (25' percentile) quartiles of 
the cut-off scores. By employing the former method in this current study, high and low 
FNE groups were determined by a score of 22 or above and 7 or below respectively. The 
SAD score was 12 or above for the high group and 2 or below for the low group. 
Alternatively, by considering the upper and lower quartiles, the high FNE group was 20 
or above and low FNE group was 9 or below. The high SAD group was 9 or above and 
the low SAD group was 3 or below. 
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Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Responses on the FNE and the SAD scales were subjected to Principal Axis 
Factor (PAF) analysis using SPSS, to investigate whether the scales measured different 
aspects of social anxiety (Floyd & Widaman, 1995). PAF was considered to be the most 
appropriate method of factor extraction, as in line with the Oei et al. (1991), this study 
was interested in a solution that was uncontaminated by unique and error variability. 
Prior to performing PAF, the suitability of data for factor analysis was assessed. 
Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed the presence of many coefficients of .3 and 
above. The Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin value was . 9, exceeding the recommended value of .6 
(Kaiser, 1970,1974) and the Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached 
statistical significance (p < . 001), supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. 
Throughout the entire factor analysis, both orthogonal and oblique rotations were 
performed using the varimax and oblimin methods. Although both approaches produced 
similar findings, the results are discussed using varimax rotation (unless stated 
otherwise), as it transformed the data into a factor matrix that was clear and interpretable. 
There were 14 components with eigenvalues exceeding 1, explaining 42.1% of 
the total variance. An inspection of the factor scree plot (Catell, 1966) revealed that the 
scree could not be clearly determined and could possibly occur after either the third, 
fourth or fifth factor. To determine which was the best solution, inspection of the number 
of items that were markers of each factor was performed using Bedford's (1997) criteria. 
He suggested that markers should be determined as items that load greater than or equal 
to .3 on a factor and which have their highest loading on that factor. Furthermore, the 
major loading should be .2 greater than any cross loading. Table 6.2. displays the 
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number of markers for one, two, three, four and five factor solutions and suggests that 
interpretability disappears after four factors and that either a three or four-factor model 
would be the best solution. 
Table 6.2. Number of Markers per Factor found in the FNE and SAD scales 
Number of markers for the factor 




2 29 25 
3 28 16 7 
4 16 13 97. 
5 16 10 970 
A technique developed by Everett (1983) was conducted to ascertain whether a 
three or a four-factor solution provided the best representation of the data. This 
procedure involved randomly splitting the sample into two groups and performing 
separate factor analyses. This produced two factor score coefficient matrices. Next, two 
sets of factor scores were calculated for the whole sample using the two separate 
coefficient matrices. These factor scores were then correlated together. Everett (1983) 
proposed that a correlation of . 90 or above indicated that the factors truly converge with 
each other. When the four-factor model was analysed correlations of . 943, . 942, . 905, 
. 878 were found. However, examination of the three-factor model revealed correlations 
of . 993, . 955, and . 949 respectively, suggesting better convergence. 
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The rotated varimax factor matrix for the three-factor solution is presented in 
Table 6.3. Except for FNE items 3,6,11,27 and 28, all the FNE items loaded 
significantly on a fear of negative evaluation factor. Interestingly, the majority of the 
SAD items mainly loaded on two factors, with the exception of the items 8,9,11,16,17, 
19,23 and 25, which tended to load on both. Factor two incorporated general social 
avoidance and distress issues and consisted of 15 SAD items. The third factor was 
relating to fear of new situations and strangers with a loading on 5 SAD items. Thus the 
factor structure of the FNE and the SAD scales indicated that they were measuring 
different aspects of social anxiety. Also, the SAD scale was measuring a new factor 
consisting of the experience of fear in new situations and with strangers, which has not 
been reported in other studies. 
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Table 6.3. Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix of the FNE and SAD measures 
Factors Factors 
123123 
FNE 13 . 649 . 141 . 005 SAD 5 . 003 . 
661 -. 005 
FNE 19 . 618 . 009 . 177 SAD 24 . 
004 . 615 . 000 
FNE 14 . 607 . 139 . 235 SAD 20 . 009 . 589 . 131 
FNE 24 . 598 . 143 . 148 
SAD 21 . 007 . 586 . 008 
FNE 7 . 593 . 128 . 172 SAD 2 . 
003 . 583 . 240 
FNE 23 . 586 -. 004 . 148 SAD 26 . 003 . 
577 . 005 
FIVE 25 . 575 . 164 . 158 
SAD 27 . 000 . 566 . 123 
FNE 21 . 547 -. 002 . 171 SAD 
6 . 176 . 562 . 340 
FNE 9 . 540 . 172 . 134 SAD 
22 . 004 . 553 . 005 
FNE 12 . 513 -. 002 . 009 
SAD 28 . 008 . 551 . 193 
FNE 17 . 512 . 215 . 177 
SAD 10 . 127 . 522. . 009 
FNE 2 . 508 . 008 . 
185 SAD 13 . 007 . 
517 -. 007 
FNE 30 . 500 . 006 . 
161 SAD 4 . 009 . 510 . 107 
FNE 10 . 500 -. 001 -. 003 SAD 12 . 008 . 478 . 175 
FNE 1 . 482 . 006 . 
178 SAD 8 . 003 . 466 . 273 
FNE 22 . 468 . 169 . 
003 SAD 7 . 118 . 409 . 125 
FNE 15 . 466 -. 004 . 005 SAD 9 -. 003 . 398 . 363 
FNE 20 . 465 -. 002 . 141 SAD-16 . 220 . 388 . 
379 
FNE 29 . 441 . 110 . 004 SAD 19 . 003 -. 272 -. 
138 
FNE 5 . 426 . 133 -. 006 SAD 23 . 006 . 267 . 007 
FNE 8 . 422 . 002 -. 005 SAD 15 . 133 . 006 . 622 
FNE 26 . 420 -. 002 -. 002 SAD 3 . 136 . 117 . 569 
FNE 28 . 404 . 213 . 007 SAD 1 . 207 . 007 . 
525 
FNE 3 . 394 . 005 . 214 SAD 11 . 192 . 335 . 
465 
FNE 4 . 390 -. 109 . 117 SAD 18 . 124 . 236 . 446 
FNE 18 . 387 . 182 . 005 SAD 14 . 143 . 206 . 415 
FNE 16 . 331 . 001 -. 009 SAD 17 . 010 . 222 . 357 
FNE 27 . 330 . 135 . 263 SAD 25 . 002 . 260 . 
314 
FNE 11 . 288 . 009 . 196 
FNE 6 . 276 -. 006 -. 006 
n. b. Bold print indicates the main factor loading of the item 
Factor 1= Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Factor 2= Social Avoidance and distress 
Factor 3= Fear of New Situations or Strangers 
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Direct oblimin rotation was performed on the three factors. The factor 
correlations revealed that factors 1 and 2 (r = . 193), factors 1 and 
3 (r = -. 273) and factors 
2 and 3 (r = -. 354) were low to moderately correlated with one another. The reason for 
the negative correlations was that the main loadings on factor 1 and 2 required 
predominantly "true" response, whereas the items from factor 3 consisted of an equal 
number of "true" and "false" responses. 
Test-Retest Reliability of the FNE and the SAD Measures 
To assess test-retest reliability, data was gathered from the recruitment of the 103 
high and low SAD participants for experiment two of this thesis. The SAD and FNE 
scales were administered during the screening process and approximately two weeks later 
during the study. Paired sample t tests revealed significant differences between FNE 
scores, with the participants' scoring higher at the time of screening (M = 16.4) than on 
the experimental day (M = 14.9), t(102) = -3.77, p< . 001. Pearson correlations for the 
FNE scale at the time of screening and the experimental day indicate acceptable test-re- 
test reliability, r= . 890, p< . 001, n= 103. There were also significant 
differences 
between the SAD scores, with participants scoring higher at the time of screening (M = 
7.5) than on the experimental day (M = 6.6), t(102) = 3.2, p= . 002. Pearson correlations 90 
for the SAD scale also indicate acceptable test-retest reliability, r= . 866, p< . 
001, n= 
103. Therefore, although participants tended to have a lower score at the time of the 
experiment on both questionnaires than at screening, there was still a suitable strength of 
relationship between the two scores on the FNE and SAD scales at both time points. 
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Internal Consistency of the FNE and the SAD Scales 
Reliability coefficients were computed using Cronbach's alpha and high levels of 
internal consistency for the FNE (=0.91) and the SAD (= 0.87) scales was found. 
Internal consistency for the individual factors was as follows: the main loadings on the 
fear of negative evaluation factor which consisted of 25 items (=0.90), the main 
loadings on the social avoidance and distress factor which had 15 items (= 0.87) and the 
main loadings on the fear of new situations and strangers factor that had 5 items (= 0.69), 
all demonstrating good internal reliability. 
Volunteering to Take Part in Research Studies 
A one-way between-group multivariate analysis of variance was performed to 
investigate if there were FNE and/or SAD score differences between those who agreed 
(volunteer group) to take part in a further study and those who did not (non-volunteer 
group). There was a significant difference between the groups on the combined 
dependent variables of FNE and SAD scores, F (2,455) = 6.22, p= . 002; Wilk's Lambda 
= . 97; partial 
2= 
. 03. When the results for the dependent variables were taken separately, 
there were no FNE scores differences between volunteers (M = 14.05) and non- 
volunteers (M = 14.82), F(1,456) = 1.22, p= . 270, partial 
2= 
. 003. There was however, 
a significant difference between the groups for SAD scores, F(1,456) = 12.38, p <. 001; 
partial 2= . 03. An inspection of the mean scores indicated that non-volunteers had higher 
scores on the SAD (M = 7.47) than the volunteer group (M = 5.85). This suggests that 
those who did not volunteer were more socially anxious than those who did. 
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Relationship of the Factors to the Attentional Bias Data 
Experiment 1 
This study reported an attentional bias in high socially anxious individuals, 
compared to low socially anxious, to specific word groups, using a visual dot probe task. 
It found that in the non-evaluation condition, the high socially anxious attended towards 
negative evaluation words, but towards somatic sensation words in the social-evaluation 
condition. Importantly, these attentional biasing effects were only apparent when the 
SAD score, not the FNE score, determined the high and low social anxiety groups. 
Pearson correlations investigated whether there was a relationship between the 
attentional bias scores found in the previous study and the main factor loadings (mean 
scores on questions that load on the specified factor) of each of the three factors. As 
shown in Table 6.4., there was a relationship between the main loadings on the general 
social avoidance and distress factor (factor 2) and the negative evaluation attentional bias 
score (r = . 432, p= . 005, n= 
40) in the non-evaluation condition. There was also a 
relationship between the main loadings on the fear of new situations and strangers factor 
(factor 3) and the negative evaluation attentional bias score (r = . 421, p= 007, n= 40) in 
this condition. In the social-evaluation condition, there was a relationship between the 
main loadings on the fear of new situations and strangers factor (factor 3) and the somatic 
attentional bias score, r= . 345, p= . 029, n= 40. There were no significant correlations 
with the main loadings on the fear of negative evaluation factor (factor 1) and the 
attentional bias scores from this experiment (all ps > . 05). 
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Table 6.4. The Relationship between the Main Loadings on the Factors and each 







Negative Evaluation . 303 . 432** . 
421** . 014 -. 009 -. 016 
Somatic Sensation . 022 -. 012 -. 068 . 273 . 
144 . 345* 
Social Situation . 058 . 135 . 256 . 119 . 260 . 092 
Physical Threat . 006 . 119 -. 
166 -. 097 . 131 . 182 
n. b. * denotes p< . 05 
** denotes p< . 01 
Factor 1= Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Factor 2= Social Avoidance and distress 
Factor 3= Fear of New Situations of Strangers 
Experiment 2 
This study reported evidence of an attentional bias in high socially anxious 
individuals, compared to low socially anxious, to physical threat words (pre-attentive), in 
the social-evaluation condition using a visual dot probe task. Once again, this finding 
was only apparent when the SAD score, not the FNE score, determined the high and low 
social anxiety groups. It is important to note that there was not any attentional bias 
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effects found in the conscious processing trials in either experimental condition. As 
detailed in chapter four, these non-significant findings were attributed to the possibility of 
either experimental fatigue and/or affective habituation (Dijksterhuis & Smith, 2002). 
Thus, due to these confounding variables, caution should be taken in the interpretation of 
the correlations from the 500 ms attentional bias data. 
Pearson correlations investigated whether there was a relationship between the 
attentional bias scores found in experiment two and the main factor loadings of each of 
the three factors. As shown in Table 6.5., there was a relationship between the main 
loadings on the fear of new situations and strangers factor (factor 3) and the masked 
physical threat attentional bias score (r = . 342, p= . 029, n= 41) in the social evaluation 
condition. There were no other significant correlations with the masked trials (14 ms) in 
either experimental condition (all ps > . 05). The attentional bias scores from unmasked 
trials (500 ms) trials did not display a relationship with any of the three factors in the 
non-evaluation condition. In the social-evaluation condition and the unmasked trials, 
there was a negative relationship between the main loadings on the fear of negative 
evaluation factor (factor 1) and the negative evaluation attentional bias score (r = -. 335, p 
= . 032, n= 
41). There was also a negative relationship between the main loadings on the 
social avoidance and distress factor (factor 2) and the negative evaluation attentional bias 
score (r = -. 396, p= . 01, n= 41). The negative relationship suggests that as the factor 
score increases the attentional bias score for the particular word group decreases. 
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Table 6.5. The Relationship between the Main Loadings on the Factors and each 
Word Groups' Attentional Bias Score by Condition for Experiment Two 
Non-Evaluation Condition Social-Evaluation Condition 
Factors Factors 
123123 
14 ms Bias Scores rrrrrr 
Negative Evaluation -. 053 . 123 . 176 -. 065 . 139 -. 009 
Somatic Sensation -. 060 -. 159 . 013 . 016 . 117 -. 060 
Social Situation -. 100 . 202 . 085 . 004 . 103 -. 015 
Physical Threat . 007 -. 039 -. 198 . 112 . 262 . 342* 
500 ms Bias Scores rrrrrr 
Negative Evaluation . 058 . 039 -. 010 -. 335* -. 396* -. 236 
Somatic Sensation . 108 . 179 . 075 -. 013 -. 064 . 031 
Social Situation -. 158 -. 034 -. 124 -. 018 -. 084 -. 005 
Physical Threat -. 199 -. 118 -. 287 -. 002 . 038 . 033 
n. b. * denotes p< . 05 ** denotes p< . 01 
Factor 1= Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Factor 2= Social Avoidance and distress 
Factor 3= Fear of New Situations of Strangers 
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Experiment 3 
This study found an attentional bias towards physical threat words in individuals 
with social phobia, compared to low anxious matched controls, using the visual dot-probe 
task. 
Pearsons correlations investigated whether there was a relationship between the 
attentional bias scores found in experiment three and the main factor loadings of each of 
the three factors. Table 6.6. shows that there was a relationship between the main 
loadings on the fear of negative evaluation factor (factor 1) and the physical threat 
attentional bias score, r= . 469, p= . 007, n= 32. There was also a relationship between 
the main loadings on the fear of new situations and strangers factor (factor 3) and the 
physical threat attentional bias score, r= . 405, p= . 02 1, n= 32. 
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Table 6.6. The Relationship between the Main Loadings on the Factors and each 




r r r 
Negative Evaluation . 149 . 071 . 117 
Somatic Sensation -. 126 -. 144 -. 112 
Social Situation -. 285 -. 304 -. 289 
Physical Threat . 469** . 238 . 405* 
n. b. * denotes p< . 05 ** denotes p <. 01 
Factor 1= Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Factor 2= Social Avoidance and distress 
Factor 3= Fear of New Situations of Strangers 
The BFNE Measure 
The 12 items included in the BFNE (Leary, 1983a) all have a high factor loading 
(. 390 or above) in this current study. Consistent with the FNE scale, paired sample t tests 
revealed significant differences between BFNE scores, with the participants' scoring 
higher at the time of screening (M = 7.2) than on the experimental day (M = 6.4), t(102) = 
3.58, p= . 001 taken from experiment two of this thesis. Reliability coefficients were 
computed using Cronbach's alpha and high levels of internal consistency for the BFNE 
was found during the initial large-scale screening (=0.86, n= 458). The brief version of 
the FNE correlates highly with the full FNE questionnaire, both on screening (r = . 957, n 
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= 103, p< . 001) and on the experimental day (r = . 956, n= 103, p< . 001). The test-retest 
reliability of the BFNE (r = . 844, n= 103, p< . 001), suggests good reliability. Thus, the 
BFNE does appear to encompass the key items of the original scale, without sacrificing 
its psychometric properties. 
The BSAD Questionnaire 
Twenty items were selected from the SAD using Bedford's (1997) criteria. This 
included 15 items from factor 2 (general social avoidance and distress) and 5 items from 
factor 3 (fear of new situations and strangers). Please see table 6.7. for full details of the 
proposed brief version of the SAD and the scoring key. Reliability coefficients were 
computed using Cronbach's alpha on the BSAD scores during the initial screening and 
acceptable levels of internal consistency were found (r = 0.85, n= 458). Consistent with 
the full version of this questionnaire, paired sample t tests revealed significant differences 
between the BSAD scores, with participants scoring higher at the time of screening (M = 
5.0) than on the experimental day (M = 4.2), t(102) = 3.39, p= . 001. The brief version of 
the SAD correlates highly with the full SAD questionnaire, both on screening (r = . 977, n 
= 103, p< . 001) and on the experimental day (r = . 981, n= 103, p< . 001) taken from 
experiment two of this thesis. The test-re-test reliability for the BSAD (r =. 841, n= 103, 
p< . 001) was also good. 
The results suggest that the proposed brief version of the SAD 
measure accounts for most of the variance of the longer scale. 
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Table 6.7. Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings for the Items of the BSAD 
Questionnaire 
Item Factor Loading 
1. I feel relaxed even in unfamiliar social situations. F (SAD 1) . 525 2.1 try to avoid situations which force me to be very sociable. T (SAD 2). 583 
3. It is easy for me to relax when I am with strangers. F (SAD 3) . 569 4. I have no particular desire to avoid people. F (SAD 4) . 510 5. I often find social occasions upsetting. T (SAD 5) . 661 6. I usually feel calm and comfortable at social occasions. F (SAD 6) . 562 7. I am usually at ease when talking to someone from the opposite 
sex. F (SAD 7) . 409 8. I often feel nervous or tense in casual get-togethers in which both 
sexes are present. T (SAD 10) . 522 9. I usually feel relaxed when I am with a group of people. F (SAD 12) . 478 10. I often want to get away from people. T (SAD 13) . 517 11. I usually feel uncomfortable when I am with a group of people I 
don't know. T (SAD 14) 
. 415 12. I usually feel relaxed when I meet someone for the first time. 
F (SAD 15) 
. 622 13.1 would avoid walking up and joining a large group of people 
T (SAD 18) 
. 446 14. I often feel on edge when I am with a group of people. T (SAD 20) . 589 15. I tend to withdraw from people. T (SAD 21) . 586 16. I don't mind talking to people at parties or social gatherings. 
F (SAD 22) 
. 553 17. I often think up excuses in order to avoid social engagements. 
T (SAD 24) 
. 615 18. I try to avoid formal social occasions. T (SAD 26) . 577 19. I usually go to whatever social engagements I have. F (SAD 27) . 566 20.1 find it easy to relax with other people. F (SAD 28) . 551 
N. B. The scoring key of True (7) or False (F) is given after each item. 
196 
Chapter Six: Study Four 
Discussion 
The FNE was designed to measure fear of negative evaluation and the SAD was 
developed as a measure of social avoidance and distress (Watson & Friend, 1969). In 
this current study both questionnaires displayed good internal consistency and reliability 
together with excellent test-retest reliability. An exploratory common factor analysis of 
the items from both questionnaires revealed a three-factor solution. The majority of FNE 
items loaded on the fear of negative evaluation factor as proposed by Watson and Friend 
(1969). The SAD items, on the other hand, showed an underlying factor structure that 
was different to the original two-factor proposal of social avoidance factor and distress. 
The first factor was a combination of general social avoidance and distress and a novel 
second factor of fear of new situations and strangers was also identified. These two 
factors consisted of a combination of avoidance and distress statements as defined by 
Watson and Friend (1969). Overall, the three factors showed good reliability and internal 
consistency. Based on these findings, it can be surmised that the FNE and the SAD scales 
measure different aspects of social anxiety and have strong psychometric properties. 
Additionally, the brief versions of the FNE scale (Leary, 1983a) and the proposed brief 
SAD scale demonstrated strong correlations with the longer version of both measures at 
two different time points. They also displayed good internal reliability and consistency. 
Moreover, the BFNE appeared to be a suitable alternative for the FNE, encompassing all 
the key aspects of the original measure but in a shorter and more manageable version. 
Finally, the proposed BSAD is a useful and reliable alternative measure of the more 
general aspects social anxiety, for use in cognitive research. 
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In consideration of examining the factors with the attentional bias data from the 
three experimental chapters in this thesis, the results have provided support for the 
validity of using the SAD scale in analogue research. In that, the social avoidance and 
distress factor correlated both with the negative evaluation attentional bias scores (non- 
evaluation condition) from experiment one and with the same word group also presented 
for 500ms (social evaluation condition) from experiment two. Furthermore, the fear of 
new situations and strangers factor from the SAD scale demonstrated a relationship with 
the negative evaluation attentional bias scores (non-evaluation condition) and with the 
somatic sensation attentional bias scores (social-evaluation condition) taken from 
experiment one. It also correlated with the physical threat attentional bias scores for the 
pre-attentive stimuli (social-evaluation condition) in experiment two. These findings 
illustrate the importance of this novel factor relating to fear in determining the nature of 
the attentional bias both at a conscious and pre-conscious level in socially anxious 
individuals. 
Conversely, the results provide limited evidence for the validity of using the FNE 
scale in analogue research. Critically, the fear of negative evaluation factor only 
correlated with the negative evaluation bias scores (500ms) in the social evaluation 
condition from experiment two. It is important to note that caution needs to be taken 
with the attentional"bias scores from the conscious processing trials in experiment two, as 
there is a possibility of attentional fatigue or pre-attentional priming influencing the 
conscious processing trials. Please see the discussion in chapter four for full details of 
these methodological considerations. Interestingly, both the fear of negative evaluation 
and the fear of new situations and strangers factors demonstrated a relationship with the 
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physical threat attentional bias scores from experiment three. Thus validating the use of 
both of these measures in identifying attentional biases in clinical studies incorporating 
individuals with social phobia matched with low anxious controls, 
Epidemiological studies (e. g., Kessler et al., 1998; Stein et al., 1996) may help to 
explain why the SAD scale is more susceptible to attentional biases to socially 
threatening stimuli in the socially anxious. These studies claimed that fear of being 
evaluated negatively (especially public speaking) is a common phenomenon throughout 
the population. For example, this research indicated that although it is an important 
factor in social anxiety, as specified in the DSM-IV, fear of negative evaluation is also a 
key concern within the population as a whole. In contrast, social phobia with more 
extensive fears, involving at least one non-public speaking fear, is the most persistent and 
disabling in the general population. Watson and Friend (1969) designed the SAD 
questionnaire to assess such multiple social fears and suggested that high levels of social 
avoidance and distress were indicative of a more pathological form of social anxiety. 
Taken together, it seems fair to conclude that those who score highly on the SAD scale, 
are experiencing greater levels of social anxiety with more than one social fear. 
Furthermore, in support of the suggestion by Mogg and Bradley (2002), it is this more 
disabling form of social anxiety that is a more sensitive predictor of cognitive biases in 
the socially anxious. 
Comparisons of the normative findings from the FNE and SAD scales with 
previous research yielded similar results. In particular, the Stopa and Clark (2001) study 
reported almost identical means for the FNE (14.26 versus 14.43 in the current study) and 
the SAD (6.27 versus 6.64 in the current study). Watson and Friend (1969) on the other 
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hand, stated slightly higher means for the FNE (15.47) and the SAD (9.11) scales. These 
differences might indicate that either US students experience slightly higher levels of 
FNE. and SAD, or that the norms have shifted over time. Also, the Oei et al. (1991) paper 
reported higher levels of FNE (17.6) and SAD (14.6), this is to be expected however, as 
the scores were taken from clinical sample. 
The current paper suggests that when using the FNE as a group classifier, future 
analogue research should adopt one of two selection criteria. First, by considering the 
mean score method (cf., Stopa & Clark, 2001), the cut off points are 22 or above for high 
FNE and 7 or below for low FNE grouping. Alternatively, by employing the percentiles 
notion (cf., Stopa & Clark, 2001), the grouping for high FNE are 20 or above and low 
FNE are 9 or below. This is the first study to propose social anxiety grouping 
classification based on the SAD measure in analogue population. The suggestion is that 
when determining groups based on this scale, the cut off points are 12 or above for high 
SAD and 2 or below for low SAD. The alternative proposition of high SAD groups 
scoring 9 or above and the low SAD group 3 or below based on percentile cut-offs, may 
make it easier to recruit participants. Interestingly, the mean score from the SAD scale in 
experiment three that included individuals with social phobia was 22.4, with a scores that 
ranged from 16 to 27. This indicates that generalised social phobics as determined by the 
ADIS-IV display higher than the recommended cut off score suggested by this current 
study. However, this study has also shown that high SAD scorers are not only less well 
distributed in a populational sample, but are also more unlikely to take part in research. 
Consequently, having a more lenient high SAD scoring criteria will increase the 
availability of participants for recruitment. 
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The present factor analysis of the FNE items showed that it is a uni-dimensional 
measure and that fear of negative evaluation is spread fairly evenly over the sample of 
students. There were seven FNE items (23%) that loaded either onto two or more factors 
or had a low factor loading. Leary (1983a) also found these items to have a low 
correlation with the scale total taken from a sample of US students and subsequently 
removed them from the BFNE scale. Oei et al. (1991) reported that the FNE consisted of 
the same single factor, with one item displaying weak support for the fear of negative 
evaluation factor. Thus, it seems fair to conclude that this questionnaire measures the 
same construct in analogue and clinical social anxiety samples, as proposed by Watson 
and Friend (1969), namely fear of negative evaluation. 
Interestingly, the SAD items loaded onto the two separate factors of general social 
avoidance and distress and fear of new situation and strangers. This was with the 
exception of eight items (29%) that either jointly loaded onto both of these or had low 
factor loadings. The proposed BSAD does not include these items and still demonstrates 
good internal consistency and reliability. Oei and colleagues (1991) reported that the 
SAD scale comprised of only a social avoidance and distress factor, and that only item 19 
did not load on it. The original Watson and Friend (1969) paper proposed that the SAD 
was a bi-dimensional measure of social anxiety, but that the factors were social avoidance 
and distress. Thus, this current factor analysis has provided initial evidence of a novel 
factor, termed fear of new situations and strangers, together with a general social 
avoidance and distress factor represents the underlying factor structure of the SAD and 
the BSAD scales. There is of course the possibility that the fear of new situations and 
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strangers factor may be particularly salient to the student population in this sample, thus 
this issue needs to be explored further in future research. 
Given the above considerations, the question as to which self-report measure to 
use in future analogue studies becomes highly pertinent. Specifically, the FNE and the 
SAD instruments have been shown to measure different features of social anxiety. 
Additionally, the measures should not be viewed as interchangeable, for it is quite 
possible for participants who have a low score on the FNE, to score highly on the SAD 
and vice versa. The recommendation is to use the scales together, as it may be that 
separate analysis of the scales will yield a more detailed evaluation of processing biases 
in social anxiety, as indeed has been reported already (Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mullins & 
Duke, 2004). It is important to note that there are several analogue studies that have used 
the FNE and found interesting and significant results in facial dot-probe studies (e. g., 
Mansell et al, 1999; Pishyar et al., 2004). Furthermore, if the research design does not 
allow for the use of such lengthy questionnaires, then the suggestion is to use the BFNE 
(Leary, 1983a) and the proposed BSAD. As the results from this study have shown that 
the scales can be reduced and still measure the key aspects of social anxiety, in an 
analogue population. 
A limitation of this study was that it was conducted on a student sample. Future 
research should extend this research not only to an UK clinical sample, but to other 
cultures too (Chapman et al., 1995). Also, the participants were predominantly a female 
sample thus limiting its applicability to men. Moreover, it should be recognised that 
other measures of social anxiety also exist and might need to be appraised together with 
the SAD and the FNE questionnaires, including the Social Phobia Scale and the Social 
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Interaction and Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998), the Social Phobia and Anxiety 
Inventory (Turner, Beidel, Dancu & Stanley, 1989), the Speech Anxiety Thoughts 
Inventory (Cho, Smits & Telch, 2004). All of which would be suitable for analogue 
research, although not as widely used as the current measures. 
To conclude, the SAD and FNE scales are comprehensive and valuable measures, 
with excellent psychometric properties, making them a useful adjunct in the assessment 
of social anxiety. The FNE scale considers the more prevalent populational and social 
anxiety fear of being evaluated in a negative fashion. The SAD instrument measures not 
only general social avoidance and distress, but also specific fears of new situations and 
strangers, encompassing the more general and disabling aspects of social anxiety. United 
Kingdom student norms and possible cut-off point for defining social anxiety groups for 
both questionnaires have been presented. This study has highlighted that care should be 
taken in the consideration of which of these scales to use in future research. Given that 
that these scales are not equivalent, it may be appropriate to employ both, if at all 
possible, to allow for the measurement of all the dimensions of social anxiety. Finally, 
the shortened form of the FNE (Leary, 1983a) has been endorsed and a shortened version 
of the SAD proposed. 
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Chapter Overview 
This thesis has sought to systematically investigate the nature of the attentional 
bias in social anxiety and social phobia to different categories of threatening words using 
the visual dot-probe paradigm. This final chapter will assess how well this aim has been 
addressed. Initially, the results from the visual-dot probe experiments and the 
psychometric study in this thesis will be described. Following this, an examination of the 
issues raised in chapter two, where it was proposed that further research might be useful 
in the understanding of dysfunctional attentional processing in social anxiety and social 
phobia, will be presented. Next, there will be some discussion on the implications of the 
findings from this thesis for the general anxiety theories presented in chapter one and the 
cognitive theories of social phobia detailed in chapter two. Finally, methodological 
issues, directions for future research and clinical implications will be considered. 
Summary of Results 
Experiment one attempted to establish evidence of an attentional bias in an 
analogue sample of individuals experiencing either high or low levels of social anxiety 
using the visual dot-probe task. At the time of designing this experiment, no previous 
studies had explored this phenomenon in high and low socially anxious participants using 
this experimental paradigm with semantic stimuli, although there has been two published 
studies since (Mansell et at., 2002; Pishyar et al., 2004). Based on the previous findings 
from the trait anxiety studies described in chapter one, detailing that high traitanxious 
individuals demonstrated an attentional bias towards threat under conditions of high state 
anxiety, such as during a period of examination stress (e. g., Mogg et al., 1994), this study 
included a social-evaluation condition. The choice of threatening words included in the 
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study was also considered an important factor. Thus, four categories of threatening 
words were selected, three of which related to social anxiety concerns (somatic 
sensations, negative evaluation and social situations). A physical threat word group was 
also included in line with previous dot-probe studies (e. g., MacLeod et al., 1988; 
Asmundson & Stein, 1994), to assess the specificity of the bias. 
As shown in Table 7.1., the results from experiment one showed that, in the non- 
evaluation condition, the high socially anxious participants, in comparison to the low 
socially anxious individuals, displayed an attentional bias towards negative evaluation 
words. In the social-evaluation condition, individuals high in social anxiety 
demonstrated an attentional bias towards somatic sensation words, compared to those 
participants low in social anxiety. Importantly, these attentional bias effects were only 
apparent when the SAD scale, not the FNE questionnaire, was used to determine high and 
low social anxiety grouping. These findings contrasted with two recently published 
analogue dot-probe studies that did (Mansell et al., 2002) and did not (Pishyar et al., 
2004) manipulate levels of social-evaluation. Both of these studies failed to find any 
evidence of selective attention effects towards threatening word stimuli to be associated 
with social anxiety. Thus, experiment one has shown not only that the high socially 
anxious do display attentional biases towards certain categories of threatening word 
stimuli, but that this is also dependent on current levels of state anxiety (i. e., non- 
evaluation and social-evaluation experimental conditions). 
The second experiment in this thesis attempted to replicate the findings from 
experiment one and to extend the research further by exploring the nature of pre- 
attentional processing in social anxiety to semantic stimuli. Pre-attentional processing 
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biases have already been demonstrated in high trait anxious individuals using the Stroop 
(e. g., MacLeod & Hagan, 1992) and visual dot-probe task (e. g., Bradley et al., 1997). 
Therefore, by using the same procedure as in experiment one, with the addition of 
varying the stimulus duration times, pre-attentive processing was also explored. To 
assess pre-conscious attentional processing, the first part of the dot-probe task presented 
word pairs for 14 ms followed by a pattern mask for 486 ms. After a short rest period, 
the second part of the task showed word pairs for 500 ms, in order to assess conscious 
processing as in experiment one. 
The results from this second experiment are presented in Table 7.1. The findings 
showed that there were no pre-attentional processing differences between the high and 
low social anxiety groups to the socially threatening word groups. The high socially 
anxious participants did however selectively attend towards masked physical threat 
words, in comparison to low socially anxious individuals, in the social evaluation 
condition. Thus providing evidence of a pre-attentional bias in socially anxious 
participants to cues that are physically threatening in nature. Mogg and Bradley (2002) 
have also recently reported evidence of a pre-attentive bias in socially anxious 
participants towards threatening faces, under non-evaluation conditions. Taken together, 
it seems fair to suggest that individuals high in social anxiety do display an automatic 
pre-attentional bias towards generally threatening cues represented by a threatening face 
or physically threatening words in a dot-probe task. Disappointingly, there were not any 
significant findings from the conscious processing trials in this study. However, it 
appears that experimental fatigue or affective habituation (Dijksterhuis & Smith, 2002) 
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may have influenced the findings. Once again, the only significant findings were when 
the SAD scale, and not the FNE measure, defined the social anxiety groups. 
The third experiment in this thesis extended the research further by investigating 
dysfunctional attentional biases in participants with generalised social phobia, in 
comparison to matched low anxious controls. As detailed in chapter two, when this study 
was originally designed there was no evidence of an attentional bias associated with 
social phobia using the visual dot-probe task (Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Horenstein & 
Segui, 1997). This was particularly surprising when one considers the consistent 
evidence of an attentional bias associated with negative evaluation words in individuals 
with social phobia in the Stroop studies (e. g., Hope et al., 1990; Maidenberg et al., 1996). 
Additionally, selective attentional biases towards threatening words have been 
established in patients with generalised anxiety disorder (e. g., MacLeod et al., 1986; 
Mogg et al., 1992). With this in mind, experiment three used the same experimental 
paradigm and categories of words as in experiment one. This study did not include a 
social-evaluative condition, as the very fact that an individual with generalised social 
phobia was taking part in the study was considered to be a socially anxiety provoking 
environment for them. 
As detailed in Table 7.1., experiment three's results showed that individuals with 
social phobia attended towards physical threat words, in comparison to the low anxious 
controls. There were no attentional bias effects towards the social threat words 
associated with social phobia. These findings are partially consistent with a recently 
published study by Musa et al. (2003). They found that individuals experiencing social 
phobia without concurrent depression displayed an attentional bias towards physical 
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threat words, though they also reported that this patient group showed a selective 
attentional preference for social threat words too. It is also notable that an attentional bias 
towards physical threat words has also been shown in Amir et al. 's (1996) Stroop study. 
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Study four investigated an interesting finding from the first two experiments. 
This was that levels of social avoidance and distress as indicated by the SAD scale, and 
not fear of negative evaluation based on the FNE measure, identified attentional 
processing differences between the high and low social anxiety groups. Mogg and 
Bradley (2002) have also reported similar findings of the SAD measure being a better 
predictor of attentional bias effects in socially anxious samples using a facial dot probe 
task. With this in mind, together with the lack of psychometric studies on these two 
popular self-report questions (Oei et al., 1991), the main aim of this experiment was to 
explore the psychometric characteristics of the FNE and SAD scales using an analogue 
sample. Essentially, this study wanted to determine whether these scales reliably 
measured the aspects of social anxiety that Watson and Friend (1969) had originally 
designed them to do. Further aims were to provide group cut-off points to guide future 
social anxiety research, and to endorse the BFNE scale and propose a shortened form of 
the SAD scale. The data were taken from a large-scale screening that took place to obtain 
participants for the second experiment in this thesis. 
The psychometric analysis in this study identified that the FNE scale comprised 
mainly a fear of negative evaluation factor. The SAD scale had a two-factor structure 
that was different to the one proposed by Watson and Friend (1969). Partially consistent 
with the original paper, there was a social avoidance and distress factor, but there was 
also a new factor relating to fears of new situations and strangers. It also showed the 
BFNE and the BSAD scales reliably measure the key characteristics of the longer FNE 
and SAD scales. 
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Importantly, the three factors demonstrated different relationships with the 
attentional bias data from the three dot-probe experiments. Please see Table 7.2. for a 
summary of the findings. This table shows that in experiment one, the social avoidance 
and distress factor and the fear of new situations and strangers factor correlated with the 
negative evaluation attentional bias scores (non-evaluation condition). Also, the fear of 
new situations and strangers factor showed a significant relationship with the somatic 
sensation attentional bias scores (social-evaluation condition) taken from the data from 
experiment one. In experiment two, the physical threat attentional bias data for the pre- 
attentive stimuli (social-evaluation condition) demonstrated a relationship with the fear of 
new situations and strangers factor, and the negative evaluation attentional bias data 
correlated with the fear of negative evaluation factor and the social avoidance and 
distress factor when displayed from 500 ms under conditions of social evaluation. Both 
the fear of negative evaluation and the fear of new situations and strangers factors 
demonstrated a relationship with the physical threat attentional bias data from experiment 
three. 
The demonstration of such a relationship between these measures and the 
attentional bias data from the experimental chapters validates the use of both of these 
measures in identifying attentional biases in socially phobic clinical and socially anxious 
analogue studies. These findings highlight not only the importance of the SAD scale in 
identifying the nature of the attentional bias in socially anxious and socially phobic 
populations, but that it is a fear of new situations and strangers that is one of the key 
factors in the attentional bias. Iri contrast, these findings provide limited evidence for the 
validity of using the FNE scale in analogue research, as a significant relationship was 
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only found with the negative evaluation word groups in the second experiment. The FNE 
scale does however appear to be equally as effective as the SAD scale in the detection of 
attentional biases in clinical studies incorporating individuals with social phobia matched 
with low anxious controls. Interestingly, there were no significant relationships with any 
of the factors and the social situation attentional bias data from any of the experiments. 
The lack of a significant relationship suggests that seeing words that are relating to social 
situations confirms the findings from the experimental studies, that these stimuli do not 
elicit any selective attentional biases in socially anxious or socially phobic individuals. 
Table 7.2. Summary of the Relationship Between the Factors from Study Four with 
Each Word Group's Attentional Bias Score from each Experiment 
Negative Somatic Social Physical 
Evaluation Sensation Situation Threat 
Attentional Attentional Attentional Attentional 
Bias Data Bias Data Bias Data Bias Data 
Fear of Negative Experiment 2 No Significant No Significant Experiment 3 
Evaluation (SE = 500ms) Relationship Relationship (500ms) 
(factor 1) 
Social Avoidance Experiment 1 No Significant No Significant No Significant 
And Distress (NE = 500ms) Relationship Relationship Relationship 
(factor 2) Experiment 2 
(SE = 500ms) 
Fear of New Experiment 1 Experiment 1 No Significant Experiment 2 
Situations and (NE = 500ms) (SE = 500ms) Relationship (SE = 14ms) 
Strangers -Experiment 3 
(factor 3) (500ms) 
n. b. NE = Non-Evaluation Condition SE = Social-Evaluation Condition 
14 ms and 500 ms = Stimuli Presentation Times 
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Examination of the Issues 
This section of the overview and evaluation considers the four issues that were 
raised in chapter two, which this programme of work sought to systematically investigate. 
Following this, the implications of the findings will be discussed in relation to the 
aforementioned cognitive theories of anxiety and social phobia. 
Nature of Threat Cues 
After reviewing the literature on attentional processing in social phobia studies, 
the choice of word stimuli included in the visual dot-probe task was considered to be an 
important factor. Indeed, chapter two identified that there were inconsistencies in the 
choice of word selection that had been previously included in dot-probe studies. For 
example, the Stroop studies highlighted that different categories of social threat (e. g., 
anxiety symptoms, negative evaluation and social situation) were important factors in 
identifying attentional processing differences in patients with social phobia (e. g., 
Maidenberg et al., 1996; McNeil et al., 1995). Furthermore, as the physical threat words 
included themes of panic symptoms (Asmundson & Stein, 1994) or themes of violence 
(Horenstein & Segui, 1997), it was felt that more categorically distinct word groups were 
needed. 
The results from experiment one demonstrated the importance of including 
different categories of social threat words. The findings showed that the high socially 
anxious selectively attended toward negative evaluation words in the non-evaluation 
condition and they attended to the somatic sensation words in the social evaluative 
condition, in contrast to the low socially anxious. The suggestion here is, that subtle 
processing differences between the high and low social anxiety groups may have not 
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have been identified without the inclusion of such categorically distinct words. In 
support of this view, both Mansell et al. (2002) and Pishyar et al. (2004) only included 
`general' negative social-evaluative words and failed to find any significant attentional 
bias differences between high and low social anxiety groups. Indeed, these studies 
included a mix of both negative evaluation (e. g., foolish, ridiculed, inadequate) and 
somatic sensation (e. g., blushing, embarrassed, sweating) words, and it may be that 
including such categories under one negative word group could have inadvertently 
confounded any selective attention effects. Thus, it seems fair to propose that the 
inclusion of different categories of social threat words may be an influential factor, 
together with other factors that are discussed throughout this section, in detecting 
dysfunctional attentional processing in social anxiety. 
Additionally, an attentional bias towards physical threat words at a pre-attentional 
level in social anxiety (experiment two) and at a conscious level in social phobia 
(experiment three), when levels of state anxiety were high has been reported in this 
thesis. These findings are consistent with research that showed a pre-attentive bias only 
being apparent in trait anxious participants under state anxious conditions (MacLeod & 
Rutherford, 1992) and in clinically anxious patients at a conscious level of processing 
(MacLeod & Mathews, 1991). Furthermore, a selective attentional preference for 
physical threat words has also been documented in social phobia research using dot-probe 
(Musa et al., 2003) and Stroop (Amir et al., 1996) tasks. Thus, it appears that physical 
threat words are of attentional concern to individuals with social anxiety and social 
phobia. However, it is interesting that the biasing effects did not include any of the social 
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threat words at a pre-attentive level in social anxiety and a conscious level of processing 
in social phobia. Possible explanations for this are provided throughout this section. 
As previously mentioned, the reason for including a negative evaluation, a 
somatic sensation and a social situation word group was to try and tease out the subtle 
selective attentional effects associated with social anxiety and social phobia using these 
categorically distinct social-threat words. Experiment one was the only study in this 
thesis that found the nature of attentional bias in individuals with high levels of social 
anxiety was towards different categories of social-threat (negative evaluation under non- 
evaluative conditions and somatic sensations under social evaluative conditions) word 
groups. The findings from experiment two suggested that at a pre-conscious level, the 
attentional bias was towards physical and not disorder-specific threat. The non- 
significant results from the conscious processing trials were possibly due to experimental 
fatigue and/or priming effects that caused affective habituation of the threat words. The 
latter possibility has important therapeutic implications that are discussed later. The lack 
of processing differences in experiment three between the social phobia group and the 
low anxious controls, to the social-threat words was initially disappointing. In contrast, a 
more recent study by Musa et al. (2003) reported that social phobics (without concurrent 
depression) attended towards social-threat and physical threat words, in comparison to 
non-anxious controls. Thus, in comparing these findings to the results from experiment 
three, it appeared that social phobia was associated with an attentional bias towards 
general social-threat words (e. g., embarrassed, stupid, grotesque), as well as physical 
threat words, and not specific categories of social threat, such as negative evaluation, 
somatic sensation and social situation words. The next section of this evaluation 
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however, will present an alternative explanation regarding the lack of attentional focus to 
somatic sensation, negative evaluation and social situation word groups in experiment 
three. 
Influence of State Anxiety on the Nature of the Bias 
The inclusion of a social-evaluative condition in experiments one and two was 
effective in highlighting differences in the nature of attentional processing in socially 
anxious individuals, compared to low social anxious participants, both at a pre-attentive 
and conscious level of attentional processing. Therefore, in line with the trait anxiety 
studies described in chapter one (e. g., MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Bradley et al., 1997), 
these findings provide further support for cognitive analogue research to include state 
anxiety manipulations to identify processing differences between high and low anxious 
individuals, irrespective of the type of anxiety. Furthermore, dot-probe studies including 
facial stimuli have also found differences in attentional processing, when levels of social- 
evaluative anxiety have been manipulated (e. g., Mansell et al., 1999; Mansell et al., 
2003). For example, Mansell and colleagues (2003) found no significant attentional bias 
effect between individuals who were high and low in social anxiety when levels of state 
anxiety were low. In the social-evaluation condition however, the high socially anxious 
group attended away from both positive and negative faces in comparison to the low 
social anxiety group. 
Experiment three did not specifically include a social-evaluation condition. It is 
notable however that the state anxiety scores for the social phobia sample (M = 51.3), 
compared to the low anxious controls (M = 25.9), indicated that the experimental 
situation together with the ADIS-IV interview increased levels of state anxiety in the 
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social phobia sample and not the low anxious controls. The suggestion here is that 
increases in state anxiety may have different effects on individuals with clinical levels of 
generalised social phobia than the analogue sample with high levels of social anxiety. 
More specifically, experiment three found that a high level of state anxiety resulted in no 
evidence of an attentional bias towards disorder-specific threat in individuals with social 
phobia, whereas experiment one found that individuals with high levels of social anxiety 
attended towards somatic sensation words when levels of state anxiety were high. 
Interestingly, similar findings to experiment three, have been reported in Stroop 
studies that have induced social-evaluative conditions with social phobia patients (Amir 
et al., 1996). In fact, the level of state anxiety in the social phobia sample reported in the 
Amir et al. (1996) study was the same (M = 51.6) as the generalised social phobia sample 
in experiment three. Indeed, t tests revealed no significant differences between the state 
anxiety score in experiment three and the Amir et al. (1996) study, t(29) = . 15, p= . 40, d 
= . 05. Furthermore, in line with experiment three, Amir and colleagues also found no 
evidence of selective attention towards social-threat words, only an attentional bias 
towards physical threat words when levels of state anxiety were high. Thus, providing 
further evidence that the attentional bias towards social-threat words associated with 
social phobia may be suppressed when levels of state anxiety are high, although an 
attentional bias towards physical threat words are still evident. 
In further support, the individuals with social phobia in the Asmundson and Stein 
(1994) study also had high levels of state anxiety (M = 53.3), which was similar to 
experiment three (M = 51.6), and also found no attentional bias effects to social threat 
words, when compared to low anxious controls. Additionally, the social phobia sample 
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without concurrent depression that demonstrated an attentional bias towards negative 
evaluation words in the Musa et al. (2003) study, had relatively low levels of state 
anxiety (M = 43.1). The level of state anxiety in this study was significantly lower than 
in the social phobia study in this thesis (experiment 3), t (43) = 2.76, p= . 004, d= . 75. In 
contrast, levels of state anxiety were as low (M = 43.1) in the Horenstein and Segui 
(1997) sample of social phobics, as in the Musa et al. study, but there was no evidence of 
an attentional bias in this study to social threat words. Also, the individuals with social 
phobia with concurrent depression in the study by Musa and colleagues, who did not 
demonstrate any evidence of an attentional bias had similarly high levels (M = 50.8) of 
state anxiety as in experiment three, t(48) = . 16, p= . 40, d= . 04. Taken together, with 
the exception of the Horenstein and Segui study, experiment three concurs with the 
findings from the previous Stroop (Amir et al., 1996) and dot-probe (Asmundson & 
Stein, 1994; Musa et al., 2003) studies. Essentially, when levels of state anxiety are high 
in individuals with social phobia, it appears to have the effect of attenuating the strength 
of the bias towards social-threat words. 
The results from experiment one however, do not concur with this assumption, as 
the attentional bias towards somatic sensation words was not suppressed in a sample of 
high socially anxious participants under high levels of state anxiety (M = 51.6). An 
alternative proposal to the possibility that socially anxious and socially phobic samples 
may react differently under high levels of state anxiety is that the method of inducing 
state anxiety was different in experiment one and three. The former experiment included 
a social-evaluation condition by focusing on one of the key concerns of the socially 
anxious, believing that they would have to give a speech. The latter study did not 
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deliberately manipulate state anxiety by such an induction technique instead it was 
increased by a variety of fears. These included being in a strange social situation (the 
experiment) and having to describe previous life events that occurred from a variety of 
socially and generally anxious situations (the ADIS-IV interview). The arousal of more 
general "social concerns and fears in social phobia, compared to just one specific speech 
related anxiety in social anxiety, may have been a possible explanation for the results. In 
that, social anxiety relating to giving a presentation could result in an attentional focus 
towards somatic sensations relating to displaying physical signs of anxiety seen as a 
weakness to high socially anxious individuals (e. g., Spurr & Stopa, 2002). It is notable 
that the Amir et al. (1996) Stroop social phobia and the Mansell et al. (1999) dot-probe 
social anxiety studies, both manipulated social evaluation in a similar way to experiment 
one. They did not however include words relating to anxiety symptoms, so it is not 
possible to generalise this view any further at this point. 
Overall, the suggestion here is that different types of social anxiety provoking 
situations may lead to differences in the nature of the selective attention towards threat. 
More specifically, a social-evaluative condition (e. g., believing that they would have to 
give a speech and be recorded and assessed) would motivate the socially anxious person 
to attend to specific speech related threat, such as anxiety-related somatic sensations 
(nervous, blushing). Whereas, when levels of state anxiety are increased due to 
experiencing a situation that causes the person to recall a variety of social anxiety and 
indeed general anxiety provoking situations (such as the ADIS-IV), the attentional focus 
of people with social phobia may be towards more general threat, possibly at the cost of 
processing social-threat related words. It does however seem fair to suggest that somatic 
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sensations could be a response to both social-evaluative and more general social threat 
situations, but as the social phobia sample in experiment three were not expecting to be 
evaluated after the dot-probe task, as the social anxiety sample were in experiment one, 
this may have reduced the attentional focus to such visible signs of anxiety. Future 
research needs to incorporate themes of threatening stimuli that are specific to the 
induction used to raise levels of state anxiety in cognitive experimental research to 
explore this proposal further. 
Participant Selection 
The issue of participant selection in the two analogue studies proved to be an 
important one, in relation to the choice of self-report social anxiety questionnaire that can 
reliably identify any attentional bias effects. Experiment one initially used the FNE scale 
to determine levels of fear of negative evaluation in the students that were screened to 
take part in the study. This questionnaire was originally chosen because it was the most 
popular choice in previous social anxiety analogue research (e. g., Bradley et al., 1997; 
Mansell et al., 1999). However, when the reaction time data was analysed using the FNE 
scale to determine high and low groups, there were no significant main effects or 
interactions. The data were reanalysed using the SAD scale (based on a median split of 
participant scores), which participants also completed on the day of the experiment. This 
revealed differences in attentional bias between the high and low social anxiety groups. 
Due to this finding, experiment two used the SAD scale to define high and low social 
anxiety groups, but also included the FNE scale at screening and on the experimental day. 
Once again the SAD scale was the best predictor of attentional bias in the social anxiety 
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groups and social anxiety groups based on the FNE questionnaire yielded no significant 
results. 
In view of these two findings, study four involved a detailed psychometric 
analysis of these questionnaires. Exploratory factor analysis revealed that the FNE scale 
consisted of one factor, namely fear of negative evaluation. The SAD scale comprised a 
social avoidance and distress factor and a fear of new situations and strangers factor. 
Interestingly, it was the two factors from the SAD scale that demonstrated more evidence 
of a relationship with the attentional bias data from experiments one and two that 
included an analogue non-clinical sample. Interestingly, both the fear of negative 
evaluation factor (FNE scale) and the fear of new situations factor (SAD scale) 
demonstrated a relationship with the physical threat attentional bias data from experiment 
three, that included a generalised social phobia sample and low anxious matched controls. 
This suggests that the validity of both questionnaires is apparent in studies including 
generalised social phobia participants and low anxious controls. Overall, study four 
conf inns not only that the two questionnaires reliably measure different aspects of social 
anxiety, but also that the findings from the correlational analysis also suggest that the 
SAD scale is a more sensitive measure of attentional bias in socially anxious samples. 
A further aim of study four was to explore shortened versions of both 
questionnaires, as it has been argued that the FNE and SAD scales took too long to 
complete (e. g., Cox & Swinson, 1995; Heimberg, 1994; Leary, 1983a). There was 
already a brief version of the FNE designed by Leary (1983a), but there was no published 
version of a shortened form of the SAD scale. Consequently, this study devised a BSAD 
scale based on the main factor loadings from the psychometric analysis of the SAD scale. 
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Psychometric analysis showed that both the BFNE and BSAD questionnaires 
encompassed the key characteristics of the longer versions. Thus, if future studies wish 
to include both measures, but feel that the FNE and SAD scales are too long, the BFNE 
and BSAD measures provide suitable alternatives. 
In experiment three, the recruitment of individuals with generalised social phobia 
was based on the ADIS-IV. The participants also completed the SAD and FNE scales on 
the experimental day to ensure that they had high levels of social anxiety. The 
recruitment criteria used in this experiment did successfully identify individuals with 
generalised social -phobia, but it may not have allowed for the full exploration of the 
degree to which any secondary diagnoses, such as generalised anxiety disorder, could 
have influenced the participants' mental health and indeed attentional processing. It does 
however, seem fair to safely surmise that at the very least, the generalised social phobia 
participants in experiment three where also experiencing high levels of generalised 
anxiety disorder. The difficulty lies within the determination of the possible interaction 
between these two anxiety disorders and their influence on the nature of attentional bias 
in this experiment. Indeed, the generalised anxiety disorder literature shows that both 
Stroop (e. g., Mathews & MacLeod, 1985) and dot-probe (e. g., MacLeod et al., 1986) 
studies reported an attentional bias towards physical threat to be associated with this 
disorder. Thus, in consideration of the psychological processes associated with this 
sample of generalised social phobia, it is possible that the saliency and the potency of the 
threat stimulus, together with the influence of generalised anxiety, and being in a 
generally state anxious frame of mind, may have been influential factors in the attentional 
bias towards physical threat, which was found in this experiment. 
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Theoretical Implications - Cognitive Theories of Anxiety 
The current programme of work has shown that the notion of disorder-specific 
threat in social phobia needs to be considered in more detail by Eysenck (1992) and 
Williams and colleagues (1988). It is quite possible, as highlighted in experiment three, 
that an individual with generalised social phobia may have a secondary or dual diagnosis 
of generalised anxiety disorder. Thus, the disorder-specific threat could be related not 
only to themes of social-threat, but also to stimuli relating to worry and physical-threat. 
On the other hand, it is also quite possible that the psychological processes of individuals 
with social phobia include the preferential processing of physical threat, as well as social 
threat. This raises the question of exactly what is disorder-specific threat in social 
phobia. The suggestion here is that these theories do not fully address the issue of 
secondary or dual diagnosis anxiety disorders when predicting the nature of the 
attentional bias in anxiety disorders. Both theoretical perspectives need to consider what 
type(s) of threatening information capture attentional processing not only within each 
anxiety disorder, but also in relation to the issue of secondary or dual diagnosis anxiety 
disorders too. Essentially, these theories do not make it clear how secondary or dual 
diagnosis anxiety disorders influence the nature of selective attention to threatening 
information. 
Overall, if one decides that disorder-specific information in social anxiety relates 
to themes of social-threat only, then the results from the pre-attentional processing trials 
in experiment two do not provide support for the Williams et al. (1988). This model 
predicted that pre-attentive biases towards socially threatening words were associated 
with individuals high in social anxiety, in a state anxious condition. The results however, 
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only found evidence of a pre-attentional attentional bias towards physical threat in high 
socially anxious participants, when compared to the low socially anxious. In contrast, 
Eysenck (1992) predicted that those high in anxiety would display a pre-attentional bias 
towards disorder-specific and generally threatening stimuli too. Experiment two's results 
provided partial support for Eysenck's theory, in that the attentional focus in socially 
anxious individuals at the pre-attentive stage of processing is only towards physical threat 
which represent a more general threat, and not social threat, during social-evaluative 
manipulations. 
MacLeod (1991) proposed that the key difference between high trait anxious and 
clinically anxious individuals is that the former were able to consciously override certain 
dysfunctional attentional processing. Interestingly, the three information-processing 
studies in this thesis supplied some evidence to support this notion. More specifically, 
even though experiment two found pre-attentive biases towards physical threat words 
under social evaluative conditions to be associated with social anxiety, experiment one 
did not reveal any significant conscious selective attention effects towards this word 
group in the high or low socially anxious groups. This indicates, in line with MacLeod 
(1991), that some sort of attentional control could be evident in the conscious processing 
of physical threat in high socially anxious participants, which was not apparent in 
experiment two at a pre-attentive level. In further support, experiment three found that 
individuals with social phobia attended towards physical threat at a conscious level of 
processing, whereas the control group attended away. Taken together, the findings from 
experiment one, two and three of this thesis provide support for MacLeod (1991), who 
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stated that differences between trait and clinically anxious individuals are that the latter 
are unable to consciously avoid attending to physical threat cues. 
However, MacLeod's (1991) prediction was not supported with the findings from 
the socially threatening word groups. In fact, the reverse effect appeared to occur in the 
analogue studies. There was no evidence of a pre-attentive bias to the negative 
evaluation, social situation and somatic sensation word groups in high socially anxious 
individuals in experiment two. Although in experiment one, the high socially anxious 
attended towards the negative evaluation (non-evaluation condition) and somatic 
sensation (social-evaluative condition) words at a conscious level of processing. 
Furthermore, experiment three showed that people with social phobia displayed no 
attentional bias effects towards the socially threatening word groups at a conscious level 
of processing. Overall, although the series of dot-probe studies suggested some evidence 
to support MacLeod's view with the physical threat words, they equally provided 
evidence to contradict this theory with the socially threatening word groups. This 
suggests that this viewpoint is perhaps too simplistic and that other factors such as the 
type and saliency of the threat, together with current levels of state anxiety, also influence 
the nature of the processing in socially anxious and socially phobic individuals. 
A final point to consider is the attentional behaviour of the low socially anxious 
groups in experiment one, two and three, in relation to the more recent anxiety theories of 
Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) and Mogg and Bradley (1998). They both argued that 
individuals with low levels of anxiety would not attend to relatively low indicators of 
threat (such as threatening words), but would attend to more severe forms of threat (such 
as threatening pictures). In support, where there were significant differences between the 
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high and low socially anxious groups, the low anxious participants tended to attend away 
from the threat words, irrespective of whether they were in a social-evaluative situation 
or not. Thus, individuals low in social anxiety do not appear to direct their attention to 
threatening words, in comparison to individuals with high levels of social anxiety. 
However, as pictorial stimuli were not included in this thesis, no conclusions can be 
drawn on more severe forms of threat. 
Theoretical Implications - Cognitive Theories of Social Phobia 
This thesis also aimed to address the aforementioned theoretical conflict between 
the three different cognitive perspectives of social phobia (Beck et al., 1985; Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), in relation to their predictions regarding the 
focus of the attentional bias to threatening information. Beck et al. (1985) and Rapee and 
Heimberg (1997) proposed that in a social situation, an individual with social phobia 
would attend towards threat cues related to the self (e. g., physical signs of anxiety, 
thoughts of negative evaluation from others) and to external disorder-specific threat (e. g., 
the social situation or negative reactions from others). In contrast, Clark and Wells 
(1995) hypothesised that a pre-occupation with negative evaluation is apparent in social 
phobia irrespective of being in a social-evaluative situation. Furthermore, during a social 
encounter, the person with social phobia would focus solely on interoceptive information, 
such as negative beliefs in their performance and the fear of showing physiological signs 
of anxiety. 
The three studies exploring this theoretical conflict used different categories of 
words designed to adequately evaluate these predictions. The negative evaluation and 
somatic sensation word groups were included as, according to these theoretical 
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perspectives, they represent the interoceptive concerns of an individual with social 
phobia. A social situation word group was included to assess external threat processing 
and a physical threat word group to determine whether the attentional bias is specific to 
the disorder. 
Experiment one provided partial support for the Clark and Wells (1995) model, as 
there was an attentional bias towards negative evaluation words in the high socially 
anxious individuals, compared to the low socially anxious, in the non-evaluation 
condition. These findings suggested a pre-occupation with themes of negative evaluation 
being apparent in socially anxious individuals, without them actually being in a socially 
threatening situation. Conversely, the findings did not support the predictions by Beck 
and colleagues (1985) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997), who both argued that the 
individual with social phobia needed to be in a social situation for such selective effects 
to become apparent. In the social-evaluation condition, the findings partially support all 
three theoretical perspectives. The high socially anxious demonstrated an attentional bias 
towards somatic sensation words, in contrast to the low socially anxious who looked 
away. Although, this supports the three cognitive theories of social phobia, the predicted 
bias towards negative evaluation words during this experimental induction was not found. 
Overall, this finding provided evidence that the primary attentional concern in individuals 
with social anxiety is towards anxiety symptoms and not negative evaluation, when in a 
social-evaluative situation. 
The results from experiment two and three of a pre-attentive bias towards physical 
threat words in high socially anxious individuals, in the social-evaluative condition, and a 
conscious attentional bias towards physical threat in social phobia respectively, did not 
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provide support for any of the cognitive perspectives of social phobia. In particular, all 
three theories predicted that the attentional bias in social phobia is towards social threat 
only (e. g., Beck et al., 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). However, 
if one considers that secondary anxiety disorders in social phobia are extremely common 
(e. g., Brown & Barlow, 1992) and that generalised anxiety disorder is the most common 
secondary anxiety disorder in social phobia (e. g., Barlow et al., 1986, Turner et al., 
1991), then the selective processing of physical threat could be a disorder-specific 
stimuli. Further evidence to support this notion can be obtained from the generalised 
anxiety disorder attentional studies. For example, the literature exploring the nature of 
the attentional bias in generalised anxiety disorder patients has shown that they 
demonstrate an attentional bias towards physical threat, both in Stroop (e. g., Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1985; Mogg et al., 1995) and visual dot-probe (Mathews et al., 1986; Mogg et 
al., 1992) tasks. Additionally, an attentional bias towards physical threat in social 
phobics has been reported in Stroop (e. g., Amir et al., 1996) and dot-probe (Musa et al., 
2003) research. Taken together, it seems fair to propose that in individuals with 
generalised social phobia, the influence of secondary anxiety disorders or possible dual 
diagnoses, may have an interactive effect on the nature of the bias to physical threat and 
as such is a disorder-specific word category in information processing studies. An 
alternative view however, is that in the disorder of social phobia, both biases may 
actually be evident. Indeed, this may possibly be due to environmental and/or 
developmental factors, the individual could actually have started with an attentional bias 
towards physical threat that generalised to social threat, as the social phobia developed. 
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Thus, making it part of the psychological process in individuals with social phobia that 
biases exist both to social-threat and to physical threat. 
Overall, the dot-probe experiments in this thesis did not fully determine whether 
the attentional bias in socially anxious and socially phobic individuals was towards 
internally related threat cues and/or external threat information. Although, as all three 
studies did not find evidence of an attentional bias towards the social situation words 
whatsoever, it seems fair to propose that there does not seem to be an attentional bias to 
this type of external related threat in social anxiety and social phobic individuals. This is 
in direct contrast to Beck et al. (1985) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997), who both 
predicted an attentional bias towards external threat. It is notable however, that facial 
dot-probe studies have reported that high socially anxious individuals (e. g., Mogg & 
Bradley, 2002; Pishyar et al. 2004) and people with social phobia (Mogg et al. 2004) 
attend towards negative facial expressions. Importantly, as this type of threat is 
considered to be an external cue, these studies provide support for the aforementioned 
theoretical perspectives. Conversely, the lack of attentional bias towards social situation 
words provided support for the Clark and Wells (1995) model, who suggested that the 
primary attentional concern in individuals with social phobia is towards interoceptive 
threat cues. Also, there is evidence from the facial dot-probe studies of an attentional 
bias away from aversive facial stimuli, classified as an external threat, in participants 
with high levels of social anxiety (e. g., Mansell et al., 1999) and with socially phobia 
(e. g., Chen et al., 2002). Thus, the issue of whether the attentional focus is externally 
and/or internally cued in social anxiety and social phobia still requires further research. 
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The findings from the information processing experiments in this thesis have 
suggested that the key cognitive perspectives of social phobia need to take into account 
several other factors. More specifically, how the influence of state anxiety impacts on the 
nature of pre-attentional and attentional processing associated with social anxiety and 
social phobia. Also, how the presence of secondary disorders or a dual diagnosis in 
persons with social phobia affects the nature of attentional processing. 
Methodological Considerations and Future Research 
One important methodological consideration that arose in experiment one was a 
design issue with the number of critical trials presented to the participants. In that, there 
were 12 words per threat category presented once to the participants throughout the dot- 
probe task. Essentially, this allowed for three data points to contribute to the mean 
reaction time score of which there were four possible connotations. These were the four 
different threat word groups, the probe position and the threat word position (that could 
be presented in the upper or lower part of the screen). There was concern that the number 
of data points that represented a mean reaction time score for a participant may not be 
sufficient. This concern was even more apparent once the data had been `cleaned' to 
remove the extreme scores, as in certain cases one or two reaction times scores 
determined the data point mean. Thus, in experiment two and three the number of critical 
trials was increased. The former experiment used 16 threatening words per word 
category and due to the exploration of pre-attentive and conscious processing trials 
requiring two dot-probe tasks, each word was presented a total of three times throughout 
a task. This resulted in the increase of the number of critical data points for each mean 
reaction time score to a maximum total of four. Experiment three also included 16 words 
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per word group, and only presented them once to the participants throughout the dot- 
probe trial, once again allowing for four data points to contribute to the mean reaction 
time score. To overcome this potential problem in future research, the suggestion here is 
to include as many critical trials as possible into the research design. 
A further issue in experiment two, was in relation to the participants completing 
the pre-attentive trials before the conscious processing trials. This may have given rise to 
a methodological problem, because by ordering the trials in this way, the possibility of 
fatigue or affective habituation (Dijksterhuis & Smith, 2002) effects influencing the 
results from the conscious processing trials cannot be ruled out. The reason for presenting 
the pre-attentive trials first was to address the concerns of Fox (1996), who argued that 
intermixing conscious and pre-conscious trials caused pre-attentional priming effects. 
Fox proposed that presenting the conscious trials either before, or intermixed with, the 
pre-conscious trials would heighten the participants' awareness that threat was being 
presented, and thus pre-attentively activate a search for further threat. Fox suggested that 
this was a confounding factor when trying to determine pre-attentive biases to threat. 
Consequently, experiment two was designed in direct consideration of this 
proposal and presented the pre-conscious dot-probe trials before the conscious trials. 
However, by doing this, it could have inadvertently caused the participants to get tired or 
bored with the second part of the dot-probe task that presented the trials for 500ms. 
Luecken et al. (2004) proposed an alternative explanation for the non-significant findings 
in experiment two. Their study also found that by presenting the pre-attentive trials 
before the conscious processing trials disrupted evidence of attentional bias in the 
conscious task. The authors suggested that consistent with a previous proposal by 
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Dijksterhuis and Smith (2002), repeated exposure to threatening stimuli at a pre-attentive 
level of attentional processing, causes affective habituation in the conscious processing 
trials. Essentially, Dijksterhuis and Smith suggested that being constantly exposed to " 
threat pre-consciously could decrease the intensity of the threat at a conscious level. An 
important point to note however is that experiment two found evidence of a pre-attentive 
bias to physical threat being evident without conscious priming, which challenges Fox's 
argument that automatic processing differences are only apparent in the presence of 
unmasked trials. However, the designing of experiment two in this way may have 
inadvertently resulted in the participants getting used to the threat at a pre-conscious 
level, thus reducing the intensity of the word categories at a conscious level of attentional 
processing. Further research is needed on this issue, which could include the participants 
completing the pre-attentive dot-probe task first, followed by a longer break period (e. g., 
a day or a week) before they attempted the conscious processing task. The inclusion of 
such a long time-scale between the two tasks should reduce any effects of affective 
habituation in the conscious processing trials. ' Also, this experiment needs to be 
replicated to provide further support for this notion of affective habituation. 
The majority of the participants that took part in the studies in this thesis were 
taken from a student sample experiencing various levels of social anxiety. It was argued 
in chapter two that the results from the exploration of attentional biases in high socially 
anxious individuals can be generalised to persons with social phobia (e. g., Turner et al., 
1986). Experiment one and experiment three however, indicate that this may not be the 
case, as during high levels of state anxiety, the high socially anxious displayed an 
attentional bias towards somatic sensation words, whereas the social phobics attended 
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towards physical threat. It was argued earlier in this section that this dissimilarity could 
be attributable to differences in the factors that heightened the state anxiety. Insofar as, 
the high socially anxious group were given a social evaluative induction, whereas the 
experimental setting and the ADIS-IV interview may have led to an increase of anxiety in 
the social phobia sample. However, an alternative explanation mentioned earlier in this 
section, may be that individuals high in social anxiety and individuals with social phobia 
possess different processing biases. To explore this further, future research needs to 
directly compare high socially anxious and social phobia samples, together with low 
anxious controls. Within the experimental design, all participants need to be exposed to 
the same social-evaluative induction. This will allow for a determination of where the 
differences and similarities are between the different groups. To date, there are no 
published studies that have explored this issue comparing the attentional processing in 
socially anxious and socially phobic individuals with one another. 
A limitation of this programme of work was in the nature of the control groups 
used in the three experimental chapters. It should be pointed out that although they all 
reported lower levels of social avoidance and distress equivalent to an average person, 
they still may not be a homogeneous group. Some of the low anxious participants were 
likely to be low in levels of anxiety and depression, therefore making them suitable 
control participants. Other individuals may have been less appropriate because they had 
other personality traits such as high levels of repression, as assessed by the SDS scale. In 
all three information-processing studies included in this thesis the low socially anxious 
groups scored slightly but significantly higher on the SDS scale, than the high social 
anxiety or generalised social phobia group. High scores on this scale are associated with 
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a repressed coping style, which has in turn been associated with health problems. For 
example, there is evidence to show that a repressed coping style is a potential 
confounding variable in studies looking at cognitive biases in anxiety (e. g., Derakashan 
& Eysenck, 1997; Mogg et al., 1994). The proposal is that individuals who report low 
levels of anxiety, but have a high score on the SDS, behave like high anxious individuals 
in physiological tests. It was not within the scope of this thesis to investigate the 
heterogeneity of each group of low socially anxious individuals, but it would certainly 
provide a further avenue' of research. 
A further issue is that the effects of gender differences were not covered in this 
thesis. As noted in chapter two, most studies have found a slightly higher rate of social 
phobia in females than in males (e. g., Magee et al., 1996; Schneier & Johnson, 1992). 
Nevertheless, there were no hypotheses concerning differences between the genders from 
the cognitive theories of social phobia (Beck et al., 1985; Clark & Well, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). Furthermore, the small cell sizes and the predominance of females in 
the studies made it difficult to conduct a post hoc analysis of the effects of gender. 
However, as men and women are socialised to possess somewhat different kinds of social 
competencies, to view themselves in different ways, and motivated to convey somewhat 
different images of themselves to other people (e. g., Deaux & Major, 1987), gender 
differences would make an interesting topic for further research. 
Another consideration relating to the issue of participant selection was with 
regards to the generalised social phobia group. Whilst conducting the ADIS-IV 
interviews it became very clear that although it was easy to ascertain the presence of 
social phobia, the possibility of secondary or indeed a dual diagnosis of generalised 
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anxiety disorder were also important factors in at least 75% of the sample. It is unclear 
how this influenced the findings in experiment three, due to a relatively small sample size 
(n = 16) not permitting further post hoc analysis. Future research is needed looking not 
only at individuals with social phobia, but also the influences of comorbid or secondary 
disorders on the nature of dysfunctional attentional processing. Studies could include 
larger samples of participants and examine several categories of social phobia. They 
could include not only people experiencing relatively `pure' generalised social phobia, 
but also generalised social phobia with generalised anxiety disorder and `pure' 
generalised anxiety disorder. Such an approach would provide further insight into the 
effects of other anxiety disorders on the nature of dysfunctional attentional processing at 
a conscious and pre-attentive level of processing. 
A final point to consider is the choice of stimuli used in the series of dot-probe 
studies included in this thesis. As detailed in chapter two, at the time of designing these 
studies there was no published research that had found evidence of an attentional bias 
towards threatening words in individuals with social anxiety and social phobia 
(Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Horenstein & Segui, 1997). This was felt to be unusual 
considering the fact that Stroop studies (e. g., Hope et al., 1990; Mattia et al., 1993) had 
found quite consistent evidence of an attentional bias towards social threat words. Also, 
evidence of an attentional bias towards disorder specific threat has been found in 
individuals suffering from spider phobia (Watts et al., 1986), generalised anxiety disorder 
(Mogg et al., 1992) and panic disorder (Horenstein & Segui, 1997). Consequently it was 
felt that a systematic investigation into selective attentional processing to threat words 
was needed. 
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Since then, facial stimuli have been used to explore attentional bias towards 
aversive faces in social anxiety (e. g., Mansell, 1999, Mogg & Bradley, 2002) and social 
phobia (Chen et al., 2002; Mogg et al., 2004) has been reported. It has been argued that 
facial stimuli represent a more ecologically valid social threat to social anxiety and social 
phobia, as angry faces denotes signs of disapproval from others (e. g., Mogg & Bradley, 
1998). The viewpoint here is that the pairing of an angry face with a neutral face may 
actually be presenting a similar type of social threat to a person with high levels of social 
anxiety. Indeed, a neutral face could be interpreted as a sign of disinterest or boredom, 
which individuals with social anxiety or social phobia may find equally as threatening as 
an angry face. A further consideration would be to include pictorial stimuli, as the trait 
anxiety literature using such stimuli has reliably demonstrated preferential attentional 
focus towards affective pictures (Mogg et al., 2000; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). 
Obviously, it would be difficult to design pictures relating to negative evaluation, but it 
would be interesting for future research to include pictorial stimuli relating to social 
situational threat (such as an interview setting, person giving a speech or a social 
gathering), including the display of anxiety symptoms (e. g., the person sweating or 
blushing), to ascertain how this influences the nature of the attentional bias in social 
phobia and social anxiety. 
Clinical Implications 
This section of the thesis looks at the clinical implications from the research 
presented throughout this programme of work, of which two main areas of interest have 
arisen. First, a consideration of how the findings from the dot probe studies may help to 
inform the attentional re-training studies, which is an exciting new avenue of cognitive 
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research. Second, and in a related vein, the role of affective habituation on reducing the 
intensity of an attentional bias to threatening information will be presented and discussed. 
The exploration of attentional processing biases in anxious populations is 
motivated by the hope that it will lead to new or better methods for treating and 
preventing emotional disorders. Mathews (1996) suggested that the notion of attentional 
processing biases maintaining anxiety (e. g., Beck et al., 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Eysenck, 1992; Williams et al., 1988) is validated and upheld by the successful use of 
cognitive therapy to treat anxiety disorders such as social phobia. A promising new area 
of cognitive research is that of attention re-training procedures to modify biases in 
information processing. Interestingly, Mathews and MacLeod (2002) recently 
demonstrated that the inducement of attentional biases in anxious populations followed 
by repeated training sessions, might be able to reduce levels of anxiety in these anxious 
participants. Additionally, work on attention by MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, 
Ebsworthy and Holker (2002) showed that the processing styles typical of individuals 
with high levels of anxiety could be induced experimentally. This series of experiments 
involved an extensive training phase, where one group of participants were always 
exposed to the targets being found in the threat location (threat-trained) and another 
group always had the target replacing the non-threat location (neutral trained). The 
training phase was followed by a non-contingent test task. This showed that those who 
were threat-trained attended to new threat words, and were slowed if the target appeared 
elsewhere, similar to the dysfunctional attentional processing displayed by highly anxious 
individuals. Critically, this threat-training procedure did not increase the participants' 
level of state anxiety, but it did make them experience heightened level of stress in a later 
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unsolvable anagram task. In a related vein, Amir, Beard, Klump, Elias, Brady and Hewitt 
(2004) have recently presented evidence suggesting that the attentional bias in social 
phobia can be modified. They trained treatment seeking socially phobic individuals 
using a modified version of the probe detection paradigm with aversive and positive faces 
as stimuli. The modification programme directed their attention to positive stimuli, 
which was achieved by the dot-probe replacing the happy face on 80% of the trials. The 
dot-probe task was effective in changing biased attention away from threat, and also 
reduced social anxiety symptoms in the patients. 
So how do the results from this series of dot-probe studies aid in the advancement 
of this new and exciting area of research? First, experiment one showed that in the 
social-evaluation condition, those high in social anxiety attended towards somatic 
sensations (e. g., blushing, nervous, tense). Indeed, all three theoretical perspectives 
(Beck et al., 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) and research (e. g., 
Mansell et al., 2003) have proposed that a heightened awareness of physiological 
sensations relating to anxiety symptoms is a characteristic of social anxiety. Thus, the 
proposal here is to apply the aforementioned training technique that incorporates words 
relating to somatic sensations and to also include a similar social-evaluation instruction as 
in experiment one, in order to heighten attentional awareness to the displaying of anxiety 
symptoms. Once the participants have completed the training phase, they would then 
actually give a speech and rate their levels of anxiety, together with an independent 
rater's assessment, to see if they felt and appeared less anxious having completed the 
training phase. Also, as attentional bias to physical threat appears to be a theme that has 
emerged in experiments two and three and published research (e. g., Amir et al., 1996; 
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Musa et al., 2003), this word group could also be included into a similar training 
programme. Furthermore, although an attentional bias to negative evaluation words was 
only evident in experiment one, the fairly strong research evidence (e. g., Hope et al., 
1990; Musa et al., 2003), together with the theoretical proposals that fear of negative 
evaluation is a central construct in social phobia (Beck et al., 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), provide support for the inclusion of this word group in such 
an attentional training procedure. 
The possibility that the experimental design in experiment two may have led to 
affective habituation of the threat stimuli in the participants may have possible clinical 
implications similar to the attentional training notion presented above. Recently, 
Dijkersterhuis and Smith (2002) argued that repeated exposure to threat could decrease 
the intensity of reaction in the individual, thus reducing attentional biasing effects. They 
termed this phenomenon `affective habituation'. In support, a study by Luecken et al. 
(2004) found this to be the case when they presented the same stimuli pre-consciously 
and then consciously to individuals using the dot-probe task. Their results indicated that 
the evidence of attentional biases in trait anxious individuals was disrupted in the 
conscious processing trials. The authors argued that the lack of differences between the- 
high and low trait anxious groups in the conscious processing trials was because of 
affective habituation to the threat words in the masked trials. In view of this, it seems fair 
to speculate that the findings from the unmasked trials in experiment two were influenced 
in a similar way. This was mainly due to the possibility that even though different threat 
words were presented in each level of processing, they were still the same categories of 
threat. Furthermore, the same stimuli were presented three times within each trial, thus 
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exposing the participant to the same categories of threat six times in total. Taken 
together, it seems fair to suggest that the participants became less reactive to the intensity 
of the threat due to affective habituation effects, which of course would be extremely 
useful in reducing selective attention to threat in clinical populations. 
Leucken et al. (2004) proposed that if the repeated pre-attentive exposure to threat 
does disrupt dysfunctional attentional processing patterns at a more conscious level of 
processing, then the clinical implications were that the inducement of affective 
habituation in clinically anxious individuals may help to reduce dysfunctional threat 
processing. Furthermore, as selective attention to threat is considered to be influential in 
the development and maintenance of a clinical anxiety disorder (e. g., Eysenck, 2004; 
Mathews, 1994), such techniques to reduce the threat related attentional focus would be 
of great therapeutic benefit. Further research is needed to systematically investigate the 
influence of affective habituation on trait anxious or socially anxious analogue 
individuals and clinical populations with anxiety disorders. The aim would be to 
ascertain whether exposing the individual repeatedly to threatening stimuli pre- 
consciously, does indeed mediate dysfunctional attentional biases at a conscious level of 
processing. This could be achieved by using a visual dot-probe task designed so that in 
the pre-attentive trials the dot always replaces the threat word. The proposal here is that 
this would pre-attentively heighten the attentional focus to threat. Thus, if affective 
habituation is. effective, the following set of conscious processing trials can ascertain 
whether there is an attentional bias away from the threat, or whether there are no 
attentional bias effects whatsoever, or whether this technique still results in the highly 
anxious participants selectively attending to the threat stimulus. The use of psycho- 
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physiological measures would also be a complimentary adjunct, as the reduction of 
physiological reactions (e. g., heart-rate and skin conductance responses) would be a 
further indicator that the person is less aroused by the conscious presentation of threat 
cues following the continual pre attentive exposure to threat. 
Final Conclusions 
This thesis has attempted to explore the interaction between social anxiety or 
social phobia, state anxiety, and the kinds of threatening word stimuli that elicit 
dysfunctional attentional biases. It has highlighted the importance of the presence of a 
social-evaluative situation on the nature of the attentional bias in social anxiety at a pre- 
attentive and conscious level of attentional focus. More specifically, experiments one 
and two have identified not only differences between high and low socially anxious 
individuals in the nature of their attentional focus to different categories of threat words, 
but that this is also as a function of current levels of state anxiety. Experiments two and 
three have also indicated that both the socially anxious at a pre-attentive level and the 
socially phobic at a conscious level of attentional processing, attend to physical threat 
cues. This programme of work has also shown the importance of selecting the most 
effective self-report questionnaire to identify actual attentional bias effects in socially 
anxious individuals. The findings from study four suggested that although the FNE scale 
is the most popularly used questionnaire in social anxiety research, the SAD scale may 
actually be a more sensitive measure in the determination of selective attentional 
processing. 
Finally, the implications for the theoretical perspectives of social phobia (Beck et 
al., 1985; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) that can be drawn from the 
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dot-probe studies presented in this thesis were partially supportive of an internal 
processing style in social anxiety. Indeed, the results from the first experiment provided 
evidence of an attentional bias towards negative evaluation (non-evaluative condition) 
and somatic sensation (social-evaluative condition) being associated with social anxiety. 
Additionally, all three dot-probe studies did not find any selective attentional effects with 
the social situation words, which are considered to be an external threat cue to socially 
anxious and socially phobic individual. However, there was a notable lack of any 
attentional bias effects towards the internally cued social-threat groups (somatic 
sensations and negative evaluation words) in experiments two and three, which was in 
direct contrast to not only the social phobia theories mentioned above, but also the 
cognitive perspectives of anxiety (e. g., Eysenck, 1992; Williams et al., 1988). 
Essentially, all these theoretical notions predicted an attentional bias towards disorder- 
specific threat cues in anxious individuals, and this was not consistently found in the dot- 
probe studies. Also, the attentional bias towards physical threat cues found at a pre- 
attentive level in social anxiety and a conscious level in social phobia was not predicted 
by any of these theories. Notably, this is with the exception of Eysenck (1992) who 
predicted an attentional bias towards general and socially threatening stimuli. Overall, 
this thesis has shown that theoretical perspectives, together with future research, need to 
consider several issues. These include the influence of additional anxiety disorders, levels 
of state anxiety, and the actual cause of the elevated state anxiety, in the development and 
maintenance of dysfunctional cognitive processing in the complex and multifaceted 
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Appendix One 
For each of the following words, please rate by encircling the appropriate number 
on the scale, how far you think a person suffering from SOCIAL ANXIETY would 
consider the word to be threatening. Essentially, social anxiety is characterised by the 
fear of social situations and interactions with other people. A major problem is the fear 
of being judged and evaluated negatively by other people, and this can lead to feelings 
such as inadequacy, humiliation and anxiety. In the unlikely event that you are unable to 
recognise a word then please circle it as unfamiliar. 
Very 
Neutral Threatening 
Aboard 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Bleach 1 2 3 4 5 6 7' Unfamiliar 
Gravel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Mohawk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Baboon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Dizzy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Coral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Violin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Jelly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Barge 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Average 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Chateau 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Nausea 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Schools 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Please Remember to Rate the Words from the Socially Anxious Perspective! 
Very 
Neutral Threatening 
Mitt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Able 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Standard 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Hospital 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Chin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Mild 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Fresh 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Flexible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Modulate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Audience 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Returned 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
General 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Gymnast 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Back 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Wash 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Above 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Yeast 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Normal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Tables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Vector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Gallon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Mocked 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Very 
Neutral Threatening 
Tinted 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Waterfall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Cultivate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Opportunity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Quadrant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Mattress 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Flavour 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Coarse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Embarrassed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Transformed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Desk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Bird 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pipe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Rise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Breeze 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pollen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Yardstick 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Evolution 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Radish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Volume 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Disease 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Very 
Neutral Threatening 
Version 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Liquid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Squeak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Network 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Station 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Nature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Rookie 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Periodicals 1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Suffocating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Fabric 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Barrel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Import 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Bakery 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Icicle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Budget 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Terrace 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Shuttle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Fence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Wharf 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Voucher 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Factory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pathetic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Very 
Neutral Threatening 
Exterior 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Nutshell 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ignition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Periscope 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Barrister 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Paper 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Graze 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Journal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Starlit 1 2. 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Near 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Plug 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Lodge 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Penny 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Fur 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Dating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Season 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Oblong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Device 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Package 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Cushion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Gadget 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Very 
Neutral Threateni ng 
Paddle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Calculate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Dandelion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Entry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Cable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Stroke 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
String 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pattern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Deflect 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Texture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Formula 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Saddle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Driver 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ride 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Herd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Patio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Flock 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Bracelet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Business 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Trembling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Phenomena 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Necklace 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Very 
Neutral Threateni ng 
Tomorrow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Biscuit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Lacquer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Heather 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pumpkin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Drum 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Buoy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Teapot 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Gallop 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Saw 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Disgraced 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Warehouse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Tempo 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Rhyme 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Creek 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Salad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Dollar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Castle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Eclipse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Deflect 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Dawn 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Very 
Neutral Threateni ng 
Base 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Interview 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Household 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Scarf 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ruler 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Breezy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Shovel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Shampoo 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Gallery 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Bicycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Cologne 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Sheep 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Meeting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Natural 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Slope 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Berry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Nozzle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Zipper 1 2 3 4 5 6 7. Unfamiliar 
Coffin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Rocket 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Chalk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Very 
Neutral T hreatening 
Flash 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Point 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Young 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Manufacture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Contraption 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ancient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Battery 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Breathless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Downstream 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Balance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Quarter 1 2 3 4 .5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Arc 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Dam 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Lever 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Apple 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Tiptoe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Native 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Bucket 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Stable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Freeflowing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Hobby 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Very 
Neutral Threatening 
Stake 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Dissolve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Bungalow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Phonograph 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Locomotive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Quail 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Route 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Hue 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pot 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Oven 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Deep 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Engagement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ambassador 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Taking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Modern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Quilt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
River 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Piano 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Crest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Deadly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ladder' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Garbage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Very 
Neutral Threatening 
Neutron 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Tip 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
New 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Zigzag 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Nickel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pillow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ascend 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Palace 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Buffer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Orbit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Album 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Gasping 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Geology 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pancake 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Circuit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pocket 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Sporty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ginger 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Rubber 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Zebra 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Grape 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Sunshine 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Very 
Neutral Threatening 
Mobility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ancestor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Sprinkle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Failure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Circular 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Channel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Angular 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Fling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Piped 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Functionary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Teaspoon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Speech 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Travel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Collect 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Transit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Gardening 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Versatile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Detergent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Conductor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ambulance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Flowering 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pictorial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Very 
Neutral ' Threatening 
Vibration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Inventor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Powdered 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Banner 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Outlet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Bouquet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Lullaby 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Sweating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Armchair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Feathered 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Transient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Lengthwise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Voluminous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Chimney 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Trumpet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Coconut 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Winking 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ample 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Spray 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Orchard 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Abridge 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Very 
Neutral Threatening 
Soulful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Satin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Swamp 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Bagpipe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Dialling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Dusty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Orbit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Anchovy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Cabaret 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Curly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Olive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Hairpin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Madeira 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ketchup 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Skylark 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Shaky 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Tweed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Wrap 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Limb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Leaflet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Oatmeal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Very 
Neutral Threatening 
Bean 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Reed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Periodically 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Characterise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Inept 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Purge 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Snowball 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Youngish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Mushroom 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Postmark 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Socialise 1 2 3 4 5' 6 7 Unfamiliar 
President 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Beaker 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Cruise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pebble 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Veneer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Turbine 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Biology 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Freight 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Blanket 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Fatal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Perch 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Very 
Neutral Threatening 
Octopus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Potting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Clam 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Isle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Wooden 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Engine 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Presentation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Metropolitan 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Parsley 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Zoology 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Tissue 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Symbol 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Paddle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Raisin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Doctor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Cattle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Highway 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Fifteen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Agent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Broad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Spectrum 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Driveway 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Neutral Threateni ng 
Collapse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Aeration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Cloudy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Groove 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Gradual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Saffron 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Thimble 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Matrix 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Oblong 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ravine 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Auburn 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Lightheaded 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Subscribing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Brick 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Motel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Roofing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Apricot 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Sausage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Paddock 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Humiliated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Miniatures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Neutral Threatening 
Carrot 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Donkey 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Chalky 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Funnel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Embryo 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Jumper 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Inadequate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Quotations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Sander 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Almond 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Batch 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Eagle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Frothy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Oracle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Cancer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Saddle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pentagon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Charcoal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pillar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Safari 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Quince 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Spongy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Neutral Threatening 
Assessment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Originally 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Gagging 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Zooming 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Tailor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Palate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Alfresco 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Harmonic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Bank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Airframe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Crescent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Bookcase 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Mackerel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Party 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Flooring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Postcard 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Junction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Trousers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Leather 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Cabinet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Tracing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Compiler 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Elephant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Diameter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Advanced 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Mile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Land 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Antenna 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Whiskey 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Violence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Creation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Straw 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Lemon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Twist 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Angel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Hour 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Mind 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Lotion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar " 
Pillow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Coal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pope 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 




Palpitations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Amalgamation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Guitar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Miller 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Adjacent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Fin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ink 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Examination 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Sovereignty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Sphere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Freely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Nucleus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Tractor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Facet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Glaze 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Juice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Venus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Public 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Enough 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Inch 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Tool 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Waist 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Array 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Viola 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Haven 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Layman 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Cement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Criticised 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ingredient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Golf 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Wash 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Bounce 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Greasy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Faint 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Honey 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Hereby 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Seaside 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Tumbler 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Academy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Suburb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Aerial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ballad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Saline 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Crowd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Grass 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Commerce 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Railroad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Foam 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Gate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Canyon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Heater 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Illness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Mustard 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Sunset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Breeze 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Lens 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Chip 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Furnish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Utility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pitcher 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Builder 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Mars 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Port 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Tense 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Onion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Seal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Dome 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Towel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Adjoining 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ivory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Fleet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Bunch 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Tract 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Tray 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Loop 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Coronary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Snapshot 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Geographical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Transmission 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Cloth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Porch 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Route 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Grown 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Broader 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Emperor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ridiculed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Footprint 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Blowing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Rolling 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pond 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Coal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Cotton 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Shadow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Pottery 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Channel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Injury 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Silver 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Portion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Brother 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Attic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Candy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Mixture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Logical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Entry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Sheet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Curve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Blushing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Cupboard 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Nowadays 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Currency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Lethal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Marrow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Floating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Stockade 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Ghetto 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Arched 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Cubism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Magnum 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Emergency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Furniture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Parish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Vacant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Easter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Herald 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Inferior 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Barnyard 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Nine 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
File 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Elevator 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Landlord 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Nut 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
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Pat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Conversation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Conventional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Fibre 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Chain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Circulation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Philosopher 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Saloon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Jungle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Stupid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Dipped 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Nominal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Avocado 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Trailer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Poultry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 
Stage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfamiliar 












Word Mean DeStd v Dev Dev 
aboard 2.3 1.4 performance 4.8 1.8 cultivate 1.3 0.8 
bleach 1.8 1.0 opportunity 3.1 1.4 voucher 2.1 1.2 
gravel 1.5 0.9 quadrant 1.2 0.6 factory 5.2 1.6 
mohawk 2.1 1.7 mattress 1.3 0.6 pathetic 1.9 1.2 
baboon 2.1 1.7 flavour 1.1 0.3 exterior 1.5 0.9 
dizzy 3.8 1.5 coarse 2.1 0.9 nutshell 1.4 0.5 
coral 1.3 0.6 embarrassed 5.5 1.1 ignition 1.4 0.7 
violin 1.6 0.9 transformed 1.8 0.8 periscope 3.1 1.8 
jelly 2.2 1.4 desk 1.4 0.7 barrister 1.8 1.2 
barge 2.1 1.1 bird 1.3 0.6 paper 1.7 0.9 
average 2.4 1.3 pipe 1.2 0.4 graze 1.6 1.0 
chateau 1.6 0.9 rise 1.9 0.9 journal 1.3 0.8 
nausea 4.4 1.5 breeze 1.2 0.4 starlit 1.9 1.2 
schools 3.5 1.7 pollen 1.3 0.6 near 1.2 0.4 
index 1.4 0.7 yardstick 2.2 1.5 plug 1.2 0.4 
mitt 1.3 0.8 evolution 1.6 1.1 lodge 1.1 0.2 
able 2.8 1.4 radish 1.4 1.1 penny 1.2 0.4 
standard 2.8 1.5 volume 1.6 1.1 fur 1.2 0.4 
hospital 3.5 1.7 disease 2.8 1.5 pen 3.9 2.1 
chin 1.7 1.1 version 1.5 0.7 dating 1.4 0.9 
fresh 1.4 0.7 liquid 1.2 0.4 season 1.1 0.3 
flexible 1.5 0.8 squeak 2.4 1.7 oblong 1.5 0.6 
modulate 1.5 0.9 network 2.7 1.5 device 1.5 0.6 
audience 5.5 1.4 station 2.1 1.7 package 1.1 0.2 
returned 1.9 1.2 nature 1.5 1.1 cushion 1.5 0.9 
general 1.3 0.8 rookie 2.3 1.6 gadget 1.3 0.6 
gymnast 1.4 0.8 periodicals 1.7 1.2 paddle 1.8 1.0 
back 1.6 1.2 suffocating 5.2 1.0 calculate 1.2 0.3 
wash 1.5 1.0 fabric 1.2 0.4 dandelion 2.3 1.2 
above 2.0 1.0 barrel 1.1 0.2 entry 1.2 0.4 
yeast 1.1 0.3 import 1.2 0.4 cable 2.4 1.3 
normal 2.4 1.0 bakery 1.4 1.0 stroke 1.1 0.3 
tables 1.5 0.9 icicle 1.3 0.5 string 1.2 0.4 
vector 1.4 0.7 budget 1.4 0.6 pattern 1.8 0.9 
gallon 1.1 0.2 terrace 1.5 0.9 deflect 1.2 0.4 










driver 2.0 0.9 breezy 1.2 0.4 freeflowing 2.2 1. 
ride 1.6 0.6 shovel 1.1 0.3 hobby 1.6 0. 
herd 1.6 1.1 shampoo 1.1 0.3 stake 2.1 1. 
patio 1.2 0.6 gallery 1.6 0.9 dissolve 1.5 0. 
flock 1.5 1.2 bicycle 1.4 0.6 bungalow 1.1 0. 
bracelet 1.0 0.0 cologne 1.4 0.8 phonograph 1.2 0. 
business 2.5 1.0 sheep 1.5 0.9 locomotive 1.2 0. 
trembling 4.9 1.8 meeting 4.4 1.8 quail 1.5 1. 
phenomena 1.9 1.1 natural 1.5 1.1 route 1.4 0. 
necklace 1.1 0.2 slope 1.3 0.7 hue 1.5 0. 
tomorrow 2.6 1.8 berry 1.2 0.4 pot 1.2 0. 
biscuit 1.1 0.2 round 1.1 0.3 oven 1.2 0. 
lacquer 1.1 0.2 nozzle 1.2 0.6 deep 1.8 1. 
heather 1.1 0.3 zipper 1.6 1.1 engagement 3.7 1. 
pumpkin 1.3 0.8 coffin 2.6 1.6 ambassador 2.9 2. 
drum 1.4 0.6 rocket 1.6 1.0 taking 1.9 1. 
buoy 1.2 0.4 chalk 1.6 1.2 modern 1.6 1. 
teapot 1.1 0.3 flash 1.5 0.8 quilt 1.1 0. 
gallop 1.6 0.7 point 2.6 2.0 river 1.2 0. 
saw 1.3 0.6 young 1.2 0.4 piano 1.3 0. 
pet 1.2 0.5 manufacture 1.1 0.3 crest 1.3 0. 
disgraced 5.2 1.1 contraption 1.6 0.8 deadly 3.4 1. 
warehouse 1.3 0.6 ancient 1.3 0.8 ladder 1.8 1. 
tempo 1.8 1.3 battery 1.1 0.2 garbage 1.9 1. 
rhyme 1.3 0.6 breathless 4.1 1.4 neutron 1.3 1. 
creek 1.4 0.5 downstream 1.5 0.9 tip 1.4 0. 
salad 1.1 0.3 balance 1.5 0.9 new 1.7 1. 
dollar 1.2 0.4 quarter 1.1 0.3 zigzag 1.3 0. 
castle 1.4 0.7 arc 1.1 0.3 nickel 1.1 0. 
eclipse 1.8 1.0 dam 1.3 0.5 pillow 1.1 0. 
deflect 1.4 0.5 lever 1.1 0.3 ascend 1.8 1. 
dawn 1.1 0.3 apple 1.1 0.2 palace 1.8 1. 
base 1.3 0.8 'tiptoe 1.4 0.6 buffer 1.1 0. 
interview 4.8 1.9 native 1.3 0.6 orbit 1.3 0. 
household 1.4 0.8 bucket 1.2 0.6 album 1.2 0. 
scarf 1.1 0.2 stable 2.0 1.3 gasping 3.9 1. 
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pancake 1.1 0.2 lullaby 1.2 0.5 bean 1.2 0. 
circuit 1.2 0.6 sweating 4.4 1.7 reed 1.1 0. 
pocket 1.1 0.3 armchair 1.2 0.4 periodically 1.6 0. 
sporty 1.8 0.8 feathered 1.2 0.2 characterise 2.0 1. 
ginger 1.3 0.8 transient 1.6 0.8 inept 5.1 1. 
rubber 1.3 0.8 lengthwise 1.2 0.6 purge 1.9 1. 
zebra 1.2 0.3 voluminous 1.9 1.3 snowball 1.3 0. 
grape 1.2 0.3 chimney 1.4 0.6 youngish 1.5 0. 
sunshine 1.2 0.3 trumpet 1.4 0.6 mushroom 1.2 0. 
mobility 1.8 0.8 coconut 1.1 0.3 postmark 1.1 0. 
ancestor 1.5 1.0 winking 2.1 1.1 socialise 4.9 1. 
sprinkle 1.2 0.4 ample 1.5 0.8 president 2.2 1. 
failure 5.5 1.6 spray 1.2 0.6 beaker 1.2 0. 
circular 1.1 0.3 ashamed 4.8 1.5 cruise 2.3 1. 
channel 1.4 0.9 orchard 1.1 0.3 pebble 1.2 0. 
angular 1.2 0.4 abridge 1.2 0.4 veneer 1.6 1. 
fling 1.8 0.9 soulful 1.8 1.1 turbine 1.3 0. 
piped 1.1 0.3 satin 1.2 0.6 biology 1.5 0. 
functionary 1.5 1.0 swamp 1.8 1.0 freight 1.2 0. 
teaspoon 1.1 0.2 bagpipe 1.2 0.3 blanket 1.1 0. 
speech 5.5 1.7 dialling 1.5 0.9 fatal 3.9 1. 
travel 2.7 2.2 dusty 1.1 0.3 perch 1.5 1. 
collect 1.4 0.8 orbit 1.2 0.4 octopus 1.6 1. 
transit 1.8 1.0 anchovy 1.2 0.8 potting 1.1 0. 
gardening 1.2 0.4 cabaret 1.7 0.8 clam 1.8 1. 
versatile 2.2 1.3 curly 1.2 0.6 isle 1.4 1. 
detergent 1.2 0.6 olive 1.1 0.2 wooden 1.8 1. 
conductor 1.8 1.2 hairpin 1.1 0.3 engine 1.2 0. 
ambulance 2.9 1.5 madiera 1.3 0.6 presentation 5.2 2. 
flowering 1.3 0.6 ketchup 1.1 0.3 metropolitan 2.2 1. 
pictorial 1.5 0.8 skylark 1.1 0.3 parsley 1.2 0. 
vibration 1.7 0.8 shaky 3.8 1.8 zoology 1.1 0. 
inventor 1.6 1.0 tweed 1.4 0.9 tissue 1.4 0. 
powdered 1.2 0.6 wrap 1.2 0.4 symbol 1.5 0. 
banner 1.4 0.7 limb 1.3 0.6 paddle 1.1 0. 
outlet 1.5 0.8 leaflet 1.3 0.5 raisin 1.1 0. 
bouquet 1.1 0.3 oatmeal 1.2 0.4 doctor 3.1 1. 
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